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Choice of Entity: Pass Through Entities
by John W. Lee
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Aggregate-Entity Discontinuities in Subchapters K and S
Both Subchapter K and Subchapter S provide for entity-level determination
of the entity's taxable gain or loss, I.R.C. §§ 703, 1363; but the results of such
computations are passed through to the owners of the entity with each partner or
S Corporation shareholder then individually reporting his or her "distributive" or
"pro rata" share respectively, I.R.C. §§ 702, 704, 1366, and 1377(a).
Concommitantly, the partner or S shareholder may then withdraw tax-free such
share of taxable gain as well as his or her investment, I.R.C. SS 731 and 1368,
reduced, however, by any prior distributions and by his or her share of any prior
loss, I.R.C. §§ 705(a)(2) and 1367(a)(2). Beyond this pass-through commonality,
Subchapters K and S manifest discontinuities in most respects, generally
reflecting an "aggregate" approach in the case of Subchapter K conflicting with an
"entity" approach in the case of Subchapter S. See generally, Coven & Hess, The
Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal, 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 569
(1983); Eustice, Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the
Pass-Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary Proposals) 39 Tax L. Rev. 345 (1984).
Even this pass-through core of the subchapters exhibits some aggregate-entity
discontinuities between a partner's "distributive share" under Section 704 and an S
shareholder's "pro rata share" under Section 1377(a). The various aggregate-entity
discontinuities in Subchapters K and S generally (1) present traps for the unwary
(albeit by-and-large mercifully less deadly since the Subchapter S Revision Act of
1982), (2) often still inflict unjust and not policy-driven burdens (administrative,
substantive, and/or tax planning) generally on S corporations; and (3) contain tax
planning advantages for the well-advised. Ironically, elimination of such features
of Subchapter S was a fundamental goal of the 1982 reforms. See Joint Comm.
Staff, Recommendations for Simplification of Tax Rules Relating to S
Corporations 8 (JCS-24-80, April 30, 1980) ("Staff S Recommendations"). In short,
aggregate-entity discontinuities between Subchapters K and S manifest a
fundamental failure of tax policy. The pervasive differences between tax
treatment of an S corporation and a partnership may be superficially obscured if
only the pass-through features are focused on. Thus, in direct response to a
Congressman's question in the 1987 House "Tax Treatment of Master Limited
Partnership" Hearings a former Treasury official testified that there was no
difference between a Master Limited Partnership and a Subchapter S corporation
(except as to the latter's numerical ceiling on owners).
B. Aggregate-Entity Concepts in Subchapters K and S.
I. Subchapter K.
Commentators and cases agree that Subchapter K manifests a hybrid
blend of "aggregate" and "entity" features. See Bennett v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 470, 479 (1982), citing I McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners 1 1.102 (1977); Crane & Bromberg, Law of
Partnership 16-29 (1968). A close study, however, of Subchapter K and its
background teaches that an aggregate core predominates in Subchapter K.
Such aggregate core seeks to treat the partner as if he or she were the
individual entrepreneur in order to affect a more equitable result. The Code's
treatment of "a partnership largely as an aggregate of individuals" was
intended to offer flexibility "and to preserve some degree of individuality, for
the members of small partnerships." Department of the Treasury, the
President's 1978 Tax Program: Detailed Descriptions and Supporting Analyses
of the Proposals 118 (1978), reprinted in Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting Proposals for Tax Reductions and Reform, H. D.
283, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 277 (1978).
Subchapter K, however, employs the entity approach (1) to provide
simplicity in determining and computing the entity's income and loss, I.R.C.
S 703; (2) to provide (optional) simplicity, intended particularly for large
partnerships, primarily as to contributions to the partnership, S 704(c), and
transfers a of partnership interest, IoR.C. §S 741 and 743(a); but see I.R.C.
§S 751 (applying a modified aggregate approach as to transfers of a
partnership interest to the extent of a pro rata share of ordinary income
assets of the partnerships); and (3) occasionally to prevent abuses,
particularly as to partnership-partner transactions, I.R.C. S 707. The 1954
Code House Bill, would have imposed a more pervasive entity approach,
particularly as to contributions of property with built-in gain or loss. The
1954 Code Senate Bill, as was its general approach, followed more closely the
1939 Code aggregate predominating aggregate-entity hybrid, but still adopted
entity features as to contributions and transfers of interests, albeit providing
aggregate elections which it anticipated small partnerships would use for the
more equitable results. And the legislative history of the 1954 Code
Conference Bill (which largely adopted the Senate Bill) stated that while the
1954 Code uses an "entity" approach in partner-partnership (non-partner
capacity) transactions under Section 707, "[n]o inference is intended,
however, that a partnership is to be considered as a separate entity for the
purpose of applying other provisions of the Internal Revenue laws if the
concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is more appropriate
for such provisions." H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954). But
in the end Subchapter K failed to provide a single coordinated pattern
affording predictability, as once had been called for. See Rabkin & Johnson,
The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 949
(1942).
2. Subchapter S
The still-born 1954 Senate version of Subchapter S would have yielded
no discontinuities with Subchapter K. A small (entrepreneurial) corporation
and its ten or fewer individual shareholders, all of whom were actively
engaged in the business, would have been entitled to have Subchapter K apply
in determining their federal income taxation. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 119, 453 (1954). This "check-the-box for Subchapter K to apply" model
has been frequently advocated to Congress. See .g, Hearings (on Issues
Relating to Passthrough Entities) on H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, and
H.R. 4448 before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the
House, Committee on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1986)
(Statement of John S. Pennell) ("Passthrough Entities Hearing"). Additionally,
under the 1954 Senate provisions two features were present which were to
reappear sooner or later in the Subchapter S, namely only one class of stock
was permitted "to avoid possible complications in the taxtion of preferred
stock dividends not earned in the year distributed." S. Rep. No. 1622, supra
at 119. And presumably to require parity as to self-employed retirement
plans (which were not tax favored or exempt until 1962 with full parity still
20 years later in 1982), S shareholder-employees could not under the Senate
Bill participate in any tax-exempt plan of the S corporation. Id. at 119. In
summary, the Senate Bill hoped to
make it possible for small corporations which are essentially
partnerships to enjoy the advantage of the corporate form of
organization without being made subject to possible tax
disadvantages of the corporation. It will thus eliminate the
influence of the Federal income tax in the selection of the
form of business organization which may be most desirable
under the circumstances. S. Rep. No. 1622, supra at 119.
Such elimination of tax rules and choice of business entity unfortunately was
not to be. Subchapter S (which had not been contained in the House Bill) was
eliminated in Conference, where Subchapter C and K innovations tended to
die in 1954. And the provision may have been provocative as well as
innovative since its target group (at least in 1958) was taxpayers earning
more than the lower Subchapter C inside corporate bracket (then 30%) but
less than the upper Subchapter C inside bracket (then 52%). Compare S. Rep.
No. 1983, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 1008
with Driscoll, Subchapter S - Its Role in the Tax Laws 3 House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., Tax Revision Compendium 1726 (Comm.
Prnt. 1959) ("Tax Revision Compendium").
Four years later in 1958 Congress enacted Subchapter S, but it shifted
radically from an election into Subchapter K's aggregate-entity world to an
election into a conduit-entity approach. The goal thus shifted, at least
partially, from tax neutrality to a capital subsidy for "middle income"
entrepreneurs. In the 1958 version of Subchapter S even integration followed
an entity approach with actual, and year-end deemed, distributions losing in
the S shareholder's hands their character in the S corporation's hands, except
as to long-term capital gains. The 1982 Subchapter S revisions adopted an
"aggregate" passthrough "virtually indistinguishable" from Subchapter K as to
(1) timing and taxability of entity income and loss in the hands of owners, and
(2) cash withdrawal of investment and share of retained earnings. But from
its 1958 beginning and continuing after the 1982 revisions in most other
significant aspects, Subchapter S follows an entity approach, usually in
contrast with Subchapter K aggregate rules.
[Flor example, corporate liabilities are not included in a
shareholder's basis for his interest in the corporation, and
special allocations are not a feature of S corporations. A
transferee of an S corporation interest is not entitled to
"step-up" the basis of his share of the entity's assets to
reflect his purchase price. Joint Committee Staff, Tax
Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. 11 (1987) ("MLP Hearing Pamphlet").
The only articulated Congressional policy for the Subchapter S entity
approach was simplification. See S. Rep. No. 1983, supra at 1958-3 Cum.
Bull. 1009. In this context Subchapter S may be viewed at least in part as
more of a resurrection of the House's 1954 aborted entity approach to
Subchapter K than the Senate's 1954 aggregate-entity version of Subchapter
S. This may be indicated by Chairman Wilbur Mills' preference for the entity
approach as to partnerships for simplification. See Hearings onAdvisory
Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J and of the Internal Revenue
Code before the House Comm. on Ways & means, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 13
(1959) (remarks of Chairman Mills).
On the other hand, the entity-corporate form may have been thought
necessary to encourage conversion of closely held C corporations to S
corporation status without otherwise necessary toll charges on purging
accumulated earnings and other C attributes. Indeed, most early S elections
were made by existing C corporations. See Panel Discussion on Income Tax
Revision before the House Comm. on Ways & means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 92
(1959) (colloquy by Chairman Mills). Such C to S conversions constituted a
standard 1954 Code tax planning technique for close C corporations facing
unreasonable compensation problems or accumulated earnings problems, as
noted by the Senate Finance Committee and commentators. See Nicholson,
Report on Subchapter S, Tax Revision Compendium, supra at 1741.
C. Non-Tax Discontinuities Between Partnerships and S Corporations
The major, and often decisive, non-tax difference between an S corporation
and a general partnership is limitation of liability. The reality of such limitation
is probably less than the conventional wisdom and is practically limited to tort
liabilities. Even there the owner-operator may be liable for his/her own
negligence as to the injury or in supervising the tortfeasor. The other traditional
corporate advantages (continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and
centralized management) simply are not present in most S corporations,
particularly if most of the shareholders actively participate in the business.
D. Deep Structure Analysis: Conflicting Policies of Entrepreneurial-Like Treatment
and "Simplification"
Under a deep structure policy analysis aggregate pass-through (a
rationalized Subchapter K) should be limited to entities in which (most of the
owners actively or materially participate in the business. Conversely separate
entity treatment (perhaps with conduit passthrough as in current Subchapter S)
should apply wherever the (most of) the owners do not materially participate.
Measured against this model, current tax treatment of limited partnerships
(particularly if large) and of owner-operator S corporations by and large falls
short. The PAL rules, however, reflect this policy tolerably well.
Another policy may, however, support the separate entity treatment of an S
corporation: simplicity. The historical record is mixed. And if such simplicity is
sound and effective, a one time -- all the way election for S corporations and
partnerships should be the pattern.
II. SUBCHAPTERS K AND S's AGGREGATE-ENTITY DISCONTINUITIES
A. Introduction
Probably the most widely recognized and criticized Subchapters K and S
discontinuities lie in the area of entity liabilities for "outside" basis purpose and
distributive vs. pro rata share of income and especially loss, particularly as to
special allocations of "built-in" gain or loss and retroactive and special
adjustments for owner-operator services. Differences as to purchase/sales of an
interest and owner buy-outs can be as sharp if optional Subchapter K features are
chosen abut largely disappear if they are not. Distributions cause disparities
primarily in the case of S corporations that carry a C E&P past--a C
"Doppelgaenger."
The true "sleeper" discontinuity may ultimately arise as to "partner
capacity" and "non-partner capacity" transactions where the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984's amendments to Section 707(a) lay a foundation on the Subchapter K-
side analysis as to whether the payment-distribution bears partner-entrepreneur
risks. Such analysis could clarify a broad range of Subchapter K transactions.
Subchapter S's complete lack of a similar framework proves that the apparent
simplicity of per-unit of ownership allocations and single class of stock is not real.
B. Loss Pass Through
1. Basis Limitation: Share of Entity Liabilities
a. Subchapter K
Section 704(d) limits current deductibility of a partner's distributive
share of partnership losses to the partner's basis in his/her partnership
interest with indefinite carryover of suspended losses until the parter obtains
basis. And Section 705(a)(1) adjusts the partner's basis in his/her partnership
interest upwards for entity level income; while Section 705(a)(2) adjusts such
basis downwards for distributions by the partnership and the partner's
distributive share of losses of the partnership.
By virtue of the interplay between the allocation of liability rules of
Section 752 and the contribution to a partnership basis determination rules of
Section 722, a partner's "share" of entity-level liabilities is treated under an
''aggregate" approach as a "constructive" cash contribution by the partner to
the partnership, hence giving rise to a basis increase. See Burke & Freil,
Allocating Partnership Liabilities, 41 Tax L. Rev. 173, 174 n.4 (1986).
Conversely, a decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities is treated
as a constructive cash distribution. See generally, Lee, Constructive Cash
Distributions 22nd Wm. & Mary Tax Conference 129, 130.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e), incorporating an aggregate approach, provides
for "sharing" of partnership liabilities, distinguishing between (a) recourse and
nonrecourse liabilities, and (b) general and limited partners. The regulation
further states that recourse liabilities are determined in accordance with the
partnership ratio for sharing losses but a limited partner's share of such
recourse liabilities is limited to unpaid capital contributions. In contrast, a
liability as to which none of the partners has any personal liability, e.g., a
non-recourse liability, is shared by all partners, including limited partners, in
the proportion in which they share profits under the partnership agreement.
See generally, Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A
Defense of the Traditional System Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 Calif. L.
Rev. 41 (1986). The seeming rationale is that (a) recourse liabilities upon
default would trigger creditor claims against limited partners only to the
extent of unpaid (or perhaps returned) capital contributions under local law;
and (b) while any general partner would be severally liable for the entire
claim, under subrogation he/she would have a claim for contribution from the
other general partners in the proportion in which they shared losses. In
contrast, nonrecourse liabilities would not be borne by any of the partners in
the event of default, but rather would be paid off, if at all, from partnership
profits and capital. Burke & Friel, Allocating Partnership Liabilities, 41 Tax
L. Rev. 173, 178 (1986); Lee, supra at 135.
The existing Section 752 regulations (Congressionally mandated in 1984
for overhaul) are distressingly silent as to (a) determining profit and loss
ratios for this purpose, particularly when partners share items differently as
to special assets or income, residual value, cash flow, losses and profits, and
(b) distinguishing between recourse and nonrecourse liabilities, other than in
the most simple transaction. Particular uncertainty exists under them as to
guarantees and indemnification agreements by general or limited partners,
promises to make additional contributions by limited partners, and the
splitting of a liability from a single lender in a recourse and nonrecourse
fashion. More significantly, commentators attacked the existing regulation's
distinction in general between recourse and nonrecourse liabilities as
conflicting with Crane and economically as well as conceptually ill-founded.
Coven, 74 Calif. L. Rev. supra at 43, 49-51; Burke & Friel, supra at 178-79.
Initially, the Service adopted a formalistic approach as to guarantees by
partners, essentially turning on whether the guarantee was in the partner's
individual capacity or partner capacity. Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 Cum. Bull.
184. This approach was useful to deny limited partners basis. However, in
1983 the Claims Court applied a similar formalistic approach to hold that a
guarantee of an otherwise nonrecourse debt by a general partner was not a
recourse liability, since any payment by the general would not be in its
capacity as a partner. Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457 (1984), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985) This analysis would surely
allow all borrowings by a limited partnership to be structured as non-recourse
at the partnership level, even though guaranteed by the general. An appalled
Congress quickly (in 1984) directed Treasury to rewrite the Section 752
allocation of partnership liabilities regulations under "to take into account,
where possible, the manner in which the partners share the economic risk of
loss with respect to the borrowed amounts." H.R. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong.
2d Sess. 868 (1984) (Conference Report). Congress anticipated that
the regulations specify that a partnership debt for which a
partner is primarily or secondarily liable, whether in his
capacity as a partner or otherwise, is not a nonrecourse
debt, and thus generally does not provide limited partners
with additional basis for their partnership interests.
Similarly, when a limited partner guarantees what is
otherwise a nonrecourse debt of the partnership, the
regulations will not shift the basis attributable to that debt
away from the limited partner as a result of the guarantee.
Id.
Congress apparently approved the distinction in the existing regulations
between recourse and nonrecourse debt, intending
that the revisions to the Section 752 regulations will be
based largely on the manner in which the partners, and
persons related to the partners, share the economic risk of
loss with respect to partnership debt (other than bona fide
nonrecourse debt, as defined by such regulations), with
respect to bona fide nonrecourse debt, the conferees do not
expect that such regulations will make major changes to the
manner in which the partners' shares are determined, but
may attempt to provide more certainty than presently
exist. Id. at 869.
Subsequently, the Tax Court adopted an economic analysis under which
the determinative factor was whether the limited or general partner
guaranteeing the partnership loan would be "ultimately liable" in the event
funds from the partnership's operations or investments were not adequate to
service the loan. Abramson v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 360, 374 (1984); accord
Melvin v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 63, 75 (1987); Gefen v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1471, 1501
(1986).
Had these decisions been handed down earlier, Congress need not have
acted in 1984, calling for revision of the Section 752 regulations but
approving the old distinction between recourse and non-recourse debt.
Unfortunately, commentators have extensively and ably shown that such
distinction in the present Section 752 regulations, apparently approved by
Congress, is neither conceptually sound, based upon Crane, nor consistent
with the actual debt default experience and economic practice, whether
recourse or nonrecourse, particularly in tax shelters. Coven, 74 Calif. supra
at 50-5 1. Commentators have suggested various alternatives: (1) total
freedom of allocation between the partners, leaving policing of economic
substance to Sections 704 and the at risk and other anti-tax shelter
provisions, Burke & Friel, supra (2) maintaining the distinction between non-
recourse and recourse debt, while amplifying the method of which profit and
loss ratios are determined and giving basis to partners guaranteeing debt at
least where nonrecourse, American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax
Project Subchapter K 253-80 (1984) ("ALI-Draft"), a half-way measure likely
to be followed in the Section 752 regulations; and, (3) basing the sharing of
liabilities, whether recourse or nonrecourse, on the profit sharing ratio,
Coven, 74 Calif. supra at 59, which is more sound conceptually. The first
course ignores the serious conceptual and practical lacunae in the at-risk and
the Section 704(b) regimes. Following the first course leads to the 1986 Code
PAL as the only practical, or perhaps better only political, answer for tax
shelter abuse. Reform of the underlying combination of tax preferences plus
leverage, the abandoned approach of Treasury I, was politically impossible in
1986, as in 1976 for the LAL. Instead, in 1986 we got the PAL essentially for
noncorporate users of preferences plus leverage (and closely held services
corporations) and a tough minimum tax for corporations other than small and
closely held corporations) that extensively used preferences and usually
leverage as well.
b. Subchapter S.
Just as in the case of a partner, the owner's, i.e., S shareholder's,
current deduction of his/her "proportionate share" of the S corporation's flow-
through loss is limited to his/her basis in his/her investment, i.e., unrecovered
basis in his/her S corporation stock and his/her loans to it. I.R.C.
S 1366(d)(1). Similarly, like the Subchapter K rules, Subchapter S has
provided since 1982 an indefinite carryover of suspended or disallowed losses
and deductions. I.R.C. S 1366(d)(2). Unlike the aggregate approach
partnership rule, however, such stock basis under the S corporation entity
approach does not include his/her "share" of all of the entity's liabilities, even
if endorsed by him/her as long as such liability constitutes "true debt." Coven
& Hess, supra 50 Tenn. L. Rev. at 667-69; Coven, supra 42 Tax L. Rev. at
384-85. Instead, an S shareholder may currently deduct flow-through S
corporation losses above to an amount equal to his/her basis in his/her stock
only in an amount equal to his/her basis in any loans made by him/her to the S
corporation. I.R.C. S 1366 (d). Conversely, basis in such debt is "restored"
first and then basis in stock by his/her pro rata share of the S corporation's
subsequent separately and nonseparately stated items of income. I.R.C.
S 1367(b)(2)(B).
Although not without minor complexities, these S corporation stock and
loan basis loss flow-through limitation rules are far simpler than the
partnership rules concerning sharing of entity level debt. The drafters of the
S corporation provisions employed in this context the entity, rather than
aggregate, approach. Under the aggregate approach the shareholder would
have been treated as owning a proportionate interest in the entity's assets,
just as partners in partnerships. Most likely the S corporation entity liability
rules were at least retained in 1982 in such an entity manner in order to
retard the use of S corporation as a tax shelter vehicle. Of course,
commentators quickly suggested planning alternatives, viz., direct
shareholder-level borrowings which the shareholders then would loan to the S
corporation. See Mullaney & Blau, An Analytic Comparison of Partnerships
and S Corps as Vehicles for Leveraged Investments, 59 J. Tax. 142, 143
(1983); August & Sillow, S Corporation vs. Partnership for Real Estate
Ventures, 1 J. Tax of Invest. 91, 119-22 (1984). Regardless of the
practicalities, or indeed point, of that exercise, denial of use of S corporation
debt as basis does not attack the underlying income distortion from leverage
and preference just as the similar in effect at-risk rules fail. Rather, the S
corporation rules (and at-risk rules) are directed more towards the recourse-
nonrecourse dichotomy than towards the underlying mismatch. If a surrogate
approach must be taken here due to politics, the 1986 Code PAL for tax
losses approach is far better than the 1976 at risk approach.
Finally, the S corporation entity level debt rules frustrate accustomed
business tax practices. According to conventional tax wisdom under the 1954
Code rules, the best financing for a close C corporation is entity-level debt,
shareholder guaranteed if need be as is usually the case. Consequently,
apparently following such old habits, start-up S corporations apparently too
frequently are capitalized in the same manner with entity level debt
guaranteed by the shareholders.
When the S corporation's losses exceeded the shareholder's basis in
his/her stock and any loans made by him/her to the S corporation (hence were
financed through entity level debt), shareholder self-help resort to courts for
a current deduction of the S corporation's losses, which would otherwise be
suspended until basis was restored, has generated the complexity in this
area. In Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (1lth Cir. 1985), the Eleventh
Circuit allowed the shareholder to recharacterize a transaction she had cast
as a third party bank loan to a solely owned S corporation guaranteed by her
as in substance constituting for tax purposes a loan to her by the bank
followed by her contribution of the loan proceeds to her S corporation's
equity. The Selfe test is whether the lender actually looked to the
shareholder as the primary obligor, i.e., whether under traditional "debt-
equity" analysis the taxpayer's guarantee amounted to either an equity
investment in (or shareholder loan to) the S corporation. Also a release of the
S corporation and substitution of the shareholder as primary obligor has
proven a successful argument, at least with third party loans. Rev. Rul. 75-
144 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 277; but cf. Underwood v. Comm'r, 535 F.2d 309 (5th
Cir. 1976).
Just this sort of uncertainty and frustration of business practice too
often renders use of an S corporation transactionally expensive. Clearly
legislative rules would be preferable here to self-help judicial approaches
with resultant uncertainty.
c. Conclusion
Entity-level debt should be treated consistently for purposes of the
outside basis limitation on current deduction of pass-through loss from S
corporations and partnerships. The recourse-nonrecourse approach taken
under the partnership Section 752 regulations and likely to be continued under
the 1984 mandated revisions, as well as the roughly analogous denial of entity
level debt to shareholders (even if they endorse it), is not responsive to the
underlying tax dynamics of preferences and leverage. Rather such
approaches attack only a symptom of tax sheltering--non-recourse
financing. Furthermore, such a distinction causes confusion between entity
and aggregate approaches as to both partnerships and S corporations in a
context in which the aggregate approach should apply to both as to
entrepreneur owners. A better rule would be (a) a pure aggregate approach to
entity-level debt, whether of an S corporation or a partnership as to such
owners; and (b) an entity approach in both as to passive owners. Such debt
should be shared by the active owners for basis--loss flow through purposes in
the proportion that they share in the profits as to the element of potential
partnership or S corporation income financed by the debt, or perhaps more
precisely as they will be responsible for the future income used to amortize
the non-deductible mortgage principal. This approach would be consistent
with both the true debt analysis and a year-one year-two correlative
adjustment, clearer reflection of income approach.
2. Distributive Share v. Pro Rata Share of Entity Loss.
a. Subchapter K
In my opinion under a deep structure analysis an "aggregate" policy
should underlie, or if necessary override, Section 704's allocation of income
and loss rules. In order to treat each partner as near as possible as an
individual entrepreneur the partnership should be looked through and the
"assignment of income" doctrine applied inside so that (a) income will be
allocated to the partner whose services or income earns the income, and (b)
losses will be allocated to the partner who bears them. The "rub" lies in
determining who bears losses particularly if attributable to non-recourse
partnership indebtedness. Treasury believes that under the 1954 and 1986
Codes, Subchapter K's system of partnership allocations constitutes its
"principal source of flexibility." Passthrough Entities Hearings supra at 13
(Asst. Sect. Mentz).
The AL draft (largely the basis for Subchapter K) rested in large part
on the assumption that "the Treasury from the standpoint of tax policy is not
greatly concerned about... [the allocation] . . .of the burden of taxation
among the members of the group." Jackson, Johnson, Surrey & Warren, A
Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partnerships and
Partners-American Law Institute Draft, 9 Tax L. Rev. 109, 110 (1954)
(footnotes omitted). (First two authors special consultants on partnerships;
last two, chief reporter and associate chief reporter for tax project); see
Hearings on General Revenue Revision before the House Comm. on Ways &
means 83d Cong. Ist Sess. (Part 2) 1370 (1953) (statement of Johnson on
behalf of ABA). Therefore it stressed the partnership agreement as the
source for the determination of distributive share and relied upon a capital
account analysis. "Thus, under the Draft a partner is entitled to a
distributive share of loss only if he has actually suffered a monetary loss, i.e.,
only if he suffers a reduction in his capital account, or, under agreement, he
is liable to make up that loss to the partnership." Jackson, Johnson, Surrey &
Warren, supra at 115-16.
The ALT Draft defined "distributive share" solely by reference to the
"partnership agreement." Id. at 174 (the equivalent of S 704(a)). Congress
added the predecessor to Section 704(b), which initially provided that the
partnership "bottom line" Section 702(a)(9) distributive share allocation would
govern if (a) the partnership agreement were silent as to any item, or (b) the
principal purpose of any distributive share agreement of a particular item was
to avoid or evade federal income tax. The Senate Report explained that
where "a provision in a partnership agreement for a special allocation of
certain items has substantial economic effect and is not merely a device for
reducing the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting their shares
of partnership income, then such a provision will be recognized for tax
purposes." S. Rep. No. 1622, supra at 379. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
subjected, in revised Section 704(b), bottom-line allocations, as well as
special allocations, to the requirement of "substantial economic effect", thus
extending the Senate explanation to the whole. See Joint Committee Staff,
Summary of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976).
Thus, Section 704(a) now provides that generally the partnership
agreement's allocation formula determines a partner's distributive share of
the separate items of partnership income, gain, loss deduction and credit
which he/she takes into account separately under Section 702. The partners
are free to allocate these items in any way they choose, including "special
allocations" so long as the allocations made by the partnership agreement
have "substantial economic effect." I.R.C. S 704(b); see Passthrough Entities
Hearings, supra at 13-14 (statement of Mentz).
The development of "substantial economic effect" unfortunately more
or less followed in the cases, Orrisch Halladay, etc., and even more clearly
by commentators, McKee, Partnership Allocations in Real Estate Ventures:
Crane, Kresser and Orrisch, 30 Tax L. Rev. 1, 8-18 (1976); but see, Weidner,
Partnership Allocations and Capital Accounts Analysis 42 Ohio St. L.J. 467,
476 n.36, 483, 487-504 (1981), and even arguably the legislative history, see S.
Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1976), but see, Weidner, 42 Ohio State
at 501, followed a "capital accounts" analysis, ultimately, essentially only
requiring restoration of deficits in capital accounts. In the case of allocation
of losses, other than attributable to the contributed property governed by
Section 704(c), generally the "substantial economic effect" test of the revised
Section 704(b) regulations requires "capital account maintenance" under a
detailed regulatory web providing for (1) appropriate adjustments for
contributions, distributions, and allocations; (2) liquidating distributions of
positive balances; and (3) restoration of at least a part of any deficit in
account balance upon liquidation of the partnership or of the partner's
interest. Treas. Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b); see Lokken, Partnership
Allocations, 41 Tax L. Rev. 545, 551 (1986); Passthrough Entities Hearings,
supra at 33. Thus, tax accounting is to follow book or financial accounting,
Marich & McKee, Sections 704(c) and 743(b): The Shortcomings of Existing
Regulations and the Problems of Publicly Traded Partnerships 41 Tax L. Rev.
627, 631 (1986) -- but a book accounting system in which the principal
features are dictated by the Section 704 regulations. Allocation of such
deductions attributable to non-recourse debt must meet the additional test of
consistency with other allocations with substantial economic effect. Treas.
Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv)(2). Unfortunately with these regulations, another tax
area became "essentially inpenetrable to all but those with the time, talent,
and determination to become thoroughly, prepared experts on the subject."
Lokken, supra at 621. Moreover, they ignore time value of money
considerations. See Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 48 (Kuller).
Hence, they are invalid to that extent. See Sheppard, The Gauntlet: Joint
Committee's Corporate Base Broadeners 36 Tax Notes 9, 10 (July 6, 1987).
The revised Section 704(b) regulations also permit temporary
allocations, so long as the "transitory" rules are not violated. An allocation
automatically passes the transitory prohibition if it is expected to be for
longer than five years. See Treas. Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c). Furthermore,
in the case of a special allocation, if sale of the property to which the
specially allocated item is attributable would result in an economic loss to
the partner to whom the specially allocated loss had been allocated, the
transitory rule is equally not violated. In the case of ACRS deductions, this
test is applied by assuming that the fair market value of the property in
question is equal to its adjusted basis after ACRS deductions. Id. Thus, a loss
is guaranteed. Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Roger Mentz argued in the
1986 Pass Through Entities Hearings that the combination of these rules
produced an inappropriate result in the context of an incentive depreciation
system, such as ACRS then and now, where tax depreciation deductions are
likely to far exceed economic depreciation in the early years. Passthrough
Entities Hearings, supra at 14. Mentz provided an illustration in which a
general parwtnership,7wt recourse financing, provided a typical "flip-flop" of
(1) net losses 99% to the capital partner and 1% to the service partner, and
then (2) at the "turn around" (when the partnership first produced net income)
a "charge back" of partnership income to the capital partner equal to the
prior losses, and then (3) an allocation of income (and any further losses)
50%:50% to the service partner and the capital partner. Id. at 15. The
partnership required restoration of capital account deficits. According to the
Mentz the partnership allocation met the Treasury Regulations S 1.704-
l(b)(2)(ii)(b) requirements.
(I) Capital accounts will be maintained properly, (2) upon
liquidation of the partnership of any partner's interest,
liquidating distributions will in all cases be made in
accordance with capital accounts, and (3) partners are
required to restore deficit capital accounts .. ." Id. at 33
n. 15.
In my view, this regulation is invalid to the extent that the allocations
exceed the capital partner's actual capital contribution if the chargeback and
deficit restoration obligation lies so far in the future that their present value
impact is small. In such cases the chargeback and restoration requirement
are virtually nonexistent economically. Cf. S. Prnt. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (vol. 1) 231 (1984). Where such features actually were non-existent,
courts readily held that a purported allocation of loss lacked economic
substance, Holladay v. Comm'r, Allison v. United States, 72 T.C. 571, 588
(1979); accord 701 F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In practical effect in such
circumstances the assignment of income doctrine was violated in that some
partners are accelerating income to the other partners in future years and are
themselves sheltering income in the present years. In short, by ignoring time
value of money, the regulations equally ignore the assignment of income
doctrine as applied within the partnership. And the case law as to allocations
of partnership net income clearly now requires application of assignment of
income doctrine within the partnership. See p._____
The revised Section 704(b) regulations overlooking of the assignment of
income doctrine should come as no surprise. Their chief conceptual
architect, after initially arguing that in effect that an aggregate approach
underlay allowing special allocations to produce deficit capital account (so
long as a deficition restoration obligation was present, McKee, supra 30 Tax
L. Rev. at 27, reversed position as to aggregate-entity and argued that the
assignment of income doctrine stopped at the partnership entity's door,
McKee, Partnership Allocations: The Need for an Entity Approach, 66 Va. L.
Rev. 1039, 1050 (1980). McKee reasoned that once the partnership earned the
items taking account of the assignment of income doctrine, the allocation
within the partnership among the partners was covered solely by Sections
704(a) and (b). "The doctrine should not also apply at the partner level
because, as between the partnership, nothing is 'earned'; rather, what has
been earned is simply to be allocated among the partners." Id.
McKee then went on to Treasury where reportedly he was the chief
architect of the Section 704(b) regulations project and the chief artisan was
Mark Kuller. McKee and Kuller now admit that the Section 704(b) regulations
"may need further refinement to adequately deal with time value of money
and assignment of income issues, but we feel the Treasury already has
sufficient regulatory authority to handle these problems." Passthrou h
Entities Hearings, supra at 53 (statement of McKee and Kull-e- See also
Marich & McKee, supra, 41 Tax L. Rev. at 638 n.34, 640. Indeed, the
Preamble to the revised Section 704(b) regulations states that the drafters
welcome comment on time value of money principles. Preamble 50 Fed.
Reg. 53422 (Dec. 31, 1985).
2. Subehapter S.
The S corporation provisions allocate the pass-thru tax entity's income
or loss (in most instances) to shareholders in accordance with their "prorata
share," I.R.C. S 1366(a)(1), which in turn is based solely upon their
proportionate stock interest during the tax year. I.R.C. § 1377(a). See
Passthrough Entities Hearing, supra at 36. Therefore, the S corporation
regime contains no provision for special allocations or more significantly for
allocations with respect to contributed property. See Passthrough Entities
Hearings supra at 36.
To some extent the practical effect of special allocations may be
achieved in an S corporation context by creative use of debt instruments
according to some commentators. Coven & Hess, supra, 50 Tenn. L. Rev. at
569. (However, debt-equity may be a problem here. But the result would be
"preferred stock," which is close enough to the estate planning goal). But
especially as to allocations with respect to contributed property, the S
corporation rules are inflexible, probably deliberately so, ostensibly for
simplicity but possibly in order to retard their tax shelter use. Thus an S
corporation unfortunately often is less able to meet legitimate nontax special
interests of owners contributing business assets with significant built-in tax
attributes.
3. Conclusion.
Assistant Secretary Roger Mentz suggested in the 1986 Passthrough
Entity Hearings that an answer to exploitation of Subchapter K through tax-
motivated partnership allocations, particularly flip-flops raise the question of
revisions to Subchapter K to substantially restrict its flexibility.
One approach deserving study would be a partnership
allocation system similar to that employed in subchapter S.
Under this more rigid system, each unit of ownership
interest in the partnership would be required to share
equally in each item of partnership income, gain, loss,
deduction, and credit and in each distribution made by the
partnership. If the partnership did not meet this
requirement, it would be taxed as a corporation under
subchapter C, just as an S corporation that is found to have
two classes of stock. Under such a regime, any shift in a
partner's percentage interest in partnership items would, as
with a transfer of shares in an S corporation, be
characterized and taxed appropriately (or, for example, a
purchase of an additional interest for capital, a receipt of an
additional interest for services, or a gift). In developing
such an approach, it could be desirable to analyze the
possibility of a single system of pass-through taxation for all
non-publicity traded business entities, which could replace
subchapters K and S of current law.
Obviously, this possible approach to revising subchapter
K, as well as any other possible revision of this magnitude,
would require extensive consideration before enactment.
We recognize, moreover, that significant restrictions on the
flexibility of subchapter K could adversely affect economic
arrangements that appear to be taxed appropriately under
current law. In this regard, it could well be appropriate to
retain more flexible treatment for certain identified
activities or industries. For example, service organizations
might be permitted to shift allocations of bottom line
income or loss without regard to units of ownership where
such shifts respond to the shift from year to year in the
relative values of services provided by the various
partners. Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 36.
Such yearning for entity simplicity as to passthrough entities was a recurring
theme throughout the 1954 Code. However, the blocking of legitimate business
arrangements by a strict entity approach, particularly as to allocations, goes too
far.
More equity would be obtained by revising the Section 704(b) regulations to
reflect time value of money principles and hence assignment of income. Under
such an arrangement a flip-flop would not be permitted to the extent that
deductions created a negative capital account.
C. Income Passthrough.
1. Special Allocations of Income.
a. Subchapter K.
As discussed above in the context of allocation of partnership losses,
Subchapter K's starting point in "allocations" or determining a partner's
distributive share of items of income is the partnership agreement, which
governs unless the allocation is without substantial economic effect. In the
case of income allocations the "varying interest" cases clearly expose that
the underlying principle of assignment of income, i.e., income must be
allocated to the partner whose services or capital generated the income,
governs. See p. __
Thus, in this context special allocations of geographic source income or
even product line or other natural division corresponding with a partner's
special services or capital investment should be permitted. And after 1984
the Code requires mandatory allocations to the contributor partner of built-in
gain or loss property. I.R.C. 5 704(c). The goal should be treatment of the
partner as near as possible to an individual entrepreneur who employed his or
her services or capital in a venture.
Special allocations of income to effect a charge back or loan
amortization where the partner remains responsible for the loan or in effect
responsible for the encumbered property should also be permitted.
i. Section 704(c) Allocations as to Contributed Property.
It was here that the House 1954 Code Bill required a mandatory entity
approach with built-in gain and loss being allocated to the partners in
accordance with their general distributive share allocation formula. The
Senate instead provided optional allocation of the built-in gain or loss to the
contributing partner. Thirty years later in 1984 Congress concluded that
abuses abounded with contributed property and mandated allocation of built-
in gain and loss to the contributing partner under revised Section 704(c), at
the same time providing character will be "carried over" for 5 years from
partner to partnership for the first time in the Code in new Section 724. In
essence, this provision mandates an aggregate approach as to the contributing
partner. Revised Section 704(c)'s mandatory allocations as to contributed
property with a differing basis from market are designed to eliminate book-
tax disparity arising from mandatory accounting for the contributed property
at market and, hence, potential assignment or other distortion of income
where a partner contributed such "built-in" gain or loss property to a
partnership. The mechanics of Section 704(c) may produce special allocations
of gain and of loss, 2._., ACRS.
b. Subchapter S.
The Subchapter S regime follows a rigid per unit of ownership allocation
formula as to allocations of income just as to allocations of loss. In this
aspect a conduit-entity approach applies.
In practice, it appears that the effect, however, of special allocations,
particularly as to services is readily achieved through compensation paid to
shareholder-employees. Policy arguments supporting importation of Section
707(a)(2) principles into Subchapter S are discussed below at p. 29.
Similarly as to capital investment special allocations, arguably
shareholder loans to the corporation can be used to effect the same results.
Both techniques, however, raise the stakes of tax complexity. Both carry
with them substantial Subchapter C history of reasonable compensation and
unreasonable law and lore as well as debt equity law and lore. Unfortunately
those issues are not as directly responsive to surely the underlying question
here. Did the capital or services of the S shareholder earn the income? Also
S corporations in which owners materially participate should be required to
allocate income (and loss) in accordance with assignment of income and time
value principles.
2. Varying Interest Rules and Retroactive Allocations.
a. Subchapter K.
i. Varying interest rule.
The ownership interest in a partnership can be changed on account of (a)
admission of a new partner, (b) a change in the partnership's profit and loss
ratio (often accompanied in a services partnership by corresponding capital
interest increases-and hence capital contribution increases--and capital
interest decreases--and hence distributions from capital--), or (c) sale or
exchange by a partner of his/her partnership capital and profit/loss interest in
the partnership to, or with, another. At least in a partnership in which
capital is a material income producing factor, an assignment of a partner's
capital interest and attendant profit share is effective under Evans v.
Comm'r, 54 T.C. 40 (1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971), to make the
assignee a partner for tax purposes, even though the assignee may not be a
partner under state law (i.e., not able to have a voice in partnership affairs or
to inspect its books, but usually entitled under local law to his/her assignor's
share of any actual distributions by the partnership).
(A) Constructive Cash Distributions From Shifting Interests and
Section 75 1(b)
Admission of a new partner to an existing partnership and shifting of
interest between existing partners pose essentially the same problems. The
decrease in the profit/loss ratio of the existing partners in both instances
usually results in a decrease of the existing partner's share of liabilities. See
Lee, supra 22d Win. & Mary Tax Conf. at 134-36. It is probably rare that the
resulting "constructive cash distribution" would exceed an existing partner's
outside basis, but if it did such excess would be treated as a constructive sale
or exchange under Section 751, except to the extent that Section 751(b)
applies. But unless precautionary steps are taken, as discussed below,
generally Section 75 l(b) will apply to restructure the constructive cash
distribution as a constructive pro rata distribution of unrealized receivables
of the partnership to the partner to the extent that the existing partner
"gives up" a share of such receivables. Such constructive distribution of such
constructive share of unrealized receivables is then deemed under Section
751(b) to be sold back to the partnership for its fair market value but with a
zero basis, resulting in ordinary income to the new partner or partner with
the increased profit/loss ratio. The partnership then has a stepped up basis in
the unrealized receivable.
While the potential Section 75 1(b) problem in admission of a new
partner or change in partnership interest was only recently recognized by the
Service in 1984 (Rev. Rul. 84-102 1984-2 C.B. 119), commentators had noted
the problem as early as 1970. They suggested to avoid the problem one
precautionary step is for the old partners in the existing partnership before
the admission or shift to expressly retain responsibility in the prior profit/loss
ratio for the satisfaction of some or all of the partnership obligations which
arose prior to the new partner's admission. See Emmons & Fine, Coping with
IRS' Ruling which applies Sec. 751 on the Admission of New Partners, 62 J.
Tax. 161 (1985). Reliance, however, on avoiding the constructive cash
distributions through this manner would appear risky, if no more than in light
of the mandated revisions to the Section 752 regulations. Over a decade ago
it was suggested that the problem could be avoided by a special allocation
charge-back of the pre-shift Section 75 1 receivables (especially potential
partnership statutory recapture) to the existing partners in the prior
profit/loss ratio so that the new partner or increase partner would not in the
future have a distributive share in those old receivables when they were
collected. See Lee, supra, 22d Wm. & Mary Tax Conf. at 137. This
apparently is the route Treasury prefers as well. For the Section 704(b)
regulations permit a restatement of the partnership's capital accounts upon
an admission of a new partner (or presumably a shift of interest between the
partners) accompanied by allocations under Section 704(c) "principles".
Treas. Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(F). Moreover, they hint not so gently that in
many instances such a reallocmTtion is mandatory lest other rules such as
assignment of income embodied in various partnership Code provisions or
Section 751(b) apply. Id. S 1.704-(b)(2)(iv)(F)(5)(iii). This problem appears
potentially applicable to most professional partnerships composed of
attorneys or accountants. Additionally, a real estate partnership with assets
carrying potential depreciation recapture (Section 1245 or Section 1250) faces
this problem since such potential recapture constitutes by statutory definition
a Section 75 1(c) asset.
(B) Varying Interest Restriction
An additional question may be raised where a new partner enters the
partnership other than on the first day of the partnership year or a shift in
profit/loss ratio between the partners occurs other than on the first day of
the tax year. At one time I thought that Sections 702 and 761 permitted
retroactive amendments, in light of the early 1939 Code case law that
overrode the assignment of income doctrine and permitted partners admitted
late in the year to share in partnership profit and loss for the entire year,
implicitly under an entity approach. Lee & Parker, Retroactive Allocations
to New Partners: An Analysis of the Area After Rodman, 40 J. Tax. 166
(1974). The Tax Court in Rodman apparently thought so too, but was reversed
by the Second Circuit on assignment of income grounds. Congress,
effectively affirmed Rodman in 1976, by revising Section 704(b) and enacting
the predecessor to Section 706(d)(1), which now provides that when partners'
interests change or vary during the tax year, each partner's distributive share
under Section 704 of various items of partnership income, gain, loss,
deduction and credit is determined by taking into account his/her varying
interest in the partnership during the taxable year. From 1976 to 1984 the
varying interest rule permitted alternatively (a) an "interim closing" of the
partnership books or (b) a pro ration of partnership income, gain, loss,
deduction and credit for the entire taxable year. S. Prnt. No. 169, supra at
217. These two methods, however, left a "loophole" for cash basis
partnerships, painted out by commentators. By deferring payment until after
entry of the new partner or until after the partners' profit/loss ratios have
been changed, a cash basis partnership could allocate a portion of an
expenditure economically accrued prior to the entry or profit/loss shift but
not paid until thereafter. S. Prnt. No. 169, supra at 218-19.
Congress closed this loophole in 1984 in enacting Section 706(d)(2) which
pro rates "cash basis items" to each day in the period to which they are
attributable and limits each partner's share, in a partnership year in which
there is a "change" in any partner's interest, in proportion to his varying
interest in the partnership on those days determined in a manner consistent
with Section 706. The legislative history explains that this determination will
require allocation of such items in the manner in which the partners would
have borne the corresponding economic cost, even though the cost is actually
borne by another partner (typically, a later-admitted partner) in connection
with a change in the partner's interest. S. Print No. 169, supra at 219. "Cash
basis items" include (1) interest, (2) taxes, (3) rents, (4) payments for services
and any other item identified by the regulations as leading to significant
mistatements of income. I.R.C. § 706(d)(2)(B). Again an aggregate approach
prevails.
ii. Retroactive Allocations Revisited
Congress carefully explained citing Lipke v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 689
(1983), that it wished to make clear that the varying interests rule is not
intended to override the longstanding rule of section 76 l(c) with respect to
interest shifts among partners who are members of the partnership for the
entire taxable year, provided such shifts are not, in substance, attributable to
the influx of new capital from such partners. See S. Print No. 169, supra at
219.
Congress could hardly have picked a worse example. Surely what it
properly wanted to carve out from Section 706's "varying interest" rule, was
the retroactive "grace" of Section 761 granting
current partners the right to adjust their respective allocations to
accurately [reflect] the fruitfulness, or lack thereof, of each partner's
contribution of capital or services to the partnership. In that case, the
current partners have sustained profit or loss during the taxable year
and all that remains to determine is the amount that each will bear.
Section 761 permits a change in this determination from that provided
in the partnership agreement. However, the allocations may not be
used as a vehicle to escape tax liability .... Therefore, [Section] 761
has no relevance to an allocation of profit or loss to an individual who
was not even a member of the partnership when that loss or profit was
sustained. Snell v. United States, 680 F.2d 545, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1982)
(dictum).
Snell rejected a retroactive allocation to a new partner bottomed on
Section 761, on the grounds that the assignment of income doctrine barred
allocation of pre-entry profits or losses to a new partner. 680 F.2d at 598.
The above quoted illustration obviously did not violate the assignment of
income doctrine. First, the assignment of income doctrine now clearly
applies to the allocation of partnership income, embodying the principle of
attribution of the "fruits" to the capital or services (qua-partner) that earned
it. Compare Williams v. United States, 680 F.2d 382, 384-85 (5th Cir. 1982)
with Snell v. United States s accord Hawkins v. Commissioner 713 F.2d
347, 351 n.6 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Richardson v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d
1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1982). Cf. Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845, 857
(2d Cir. 1976).
A district court delving into "retroactive allocations," answered the
taxpayer's argument that the Comm'r v. Culbertson; 337 U.S. 733 (1949),
"intention to form a partnership" standard gave partner-status, regardless of
contribution of capital services, with (1) the observation that since all the
family partnership cases involved purported contributions," [tihe issue was
whether the amount, quality or origin of the capital or services was sufficient
to indicate an intent to establish a partnership." Atlas v. United States, 555
F. Supp. 110, 113 (W.D. Mo. 1982). (2) "[The Culbertson case clearly
establishes that there first must be some contribution of capital or services
before a person can be taxed as a partner. Then if his intentions are in doubt,
the case merits a further look." Id. (3) "Despite the passage of 33 years,
Culbertson is still good law." Id. In short, Culbertson as ready by Atlas and
Snell show that Section 76 l(c) is only meant to give partners flexibility to
retroactively allocate income (or loss) by amendment to reflect the
"contribution" to the partnership's business of each partner's contribution
"capital" (property?) or services for that year-an "aggregate" pooling of
resources approach.
Lipke however, gives no intimations of an "aggregate" approach.
Instead, it proceeds mechanically, step-by-step (Sections 702(a), 704(a), and
761) to allow a retroactive allocation of 2% of profits or losses to "existing"
general partners (prior to the retroactive allocation, the "generals" had only a
"residual" profits interest, 81 T.C. at 698) because
"this reallocation of losses to the general partners was not
directly accompanied by a reduction in any other partner's
capital interest within the meaning of section 706(c)(2)(3).
It constituted nothing more than a readjustment of
partnership items among existing partners which, by itself,
is permissible." 81 T.C. at 696.
There is no discussion in the Lipke opinion of application of the assignment of
income doctrine to the retroactive 2% allocation to the general partners, nor
of what particular contribution by them "earned" this "loss." Just as in its
memo opinion in Rodman the Tax Court following the literal words of the
Code overlooked in Lipke the underlying policy--clear reflection of income of
aggregate components of the pass-thru entity taking account of each's
contribution. This is an easy mistake to make. See Lee & Parker, supra
(citing 1939 Code family partnership cases refusing to apply assignment of
income to retroactive allocations). Cf., Joint Committee Staff, General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. - (1976);
see Moore v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 1024 at 1228-29 n.3 (1977); accord, Williams v.
United States, supra at 385-86 n.9.
b. Subchapter S.
In the Subchapter S arena there is no direct ability to merely shift a
profits interest. Rather, there must be a change in stock ownership since the
proportionate share of profits and losses is based upon stock ownership. See
Passthrough Entities Hearings. supra at 36 (Mentz). This entity approach is
consistently followed as to the pass-thru principle since the Section 1377(a)
definition of "pro rata share" in effect provides for a proportionate approach
throughout the year based upon averaged daily ownership. There is, however,
a limited ability for a terminating shareholder to elect together with all other
Subchapter S shareholders to treat the taxable year of the S Corporation as if
it terminated upon the shareholder's termination of his/her interest. I.R.C.
5 1377(a)(2). Subchapter S contains no provision similar to the partnership
economic accrual of cash basis items rule.
Conceivably the equivalent of "retroactive services-produced
allocation" can be accomplished by year-end bonuses to shareholder-
employees. See p. 29 below. "Reasonable" compensation will raise its head
again, however. Incidentally, under Section 162(a) year-end bonus are usually
inadvisable.
Even the "AAA" rule in the case of S Corporations with C E&P follows
an entity approach. See Coven, supra 42 Tax L. Rev. at 398. Thus a new S
Corporation shareholder can avoid the dividend taint of the retained C E&P
up to AAA even if accumulated prior to his/her acquisition of a stock
interest. Of course, C E&P was accumulated previously as well.
3. Conclusion
The largely aggregate-based Section 704 rules, particularly as to
mandatory special allocations of contributed built-in gain property and
geographic-source special allocations appear more sound than a strict per unit
of ownership allocation. Moreover, the ability to retroactively allocate
according to relative contribution of services meets the needs of
entrepreneurs. The S corporation per unit of ownership rules are overly
rigid. While "compensation" to S shareholder employees supplies flexibility,
this is largely so because S shareholder - S corporation transactions are not
sufficiently delineated and regulated.
D. Non-Partner and Non-S Shareholder Capacity Transactions
1. Services
a. Subchapter K
i. Introduction
Non-partner capacity transactions constituted a major aggregate-entity
conflict trouble spot throughout the 1954 Code era, continuing under the 1986
Code. The problem arose first under the 1939 Code in the context of salaries
or guaranteed payments made to partners, with conflicting judicial adoptions
of a aggregate and entity approaches. See Jackson, Johnson, Surrey &
Warren, supra 9 Tax L. Rev. at 137; see also Rabkin & Johnson, supra 55
Harv. L. Rev. at 92 1. Under the aggregate approach, salary payments, etc.,
were treated merely as a readjustment of the partners' distributive shares;
however, this could require fragmentation of a transaction into two parts,
"one of which should be recognized to the partners other than the one
involved in the transaction, and another which should be handled as a
contribution by the partner to the partnership or a current distribution from
the partnership to the partner." Jackson, Johnson, Surrey & Warren, supra 9
Tax L. Rev. at 137. The entity approach treated the partner as an outsider
dealing with the partnership, which was thought much simpler in operation.
Id. Consequently, both the 1954 ALI Draft, Id. at 138-39, and the House bill,
H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1954), adopted the entity
approach treating the partner as an "outsider" as to transactions between
him/her and his/her partnership "other than in his capacity as a partner," Id.
at A223; with certain safeguards (e.g., non-recognition and carryover basifTas
to "sales" to the partnership where it was "controlled" by the partner).
Following this thought, the House bill adopted an entity approach as to the
payment of a "fixed or guaranteed amount for services" treating the payment
"as salary income to the recipient and ... as a business deduction to the
partnership." Id. at 68. The Senate essentially followed the House approach
here, except as-to contribution/sales where instead losses were disallowed by
Section 707(b) as to sales of loss property by principal partners. S. Rep. No.
1622, supra at 94. Furthermore, it provided special timing rules as to
"guaranteed payments" under Section 707(c), making "it clear that such
income is to be reported for tax purposes at the end of the partnership year in
which it is paid and that this treatment is only provided for purposes of the
reporting of the income by the partner and the deducting of the payments by
the partnership." Id.
ii. Tri-partite Structure
Section 707 thus contemplates three categories of partner-partnership
transactions:
a. Non-partner capacity payments, I.R.C. SS 707(a)(1) and (a)(2);
b. Guaranteed payments, I.R.C. S 707(c); and
c. All other "payments" to a partner acting in his/her capacity as a
partner, I.R.C. §9 702, 704, and 731.
Non-partner capacity payments are treated as made to an "outsider"; hence,
inclusion by the partner and deduction/capitalization, etc., by the partnership
turn on general tax principles, e.g., cash or accrual methods, etc.
Guaranteed payments, reflecting the focus of the ALL and Senate
Finance Committee on timing, Jackson, Johnson, Surrey & Warren, supra at
138; S. Rep. No. 1622, supra at 94, are taxed to the partner in the year e
payment accrues.
All other payments (and allocations), i.e., partner capacity transactions
are governed by the general Subchapter K rules as to allocations,
contributions and distributions. S. Rep. No. 1622, supra at 386.
iii. Non-Partner Capacity Transactions
Prior to the 1984 amendments to Section 707(a), the focus was on
whether the rendition of services (or transfers of property or capital) was in a
partner capacity. The Tax Court in Pratt v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 203 (1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1977), held that general partners receiving fees
equal to five percent of partnership gross receipts for performing ongoing
managerial services for the partnership were receiving neither Section 707(a)
payments (because the management fees were received for services
performed within the normal scope of the partners' duties and pursuant to the
partnership agreement) nor (b) Section 707(c) payments to a partner (since
computed as percentage of gross income and hence measured by partnership
"income" and Section 707(c) payments are determined without regard to
partnership income). Since the payments came under neither Sections 707(a)
nor 707(c), the Tax Court held that Sections 704 and 702(b) applied to the
allocation and Section 731 applied to the accompanying distribution. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court as to its treatment of the management
fees, i.e., treatment as an allocation and distribution, but solely on the
"partner capacity" ground as to the Section 707(a) issue because the Section
707(c) holding was not appealed. The Fifth Circuit in Pratt focused on the
"scope of the partnership".
It is perfectly clear that the contract creating the
partnership, which provided for the percentage payments to
the general partners for their management efforts was made
with them qua partners. Furthermore, it is equally clear
that the duteies to be performed were activities for which
the partnership was created in the first place, i.e., the
management of the shopping centers. Bearing in mind, that
the general statutory policy for treating partnerships for tax
purposes contemplated that the income of a partnership
would flow through to the individual partners, it is not
difficult to envision the purpose of Congress when it created
an exception to this general rule to limit the excepted
activities to those specifically outlined. In doing so,
Congress determined that in order for the partnership to
deal with one of its partners as an "outsider" the transaction
dealt with must be something outside the scope of the
partnership. If, on the other hand, the activities
constituting the "transaction" were activities which the
partnership itself was engaged in, compensation for such
transaction must be treated merely as a rearrangement
between the partners of their distributive shares in the
partnership income. Pratt v. Comm'r, 550 F.2d at 1026.
Cagle v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 86 (1974), f, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976),
and then Congress in 1976, made it more or less clear that Section 707(c)
expenditures were subject to the "origin-of-the-claim" test, i.e., their tax
treatment ((a) ordinary deduction, (b) capitalization and amortization as a
separate free standing asset, (c) capitalization with no amortization) turned
on the nature of the services provided and what such services related to.
Factually most "guaranteed payments" to promoter-service partners in tax
shelters would at best be properly characterized as amortizable partnership
start-up cost, formation costs, or additional acquisition costs of depreciable
or amortizable partnership assets, and at worst as non-amortizable
syndication costs, thus yielding less or no tax benefits to the other non-
service partners. See Note, Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for
Services: St. John v. United States and a Suggested Solution, 5 Va. Tax Rev.,
127, at 151 n.170 (1985). Consequently, in some cases treatment of the
payments for management services as a distributive share of net (or even
gross income) produced prior to 1984 better tax results to non-service
partners than would non-currently deductible "guaranteed payments" by
reducing the non-service partners' share of net income (or increasing their
loss in loss years if the allocation were of partnership gross income). See
Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 66 (Ginsburg); Hearings on Tax
Shelters, Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms before
the House Ways & Means Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (Ass't Sec'ty
Chapoton) (1984) ("Tax Shelter Hearings").
As the tax sheltered taxpayer's preferred tax posture shifted from
"guaranteed payments" for such management services to "distributive share",
the Service too flip flopped. In Revenue Ruling 81-300, 1981-2 Cum. Bull.,
the Internal Revenue Service disagreed with the Tax Court's conclusion in
Pratt that the payments were not Section 707(c) payments, since measured by
gross income. "It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service that in Pratt
the management fees were guaranteed payments under Section 707(c) of the
Code. On the facts presented, the payments were not disguised distributions
of partnership net income, but were compensation for services payable
without regard to partnership income." At the same time in Revenue Ruling
81-301, 198 1-2 C.B. 144, the Service buttressed Pratt's Section 707(a) analysis
by possibly limiting the predecessor to Section 707(a(l)'s non-partner
capacity transactions to those where the partner's services for the
partnership in question were substantially the same as services it rendered as
an independent contractor or as an agent for others. In Revenue Ruling 81-
301 the partner receiving the payment in question, an investment advisor, was
personally liable for partnership losses incurred in investments made pursuant
to his services or advice, incurred his own expenses in rendering advice
(including office expenses and personnel expenses), and could be removed by a
majority vote of the other partners.
Congress apparently concluded that Revenue Ruling 81-300 was
insufficient to channel partnership payments to partners for services that
would not be currently deductible, if paid to third parties, into Section 707(c)
classification and, accordingly, in 1984 enacted Section 707(a)(2)(A), which
provides for regulations treating a transaction as a Section 707(a)(1) non-
partner capacity transaction (and hence subject to the "origin-of-the-claim"
test, but not to the special accrual rules of Section 707(c)) if (a) the rendition
of the services or transfer of property by the partner, and the (b) a related
direct or indirect partnership allocation viewed together with the distribution
are "properly" so characterized. I.R.C. S 707(a)(2)(A).
Congress did not intend for new Section 707(a)(2)(A) to override Section
721 or to apply to an allocation to a partner for an extended period to reflect
his/her contribution of property or services to the partnership where the such
allocation was received in his/her capacity as a partner. S. Print. No. 169,
supra at 226. See Hearings on High-Income Taxpayers and Related
Partnership Tax Issues before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1985) (Aronson)•
Congress' goal was "transactions that worked to avoid capitalization
requirements or other rules and restrictions governing direct payments .
e.g., "allocations used to pay partnership organization or syndication fees
." Id.; Tax Shelter Hearings, supra at 226.
Congress sketched, six, nonexclusive, factors for "determining whether
the partner is receiving the putative allocation and distribution in his
capacity as a partner." S. Print. No. 169, supra at 226. The first, and
generally most important, factor is whether the partner's allocation-cum-
distribution is subject to significant entreprenurial risk to the recipient
partner as to the amount and fact of payment. Id. at 227. Short-term, gross
income allocations would be particularly suspect-here, since (a) less risk, (b)
transitory, and (c) close in time to the performance of the services (the latter
two elements also constitute negative criteria considered by Congress). Id.
In summary, in order to determine the proper characterization of the
payment a two-step analysis is often necessary. The first question is whether
the services were performed or property, etc., transferred in the partner's
capacity as a partner. If not, Section 707(a)(1) would apply if the service
provider or transferor were otherwise a partner. On the other hand even if
the services were provided in the service provider's or transferor's capacity as
a partner, the payment can take on a non-partner characteristic, i.e., Section
707(c) status as a guaranteed payment or Section 707(a)(2)(A) equivalent of a
"fee", if the payment terms manifested sufficient non-partner characteristics
as to certainty of payment. As to this latter question new Section
707(a)(2)(A) often, if not always, should be determinative.
iv. Compensatory Profits Share
The conventional approach (Diamond etc.) as to a profits interest
received for service constitutes perhaps the most severe aggregate-entity
conflict, since largely unrecognized.
(A) Interest in Capital Contributions of Others
Clearly if a taxpayer receives an interest in the capital contributions of
the other partners in exchange for services to the partnership, past or future,
the exchange of the services for the partnership capital interest does not
come within the nonrecognition umbrella of Section 721. Treas. Reg. S 1.72 1-
l(b)(1). Rather payment of the capital interest for services rendered to the
partnership is treated as a Section 707(c) guaranteed payment, namely, a
transfer by the partnership of an undivided interest in partnership assets to
the service partner for his/her services followed by his/her recontribution of
such undivided interest to the capital of the partnership. The deduction, if
any, to the partners for such payment must be allocated to the other partners
under Section 706(d)(2). See Note, supra, 5 Va. Tax Rev. at 151 n.170. The
partnership would generally have a stepped up fair market value basis
therefore in that portion of its assets deemed recontributed to the
partnership by the service partner. Although not covered by the Section
704(c) regulations, equity and arguably the assignment of income doctrine
would require that the partnership assets and capital accounts be revalued
upon this transaction, and differences between the other partners' outside
basis and the partnership's inside basis should be taken account of under
Section 707(c) principles.
The Section 721 regulations do not address the transfer of an interest in
the other partners' capital contributions for services to such other partners,
rather than to the partnership. However, McDougal v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 720
(1974), achieves much the same affect as a constructive sale to the partner
followed by recontribution approach for services rendered to the
partnership. Such a transaction is treated as a transfer by the capital partner
of an undivided interest in the partnership assets in exchange for the past
services, resulting in recognition by the service partner and the capital
partner, followed by a contribution by the service partner of his/her undivided
interest in the assets to the partnership. If a new partnership is involved, the
transfer by the capital partner would probably trigger Section 704(c).
(B) Profit-Share for Future Services
If a taxpayer receives a "profit share" for performing future services to
the partnership, the essential issue is whether such "future partnership
payments" constitute a distributive share under Section 704 or a payment to a
non-partner under Section 707(a)(1). In the case of such a payment to a non-
partner, Section 83 would apply to require inclusion of income as soon as the
partnership interest becomes nonforfeitable.
If a "profits interest"-cum-distribution is neither capped nor floored and
is received for future services with both the profits interest and the services
continuing for some period, the allocation and subsequent distribution
constitute a Section 704 distributive share and Section 73 1, etc. distribution
and neither a Section 707(a) non-partnership capacity payment, Section 707(c)
guaranteed payment, nor a Section 707(a)(2)(A) deemed non-partnership
capacity where payment involves entreprenurial risk, etc. Where the
allocation and distribution constitute such a distributive share and
accompanying distribution, the partner is taxed under Sections 702(a) and
704(a) or (b), in the partnership tax year in which the allocation is effected
rather than in the year in which the partnership profit share is received.
(C) Past Services on Own Behalf
Stafford v. United States, 727 F.2d 1045 (11th Cir. 1984) and St. John v.
United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 11 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983), involve more extensive
promotional services than did Diamond v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 530 (197 1), aff'd
492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), but all three decisions were on the same
spectrum of value created by services. Stafford by its more extensive
services would seem even more in contradiction to the Diamond principle that
a profits interest received for services constitutes a taxable transaction
(where the profits interest can be valued). Stafford, however, found that the
value created by the promoter, here a letter of intent, constituted property
and hence came within Section 721. The underlying policy here is preventing
a service renderer from converting service created value into capital gain,
Lane, Sol Diamond: The Tax Court Upsets the Service Partner, 46 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 239, 252-58 (1973). Stafford would appear to be contrary to this policy,
unlike Diamond. The same policy can be seen in the legal fiction chosen by
the Tax Court in Hale v. Corm'r, 24 T.C.M. 1497 (1965), a pre-Diamond
services case, where the Tax Court denied capital gains to the sale of a
profits interest on the grounds that it was merely a future income carve out
denying capital gain under P.C. Lake, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
Other 1984 amendments to the partnership provisions (coupled with
Section 707(a)(2)) supply an approach that reconciles Stafford with the
underlying policy of prevention of conversion of income and at the same time
provides a mechanism for taxing the service partner at a better time, namely
disposition of the partnership profits interest or a disposition by the
partnership of the underlying value created by the services partner. Under
new Section 724, if the property transferred by the services partner would
have yielded ordinary income if sold by him/her, then such value constitutes a
"inventory" item as to the transferor partner, and hence an inventory item to
the transferee partnership. Consequently, if the partnership sells this value
(within 5-years) it will result in ordinary income which must be allocated, due
to the difference between basis to the transferor partner-zero--and value, to
the transferor partner under Section 704(c). Section 724 taints such
"inventory items" as to the partnership and partner for only five years.
Similiarly, if during this initial five year period the service partner sold
his/her partnership profits interest, Section 724 coupled with Section 751(a)
would equally result in ordinary income to the service partner. For this
conceptual framework to work the value created by the service partner
should not be added to the basis of say a Section 1231 asset, but treated as a
free standing asset, yielding ordinary income. Cf. Lee, Start-Up Costs,
Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-
On Tax Reform and a Touch of Basics. 6 Va. Tax Rev., 1, 32-38. As to
whether a sale by the service partner of such created value would yield
ordinary income, the cases are a bit split. Some jurisdictions allow extensive
efforts by the taxpayer to still yield capital gain where but a single sale is
involved. Comm'r v. Williams. 256 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1958). Other
transactions look more to the overall business of the taxpayer and the efforts
involved importing a more or less products of efforts approach. Bush v.
Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. 340 (1977), aff'd, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 11 9118 (6th Cir. 1979).
(D) Past Services on Behalf of Partnership.
The Eleventh Circuit in Stafford was careful to point out that the
ownership rights in the letter intent in question lay with the service partner
and not with the partnership.
If the partnership owned the letter of intent, Stafford could
not be said to have contributed that letter because it was
not his to give. Thus, Stafford would not be eligible for
nonrecognition under S 721. on his receipt of the third
partnership share [Stafford bought two other partnership
shares for cash]. A detailed examination of the record and
the application of the legal principles set forth in James
leads us to conclude that Stafford owned the letter of intent
and it was his property to contribute to the investment
vehicle of his choice. 727 F.2d at 1049.
Stafford relied upon a Section 351 decision, James v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 69
(1969), where the taxpayer providing services entered into a contract with the
capital providers whereby the service provider agreed to secure necessary
legal and architectural work and arrange for a financing of a rental
apartment project on the capital supplier's land. Upon completion of the
project, the landowners would transfer their land to a corporation which
would then issue stock both to the landowner and to the service provider. The
stock issued to the service provider was purportedly received in exchange for
a loan commitment for the financing of the project. The loan commitment
ran in favor of the corporation because the lenders' regulations permitted
commitments only to corporations and not to individuals. In the corporate
context Section 351(d) and predecessor provisions clearly state that "services"
do not constitute property for purposes of Section 351 which also requires a
property transfer. However, the explicit statutory exclusion of "services"
from the term "property" apparently achieved the same result as pre-1954
case law. James v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. at 67, citing an early edition of Bittker
& Eustice. And the Tax Court in Diamond pointed to the pre-1954 Code
history of the predecessor to Section 351 where case law without any specific
statutory authority had established that "services" did not constitute
"property" for purposes of the predecessor of Section 351. 56 T.C. at 545
n.14.
However, under a deep structure analysis the similarity between
Sections 721 and 351 in this context disappears. The true policy reason for
not classifying services as property for Section 351 purposes is that otherwise
the service provider can convert his/her services into a stock interest in the
corporation which then could be sold at capital gains rates, due to the entity
approach to corporations (C or S). Lane, supra. The collapsible corporation
provisions discussed below only infrequently retard this conversion of the
services into capital gains. On the other hand, as discussed above Sections
704(c), 724 and 751 produce the proper character and timing: ordinary
income to the service partner but only upon a disposition by the partnership
of the value created by him/her or upon a disposition of the partnership
interest (during the five-year taint period of Section 724). Therefore, on a
policy basis past services for the partnership should generally be treated the
same as past services on the service provider's own behalf transferred to the
partnership.
True, casting the analysis in terms of what did the service provider
transfer to the partnership if the partnership already owned the
developmental rights superficially creates conceptual problems. However,
Section 707(a)(2)'s legislative history directs the regulations to provide "that
persons who become partners after performing services for ... the
partnership are to be treated as partners." S. Print. No. 169, supra at 232;
see also id. at 227 (first paragraph). The 1984 Bluebook explains that such
service providers will immediately be treated as partners for purposes of
Section 707(a)(2) even though they "formally" become partners later. Thus,
under the emerging approach of Section 707(a)(2) the question is twofold:
were the services of the sort that would be performed by a partner within
his/her capacity as a partner and, if so, was the form of payment a
"distributive share" or a more risk-less payment. Under this analysis in most
cases the service provider would be a partner performing services within the
scope of employment and the "payment" would constitute a Section 702
distributive share, followed by distribution. As further discussed below,
where the service provider "materially participates," the partnership should
be treated as an aggregate to yield as close an approximation to "direct
taxation" as possible.
v. "Guaranteed Payments" Under Section 707(c): What's Left?
The majority view is that Section 707(c) applies only to transactions
that qualify on the transfer/performance side of the transaction as
partnership capacity transactions (a la Pratt and Otey). See Leder,
Guaranteed Payments, Management and Promoters, 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed.
Tax. 14-1, 14-13 (1982); McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, supra at 113.01. Contra
Cowan, Compensating the General Partner: "The Pratt Case", 56 Taxes 10
(1978). Otherwise the non-partner capacity transaction-oriented Section
707(a)(1) would apply. Again the bright line test is whether the transfer is of
an essential asset or a sporadic, not essential asset transfer and in the case of
services, etc. whether the performance is continual or essential to the
business.
The second Section 707(c) element is the "payment's" determination be
"without regard to the income of the partnership." Cases have derived from
Section 707(c)'s focus on the manner in which the payment is determined an
underlying policy of distinguishing between (a) Section 704 entrepreneurial
risk payments, actually Section 704 distributive share cum-Section 73 1(a)
distributions, and (b) Section 707 payments, on the basis of "whether payment
by the partnership to the partner is at the risk of the economic fortunes of
the partnership." Otey v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. at 320. Thus, the essence of
Section 707(c) is (1) a partner capacity transfer accompanied by (2) a non-
partner capacity payment. This, as we have seen also constitutes the core of
a Section 707(a)(2) transaction; (a) partner capacity transfer and (b) a
distributive share of income/gain-cum-distribution or distribution alone which
are the equivalent of a direct payment or sale not at the risk of the fortunes
of the partnership. Thus the question arises as to how to distinguish a Section
707(c) guaranteed payment from a Section 707(a)(2) transaction. Two easy
distinctions are that Section 707(c) applies to payments to a partner for the
use of capital whereas Section 707(a)(2) does not. Conversely, Section
707(a)(2) applies to transfers of property to the partnership whereas Section
707(c) does not. The difficult area is that payments for services to which
both apply.
A tight reading of Section 707(a)(2)(A) and Section 707(c), together the
legislative history of Section 707(a)(2)(A), which manifests that Congress was
"concerned with transactions that worked to avoid capitalization
requirements or other rules and restrictions governing direct payments .
S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 226, indicates that the key distinction is the form of
the payment. In the case of a 707(a)(2)(A) payment the form of the payment
is an "allocation" and "distribution", when the substance of the performance
of the partner-capacity services plus the allocation-cum-distribution is a
direct payment for the services. In contrast in Section 707(c) the form and
the substance are the same: a direct payment. Thus where the form is a
payment and the services are partner-capacity services Section 707(c)
applies. If the form is a payment but the services are non-partner capacity
services, then Section 707(a)(1) applies. If the form of the payment is a
distributive share-cum-distribution, but the substance is a non-partner
capacity payment for partner capacity services, then Section 707(a)(2)(A)
applies. Presumably Section 707(a)(2)(B) never applies to a performance of
services, but only a transfer of property. Were Section 707(a)(2)(B) to apply,
there would be no means of distinguishing Section 707(a)(2)(B) from Section
707(c) because Section 707(a)(2)(B) does not speak of the form of transfer in
or transfer out, but rather the broader term transfer which would cover
transactions both cast as a sale and cast as a Section 721 transaction.
Apparently the conflict between the Service and the Tax Court in Pratt
as to whether a distributive share-cum-distribution based upon partnership
gross income constitutes a "guaranteed payment" has been resolved in favor
of the Pratt exclusion from guaranteed payments by treating the issue instead
under Section 707(a)(2)(A), which is entirely proper since payments depended
upon gross income may or may not reflect partner-risk as to the fact and
amount of payment. See Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. at 14-9-
14-12.
Since both Sections 707(a)(2)(A) and 707(c) are aimed at the same
substantive transactions (although cast in opposite form) the important
question is the distinctions in treatment under Sections 707(a)(1) and 707(c),
since Section 707(a)(2) transactions are treated as deemed Section 707(a)(1)
transactions. The differences are (a) timing of inclusion and deduction and (b)
the character of income. In the case of a guaranteed payment, the partner
must include the payment as ordinary income in his/her taxable year with, or
within, which ends the partnership's taxable year in which the partnership
deducted such payments. Treas. Reg. S 1.707-1(c). Interestingly, the timing
of the partnership's deduction turns on when the partner includes the amount
in income. The bottom line is that a Section 707(a)(1) payment is includable
in income by the partner in accordance with his/her own method of
accounting, generally cash, which means when received, see Leder, s 41
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. at 14-18, and the partnership getsa deduction only
at that time. Conversely, because a partner picks up, notwithstanding the
cash method of accounting, a guaranteed payment as income in the year in
which the partnership accrues it, the partner has income in that earlier year
and the partnership has a deduction in that year. Thus, Section 707(c) can
accelerate both income and deduction.
The Section 707(c) payment carries ordinary income status and carries
with it non-partner capacity status but only for purposes of Sections 61 and
162. Conversely, Section 707(a)(1) payments are also ordinary to the
recipient, but carry with them third party status for all purposes of the
Code. Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. at 14-18.
Existing Section 707(c) regulations take the position that a "minimum
guarantee", i.e., "where the partner has a general profit percentage, but is
guaranteed a minimum amount [, ... the guaranteed amount is a guaranteed
payment only to the extent it is greater than the amount the guaranteed
partner would have received solely by application of his general profit
percentage." Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. at 14-17; Treas. Reg.
S 1.707-1(c), ex. 2. Leder argues that this provision is at odds with the
legislative history to the 1954 Code. See Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed.
Tax. at 14-7, n.12. Be that as it may, clearly application of such a rule would
allow subversion in part of the purpose of Section 707(a)(2). In other words if
the payment for the partner-capacity services is structured as a distributive
share cum distribution and Section 707(a)(2)(A) applies, the entire distributive
share cum distribution is treated as a direct payment. Conversely, if the
payment is cast as a general profit percentage with a guaranteed minimum
payment, only the excess of the minimum payment over what the general
profit percentage would have yielded is treated as a direct payment under
Section 707(c). The distributive share that the partner would have received
any way obtains distributive share treatment. Yet, economically it is not at
risk. One might expect Treasury to address this anomaly and discontinuity
under the directive that existing Sections 707 (and 736) regulations be
reviewed in light of the policies of Section 707(a)(2)(A).
b. Subchapter S
i. Introduction
Subchapter S contains no analogue to Section 707. Moreover,
conventional doctrine holds that the businesses of a corporation (including an
S corporation) and of its shareholders are separate. Whipple v. Comm'r, 373
U.S. 193 (1963). And a shareholder has no obligation to contribute "essential
services or property to his/her corporation. Therefore, if an S shareholder
performs services for his/her S corporation and is paid, the issue theoretically
cannot be whether the performance was in a "partner" capacity or whether
payment was subject to entrepreneurial risk (unless a note were received).
Instead the only tax issues are whether the compensation was "reasonable"
under Section 162(a) or whether the payment was for services or constituted a
constructive dividend.
The Joint Committee Staff in its 1980 Subchapter S Revision
Recommendations focused a narrow aspect of owner-entity compensation
arrangements: incorporation of investments and "compensation" payments by
the S corporation to the owner for managing the investments. It proposed to
reduce compensation to S shareholder -- employees in the proportion that the
S corporation's "passive income" bore to gross receipts if such income
exceeded a 20% of gross receipts floor. Staf f S Recom mendations supra at
20. This provision dropped out by the 1982 revisions.
Section 1366(e) does provide for adjustments to the S's passthrough of
items to be taken into account by its shareholders where a "member of the
family" of one or more S shareholders renders services or furnishes capital to
the S Corporation without receiving "reasonable compensation". But this
provision is thus limited to family S Corporations like the family partnership
rules of Section 704(e).
ii. Compensatory Profit Share.
Again this is an area in which there are no special S corporation rules
and instead the general C corporation entity rules apply. I.R.C. S 137 1.
Under those rules neither past nor future services on behalf of the S
corporation constitute property for purposes of Section 35 1. I.R.C. S 35 1(d).
Thus, in those two instances the service provider would recognize gain or loss
upon receipt of the stock, subject to the rules of Section 83.
This leaves the Stafford type transaction of services on behalf of the
service provider rather than of the corporation creating a property interest
which is tranferred to the S corporation. While Stafford would sanction
treatment of, for example, a letter of intent as property for Section 351, on a
policy basis this produces the wrong result. For a subsequent sale of the
stock would generally yield capital gains, unless the collapsible corporation
provisions apply. Most tax shelter operations if conducted in corporate form,
particularly of rental property, would probably constitute collapsible
corporations. Then the question is whether the escape hatches of Sections
34 1(e) or 34 1(e) can be availed of. Essentially the latter provision lets an
otherwise collapsible corporation out from under the collapsible provisions
(which convert what would otherwise be shareholder level capital gain into
ordinary income, I.R.C. S 341) where neither the corporation nor substantial
shareholders are "dealers" or "hypothetical dealers" as to the S corporation's
assets. In the typical rental operations, the corporation presumably holds the
property primarily for rental and not for sale. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569
(1966). The Corn Products doctrine might produce a different result. Turning
to the shareholder level, a different result obtains according to whether the
shareholder is (a) a more than five percent, but not more than twenty percent
shareholder, or (b) a twenty percent or more shareholder. The former is
tainted only if in his his/her own right he/she is a dealer, the latter is subject
to a "hypothetical dealer" test which would apply in many instances. In short,
the service provider may in some instances be able to obtain capital gains,
contrary to the pattern of the partnership provisions. Accordingly from a
policy point of view Stafford's analysis should not apply to a transfer to a
controlled S corporation.
2. Loans
a. Subchapter K
i. Introduction
The Senate Finance Committee extended in the 1954 Code with scant
explanation Section 707(c) "guaranteed payment" treatment to a partnership's
payments of interest on partner loans to it to the extent such interest
payments were determined without regard to partnership income. S. Rep. No.
1622, supra at 92, 387. The cases, however, have not explored whether a
partner's loan to the partnership constitutes a non-partnership capacity
advance of capital. Presumably this should turn, at least in part, on whether
the loan was in the scope of the partner's activities, cf. Pratt v. Comm'r,
supra Furthermore, with the advent of Section 707(a)(2) the question arises
whether the partnership's repayment was subject to entrepreneurial risk.
ii. Debt-Equity.
(A) Introduction
Debt-equity arises in 2 partnership contents: (a) "sale" of property to
the partnership for a note and (b) advance of capital to the partnership.
Treas. Reg. S 1.72 1-1 treats a partner's transfer of property to a partnership
for "a promissory obligation fixed in amount and time for payment.., as a
sale or exchange under Section 707 rather than as contribution under Section
721." Notwithstanding conventional wisdom that traditional C corporation
debt-equity principles apply in Subchapter K, an approach, like Section
707(a)(2), focusing on entrepreneurial risk to payment should be taken. See
Gibson Prods. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d at 1047-49.
ALI took a more black-letter approach:
"Under Proposals. . ., a transaction will generally be
treated as a sale if, at the time of transfer of property
to a partnership or of a shift in partnership interest, the
transferring or diluted partner has received money or
other property ... or is reasonably certain of receiving
such money or other property. The determination of
whether the receipt of money or other property is
reasonably certain is factual one. However, if the
receipt by its terms and in fact will come solely from the
operating cash flow of the partnership earned after the
transfer, it will not be considered to be reasonably
certain under the Proposal, if it is highly likely that the
cash flow will be earned. On the other hand, the receipt
of money or other property will generally be considered
to be reasonably certain if the documents contained an
obligation to pay or transfer such money or other
property on a fixed schedule, and in all events, whether
or not such payment schedule extends beyond the 24-
month period provided for in the Proposal... [the genesis
of the three-year presumption in the legislative history.]"
ALI, supra at 187.
(B) Conventional Wisdom
Conventional wisdom and the handful of precedents considering the
issue have held that a promissory obligation in form may constitute in
substance an equity contribution under more-or-less traditional debt-equity
principles derived from the corporate arena. See McKee, Nelson & Whitmire,
supra at 1 3.03[3]; J1 4.07[41; and especially 1 7.02[2 and cases cited
therein. The most extensive analysis of the application of (corporate) debt-
equity analysis to purported loans to a partnership is presented by
Hambuechen v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 90, 98-105 (1964), a 1939 Code decision. The
Tax Court, however, applied the Hambuechen incorporation of corporate
debt-equity criteria to Subehapter K oi tHe T954 Code without question,
notwithstanding Section 707, which has no 1939 Code counterpart. Kingbay v.
Comm'r, 46 T.C. 147 (1966). Ironically, there the taxpayer (a limited partner)
argued, in the context of Section 752 and sharing of liabilities, that loans by
the principal shareholder of the corporate general partner to the partnership
for which such general partner was personally liable should be considered
contributions by him to the capital of the partnership under the Hambuechen
incorporation of corporate debt-equity criteria. The Tax Court in
determining whether the advances were in reality capital contributions to the
partnership and not loans, applied traditional corporate debt-equity criteria.
Kingbay restated approvingly the Hambuechen criteria:
[W]hether a particular transaction creates a valid debtor-
creditor relationship or is in reality a contribution to capital
is a question of fact to be determined from all the
surrounding circumstances with the burden of proof on the
taxpayer. Such factors as the adequacy of the capitalization
of the debtor, the issuance of notes, provision for and
payment of interest, presence or absence of a maturity date,
intention to repay, whether the debt is subordinated to
claims of outside creditors, presence or absence of security
for the loan, reasonableness of expectation of repayment,
use to which the funds were put, are among those to be
considered in making the determination. 46 T.C. at 154.
Rigorous analysis of the corporate debt-equity cases boils these down to
essentially four mega-factors:
1. Proportionality
2. Excessive Debt or "Thin Capitalization"
3. Essential Assets, discussed more fully below, generally used more in
the context of sales of appreciated property to a controlled entity than with
fresh capitalization used to acquire initial operating assets from outsiders;
and
4. Intent, which often really means that there is substantial economic
reality, i.e., an outside creditor would make the loan, or whether there has
been in fact actual enforcement of the terms of instrument when due. See
generally, Plumb, Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: "A
Critical Analysis and a Proposal 26 Tax L. Rev. 369 (1971); Bittker &
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, pp. 4-10-
4-15 (1979).
Hambuechen, however, followed the above laundry list of factors with
the "apt" statement that "the essential difference between a creditor and a
shareholder is that the latter intends to make an investment and take the
risks of the venture, while the former seeks a definite obligation, payable in
any event." 43 T.C. at 99. And, the Tax Court concluded that the advance
made by the taxpayer "was intended to be subject to the risk of the business
and not repayable in any event." 43 T.C. at 105. Nevertheless, Hambuechen
at the same time balanced its "risks of the venture" policy with a statement
indicating that "reasonable expectation of repayment," as contrasted with
placing the advances "at the risk of the business," constitutes a significant
factor, "[allthough no one factor by itself is determinative." The
Hambuechen court believed that it was applying a "substantial economic
reality" test. Id. at 104. "It had been stated many times that the form the
transaction takes is not controlling, but rather the 'substance"'. 43 T.C. at
90.
The taxpayer in Hambuechen argued that the court should not use the
corporate debt-equity factors, but did not "enlighten" the court as to what
test or factors to be used.
We can see no valid reason why, once it is necessary, for tax
purposes, to determine the existence of a debtor-creditor
relationship, such determination must be made upon
different factors or criteria depending upon who the debtor
and creditor are and the relationship to each other. 43 T.C.
at 101.
(C) Preemption by New Section 707(a)(2)
Recall that Hambuechen was a 1939 Code case and there was no
analogue to Section 707 under the 1939 Code (and partner capacity and
outsider-like dealings issues created a great deal of confusion under the 1939
Code. See Cowan, Compensating the General Partner: The Pratt Case, 56
Taxes 10T1978)). Thus the question must be asked whether Section 707 as
enacted or Section 707(a)(2) preempt the area. For the policies underlying
Section 707, especially Section 707(a)(2), parallel the underlying policies
judicially fashioned in the partnership debt-equity arena: economic effect
and expectation of repayment versus an advance "intended to be subject to
the risk of the business and not repayable in any event." Hambuechen v.
Cornm'r; 43 T.C. at 105. Therefore, if the partnership debt-equity issue at
least in the "disguised equity contribution", "sale" form context can be
brought within the framework of Section 707, then arguably the regulations,
particularly under Section 707(a)(2), should preempt further case-law
development. Section 707(a)(1) often would not apply directly even if the
debt were recognized as debt, since its scope is limited to non-partner
capacity transfers and often the purported sale is of essential operating
assets; hence, a partner-capacity transfer under Otey. At the same time
Section 707(c) would usually be inapplicable to credit "sales" or property
transfers for a note since it supplies "guaranteed payments" treatment to
partner capacity transactions, but only in the case performance of services
and return on capital invested. This leaves Section 707(a)(2) in the "sale"
context, but in the pure loan context (note for cash) Section 707(c) would
apply.
Section 707(a)(2)(A) clearly cannot apply. It recharacterizes as a
transaction occuring between a partnership and a partner acting other than in
his capacity as a member of the partnership, i.e., as a direct fee or sale, a
partnership allocation cum distribution and the performance of services for,
or transfer of property to, the partnership having "the substantial economic
effect of direct payments for such property or services .... " S. Rep. No.
169, supra at 226. It does not, however, provide for the reverse, treatment
of a purported direct payment as in economic effect a partnership allocation
and distribution where the allocation (cum distribution) is subject to
significant entreprenuerial risk. Moreover, the policy underlying Section
707(a)(2)(A) is inapplicable to a debt-equity question. The Senate Finance
Committee was "concerned with transactions that work to avoid
capitalization requirements or other rules and restrictions governing direct
payments .... " Id. at 226.
Section 707(a)(2)(B) is more problematical. Unlike Section 707(a)(2)(A),
subparagraph (2)(B) refers only to a "transfer of money or property into the
partnership and a related transfer of money or other property from the
partnership to the partner (or another partner in the case of a partner to
partner disguised sale or exchange) where such transfers, "when viewed
together, are properly characterized as a sale of property." The purpose of
Section 707(a)(2)(B) is to prevent the parties from characterizing what is in
economic effect a sale or exchange of property as a tax-free Section 721
contribution to the partnership followed by a tax-free Section 731 distribution
from the partnership in order to avoid or defer tax on the transaction. S.
Rep. No. 169, supra at 230. Conversely, if the transaction does not
substantially resemble economically a sale or exchange of all or part of the
property, then the contribution comes under Section 72 1, and not Section 707,
and the payment out will be a distributive share and not a deemed nonpartner
capacity transaction, i.e., sale. See Otey v. Comm'r. 70 T.C. at 319.
As discussed above Section 707(a)(2)(B) rests on the assumption that the
"transfer" in is in a partner capacity. The issue then is whether the payment
by the partnership to the partner is at the risk of the economic fortunes of
the partnership, Otey v. Comm'r, supra at 230. In short, therefore, Section
707(a)(2)(B) can form the framework for regulations determining whether the
transfer of money or other property, including the promissory note by the
partnership to such partner plus the transfer of money or other property to
the partnership, when viewed together, are properly characterized as (a) a
sale of property, or (b) a tax-free contribution of property, followed by a
generally tax-free distribution. Such regulations should preempt the case law
debt-equity approach (much like the Section 482 preemption of Section 61
assignment of income doctrine where both overlap, s e.g., Haag v. Comm'r,
88 T.C. No. 32 (March 16, 1987)).
Unfortunately, however, Section 707(a)(2)(B)'s legislative history offers
scant guidance as to when a transfer in-cum-transfer out economically
resembles a sale rather than an equity contribution-cum-distribution, in
contrast with Section 707(a)(2)(B) legislative history which details common
factors militating towards entrepreneurial risk. But as discussed below, the
loan-proceeds distribution and deficit-restoration discussion indicate that
where the "payment" is made in fixed form, the issue is the probability that
the partner may retain the distributed property (cash distribution).
Analogously with a note payment, the question is the probabilities of actual
payment. For this reason alone the "objective" approach of the ill-fated
Section 385 regulations probably cannot be used.
Several of the traditional corporate debt-equity factors listed by the
Tax Court in Hambuechen are directed to the reasonable expectations of
repayment versus subject to the risks of the venture: Reasonableness of
expectation of repayment, use to which the funds were put, and whether
payment can only be made out of future profits .... " 43 T.C. at 99; accord,
Kingbay v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. at 154. The reasonableness of expectation of
repayment has traditionally focused in large part on "source of payments".
See Plumb, 26 Tax L. Rev. supra at 526. Generally, a source of repayment
analysis becomes important where the shareholder advance to her/his
corporation is used to acquire essential operating assets, or perhaps even
more frequently where such assets are transferred by the shareholder to the
corporation in exchange for the purported debt. Id. at 522. The character of
such essential operating assets narrows the sources from which payment
reasonably may be expected. Id. at 522, 526. Generally, a corporation has
four potential sources for repayment of shareholder advances: (1) liquidation
of assets; (2) profits from operations; (3) cash flow, i.e., excess of receipts
over cash outlay; and (4) refinancing of liabilities or borrowing against
appreciation in assets. In the corporate context if liquidation (operating)
assets is the only source of repayment, generally a strong inference arises
that shareholder-creditors would not undertake such drastic action and hence
do not "intend" true loan status. Plumb, supra 26 Tax L. Rev. at 526. A
different story is presented by a real estate development business which
gradually does liquidate its original assets, unless substantial additional funds
were needed to develop such assets for resale. See. . Aqualane Shores,
Inc. v. Comm'r. 269 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1959). A bona fide third party
purchase offer has been bootstrapped into a source of repayments on the
grounds that the properties contain self-liquidating potential. Bradshaw v.
United States, 683 F.2d 365, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1982). Profits on the other hand
constitute an excellent source for repayment of "debt" unless speculative in
an untried business. Plumb, 26 Tax L. Rev. 527-28. Projected cash flow
adequate to retire the purported the debt according to its own terms is the
most meaningful criterion of economic reality. Id. at 528-29.
A final, perhaps minor factor in the corporate debt equity context is a
"core" or "essential assets" risk analysis which superficially appears
substantially similar to the Otey partner capacity analysis focusing on
whether the transferred property was essential to the purpose for which the
partnership was formed. The corporate debt-equity argument here runs that
where purported debt was issued (a) in exchange for funds used to acquire
essential operating assets, under an economic substance analysis such assets
by their very nature are placed at the risk of the business and manifest a
continued proprietary interest due to the high degree of risk which is the
essence of an equity interest. See Plumb, 26 Tax L. Rev. at 520. Some
commentators argue that because loans from outsiders can be used to
purchase essential assets, loans from shareholders or transfers from
shareholders for the same purpose are permitted so long as expectation of
payment is reasonable. Bittker & Eustice, supra at 14-13-14-14. The reality
appears to be that substantially "pro rata" to a corporation with substantial
debt, shareholder advances used for core assets or core assets transferred for
corporate notes require a very certain source of payment aside from
speculative profits, ability to self liquidate the core assets, etc. Compare
Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d at 373; Plumb, supra 26 Tax L. Rev. at
520-22.
In Otey, however, the transfer of the essential operating asset by the
partner was a factor in determining whether the transfer was in the partner's
capacity. There the property was a part of the raison d'etre of the
partnership formation. Essential operating asset was not a factor here as to
probability of repayment,but rather was relevant to the role the partner was
to play in the partnership. Since the Section 707(a)(2) legislative history
relegates determination of partnership capacity transfer to a very
subordinate role, the fact that operating assets are transferred for the
purported note might not be a major factor in itself as to whether the note
constitutes debt or equity. Furthermore, since this aspect is encompassed by
the first step of the two-step analysis, it should not play a major role in the
second factor unless it truly significantly lessens the probabilities of
repayment.
(D) Non-recourse Debt-Equity Advances by a Partner and Section 752(e)
Partnership debt-equity issues raise a problem that does not arise in
corporate, including S corporation, debt-equity issues. A partner's equity
contribution is includable only in her/his basis under Section 723, but a
recourse or nonrecourse loan to the partnership by the partner is shared as a
partnership liability by the other partners under the Section 752 rules. Not
surprisingly with the proliferation of tax shelters, in recent years partnership
debt-equity controversy has arisen in this Section 752 arena. The opening
salvos were Revenue Rulings 72-135, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 200, and 72-350,
1972-2 Cum. Bull. 394. Revenue Ruling 72-135 flatly states that a non-
recourse "loan" from the general partner to a limited partner (in a limited
partnership engaged in the acquisition, exploration, development, and
operation of oil and natural gas properties) or to the partnership constitutes a
contribution to the capital of the partnership by the general partner, rather
than a loan. Consequently, the nonrecourse liability in the case of a
purported loan to the partnership could not be shared by the limited partners
and amounts lent to them by the general and then contributed to the
partnership were not included in their basis either. The probabilities of
repayment, and hence who would bear the ultimate risk, was not discussed.
Revenue Ruling 72-350 proceeds more along a risk analysis approach. The
loan to an oil and gas partnership their was secured by the partner's
properties "consisting of some unproven leases and some expensive but
virtually unsalvageable oil and gas well installations." 1972-2 Cum. Bull.
395. Additionally, the lender who was not otherwise a partner had the right
at any time to convert the loan and receive in exchange a 25 percent equity
interest. The lender was not formally a member of the partnership. Revenue
Ruling 72-350 concluded that the so called "loan" was not a bona fide debt but
"in reality, capital placed at the risk of the venture .... " Thus the funds
advanced by the purported lender constituted his equity interest in the
venture. Therefore the limited partners could not include such purported
non-recourse loan in their bases.
I
Revenue Ruling 72-330 apparently described a common technique in the
oil and gas industry for boosting limited partners' bases. See Backar v.
Western States Producing Co, 547 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1977); Gibson Products
Co. v. United States 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1978) aff'd. 637 F.2d
1041 (5th Cir. 1981); Dillingham v. United States, 81-2 U.S. T.C. 11 9601
(W.D. Okla. 1981). See also Joint Committee, Handbook on Tax Shelters 36
n.9 (April 22, 1976) ("[TIhere may be questions as to whether nonrecourse
loans made to the partnership [engaged in oil and gas drilling and production]
should be treated as debt, which may be used to increase the basis of limited
partners, or an equity investment by the lender which may not be so used.").
While the district court in Gibson Products did not resolve the debt equity
question since it found the repayment obligation to be too contingent (and the
purported liability exceeded the fair market value of the assets), the Fifth
Circuit supplied an extensive financial risk analysis approach. 637 F.2d at
1047-49.
True the facts in Gibson Products were extreme with the purported debt
exceeding the fair market value of the property so that the case is an abusive
tax shelter inflated purchase price decision. Nevertheless, the analysis of
reasonable likelihood of repayment in light of all reasonably foreseeable risks
should be the proper focus of a partnership debt-equity analysis. The fact
that the question arises in a Section 752 context where the proper analysis is
ultimate economic risk as to a purported partnership liability, should not
change the analysis, because likelihood of repayment affects that ultimate
economic risk.
b. Subchapter S.
i. Introduction.
Debt-entity in an S corporation context cannot be directly analyzed on
an entrepreneur-like transfer and entrepreneur-like risk as to payment basis.
To date, debt-equity in the S corporation context has largely bogged down
over the second-class of stock issue, now largely resolved by the "straight-
debt" safeharbor of Section 136 1(c)(5)(B). Cases have yet to grapple in a
broader context with how the S issues differ from C issues. But Portgage
Plastics Co. v. United States, 486 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1973), indicates a
receptiveness to looking at Subchapter S policies, or at least the policy of
denying particular tax benefits wrongfully taken. 486 F.2d at 637; 470 F.2d
at 318 nn. 7 and 9.
At first blush, just as with partnerships, the most important traditional
tax uses of owner-held "debt" (i.e., (I) effecting a single tax on corporate
earnings through the inside interest deduction and (2) tax-free withdrawal of
investment), other than "locking in character", are met functionally with a lot
less hassle through use of the pass-thru provisions of the S corporation tax
regime. I.R.C. SS 1366(a), 1367(a)(1), and 1368(b)(1). See Portage Plastics
Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d at 318 n.7. And, if the 1988 rate changes
stick, i.e., the capital gains preference is truly eliminated, this lock-in of
character advantage disappears as well.
Below the surface, minor tax advantages maybe found in debt where a
"conversion" has occurred or is contemplated. In an S corporation converted
from a C corporation, which retains C E&P (C E&P can arise as well in a
reorganization by an S corporation that has always been an S), a shareholder
cannot withdraw her/his investment and share of retained earnings tax free,
except to the extent covered by the Accumulated Adjustments Account
("AAA"). Distributions above AAA constitute ordinary income until C E&P is
exhausted. I.R.C. S 1368(c)(2). In such perhaps limited circumstances
(perhaps less limited in view of the wave of C to S conversions triggered by
the 1986 Code) the principal amount of debt held by an S shareholder can be
received by her/him tax free unless such shareholder's basis in such debt has
already been reduced by her/his "pro rata share" of the S corporation's losses
under Sections 1366(d)(1)(B) and 1367(b)(2)(A), and not restored by a
subsequent pro rata share of the S corporation's income under Section
1367(b)(2)(B).) Conversely, where an S corporation converts to a C
corporation, by termination or revocation of its election under Section
1362(d), the S corporation's debt held by the shareholder then can be used to
withdraw her/his investment or perhaps more accurately bailout earnings.
See Eustice & Kuntz, Subchapter S at 6-9; Portage Plastics Co. v. United
States, 470 F.2d at 318. This ploy lies at the heart of suggested techniques
for avoiding the no basis consequence of inside S corporation debt: viz., the
shareholder instead borrows and then lends the proceeds to the S
corporation. Upon conversion, the S corporation loan still outstanding to the
shareholder serves as the conduit for supplying tax-free principal and interest
income offsetable presumably by an interest deduction under the investment
interest provisions to the shareholder, or even former shareholder. Similarly,
such shareholder loans avoid the no basis consequence of related party loans
to the S corporation. See,.g., Frankel v. Comm'r 61 T.C. 343 (1973), aff'd
(3d Cir. 1974) in unpublished opinion; Prashker v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 172 (1972S;
Lee v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. 1157 (1976). See generally Note, Underwood v.
Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1976) -- Section 1374(c)(2) and the
Actual Investment Limitation on NOL Pass Through to Subchapter C
Corporation Shareholders, 30 Tax Law. 790 (1977).
Shareholder held S corporation debt may also be important in
accomplishing estate freezing objectives, and shifting income or control,
which generally in a C corporation would be effectuated by the issuance of
preferred stock--prohibited under the second class of stock proviso of Section
1361(b)(1)(D). See Coven & Hess, supra Portage Plastics 470 F.2d at 318.
As a practical matter generally such debt was issued at the creation of the
corporation or for additional cash infusions at or before the conversion, since
debt issued for no consideration constitutes a dividend as does debt issued for
stock in a recapitalization under the "excess principal amount" rule of Section
356.
S corporation debt issued (disproportionately) to shareholders does
provide an "economic preference" or priority over stock investment in the
event of the S corporation's business fails. See Eustice & Kuntz, supra at 6-
9. Even proportionate held debt, if secured,-c-uld come ahead of unsecured
outside creditors.
The disadvantages to S corporation debt held by a shareholder as
contrasted with further stock investment are substantial and would appear to
usually outweigh the limited advantages to S corporation debt. See Eustice &
Kuntz, supra at 6-9. First, since pro rata share of income or loss is based
upon stock ownership and not stock and debt ownership, breaking one's
investment up between stock and debt disproportionately to other
shareholders yields a lower share of losses to the extent that the investment
is made in debt. See Schenk, Federal Taxation of S Corporations 5-9 (1985),
Also, bad debt treatment is substantially adverse as contrasted with
treatment of stock assuming that Section 1244 applies. Section 1244 yields
an ordinary deduction up to $50,000 (or $100,000 in the case of a joint
return). I.R.C. S 1244(b) and (a). In contrast, a worthless debt usually yields
short term capital loss under Section 166(d), which in effect limits the
deduction, albeit ordinary, to $3,000 a year or the amount of any capital gain
if greater. See Schenk, supra at 5-10; Eustice & Kuntz, supra at 6-12. But
these problems pale in comparison to the problems that arise if the S
corporation cannot meet the debt service on the shareholder-held note. See
Eustice & Kuntz, supra at 6-9.
An S corporation which runs into debt service problems as to
shareholder debt truly faces the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, the S
corporation's failure to make required payments, particularly interest
payments, under traditional debt-equity analysis manifests an "intent" to
establish an equity relationship rather than a debt relationship, but the
negative impact of such failure was substantially lessened if attributable to
an unexpected cost. See Plumb, supra 26 Tax L. Rev. at 526, and 522. Under
the withdrawn, reproposed Section 385 regulations (inapplicable to S
corporations), a failure to pay interest in a subsequent year rendered an
instrument determined (under the objective proportionality, excessive debt,
and reasonable rate of interest rules) to be debt in year I to be reclassified as
equity, or preferred stock, in year 2. Such a "second look" rule was necessary
under the regulation's approach since probability of repayment or source of
repayment or similar factors were not examined at the time of the first look
applying the above objective factors. In short, failure to pay interest at least
invites an audit and probably substantially sours the taxpayer's case. That
being the case if debt service is impossible, restructuring should be sought.
Here the fun really begins.
If the shareholder cancels the S corporation's debt, the S corporation
under amendments to Section 108 in response to the Putoma decision
recognizes ordinary income, which then passes-thru to its shareholders. See
Eustice & Kuntz, supra. On the other hand, if the shareholder contributes--he
debt to the capital of the S corporation or exchanges it for stock, to the
extent that the shareholder's basis is less than the face (a likely event in the
case of pass-thru of basis-reducing losses in excess of basis in stock) and the
instrument is not a "security", defined in this context as a registered security,
Section 351 and Section 118 are barred to the shareholder with resulting
recognition, albeit at capital gain. See Eustice & Kuntz, supra. To some
degree, however, the conversion of debt into stock is less of a problem than
the above commentators point out, in that this would appear an ideal
transaction for a recapitalization under Section 368(a)(1), so that the
exchange would be tax free and the excess principal amount rule of Section
356(d) course would not be triggered. In any event, the entire area is subject
to the nagging uncertainty of the debt-equity rules in general and further the
mysteries of their application to S corporations hovers over the entire area,
with faint rumblings of the second class of stock danger.
ii. Special S Corporation Rules: Second Class of Stock
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) prohibits, as a definitional matter, "small business
corporation" status (a prerequisite to electing subchapter S, see I.R.C.
S 1361(a)(1)) to a corporation having more than one class of stock. For this
purpose "straight debt" is not treated as a second class of stock. I.R.C.
S 1361(c)(5)(A). "Straight debt" is defined as any written, unconditional
promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain if the interest
rate is not contingent on the borrower's profits or discretion or similar
factors, the debt is not convertible into stock, and the creditor would
otherwise qualify as an S corporation shareholder. I.R.C. § 136 l(c)(5)(B).
While Congress provided the straight debt safe harbor rule as to the
second class of stock issue, Congress contemplated that a safe harbor debt
instrument might nevertheless be treated as stock under general tax
principles accordingly authorized regulations
relating to the treatment of these instruments for purposes
of applying subchapter S and other provisions of the Code.
It is intended that these rules would treat the instrument in
such a way as to prevent taxable income on the one hand,
and also to prevent unfair, harsh results to the taxpayer. It
is anticipated that the safe-harbor instruments will be
treated as debt under subchapter S, so that no corporate
income or loss will be allocated to the instruments.
Payments on the instruments shall be includable in the
income of the holder and deductible by the corporation
(subject to the rules added by the bill relating to the accrual
of unpaid amounts). Payments on these instruments maybe
examined to determine whether the payments represent
interest or other income in any situation where the
treatment as interest might give the taxpayer an
unwarranted tax advantage, such as under the net interest
exclusion. S Rep. No. 640, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 22 (1982).
Outside of the protective umbrella of the straight debt safe harbor,
Congress intended that the "usual tax law classification principles" would
apply to determine whether the instrument constituted stock or debt. Id.
Furthermore, in the case of a C corporation with outstanding debt treated
under the general principles as equity, conversion to S corporation status does
not constitute a shift as to the purported debt instrument from equity to debt
(which would trigger the excess principal amount rules of Section 356), but
rather a later redemption of the instrument may be treated as a dividend if
the S corporation has remained C E&P. Id.
iii. S Corporation Debt-Equity
(A) Introduction
Where an entrepreneur holds appreciated property which is needed in
the S corporation's business, in theory he/she has six choices as to the form of
transfer of ownership to the S corporation.
(1) Section 351 contribution for stock
(2) Section 351 contribution for stock and security (or security alone
if the transferor is already a stockholder)
(3) Sale, or part sale-part contribution, to the S corporation, including
an installment sale.
(4) Section 35 1(a) and (b), part contribution-part deemed sale since
"boot" (cash or short-term note, or other recognition property).
(5) Cross sale of part interest in property to joint entrepreneurs and
then joint Section 351 contribution.
(6) Section 357 tainted liabilities and liabilities in excess of basis
where th-e transferor borrows out the equity prior to a transfer subject to the
liabilities to the S corporation.
Under the "step transaction doctrine" as well as the concept of
economic equivalence, a purported sale to the S corporation (particularly if a
part sale-part contribution), a contribution of money to the S corporation
followed by its purchase of property from the contributor, and a formal boot
note under Section 35 l(b) should all be treated the same, and usually are.
As indicated above in the discussion of partnership debt-equity, the
deep structure analysis corporate debt-equity question is the same as the
deep structure analysis under Section 707(a)(2): Is the payment of the
purported note at the risk of the enterprise. If so, a purported "sale" to the
entity for a note would instead constitute in substance either (a) disguised
equity, i.e., "preferred stock", or (b) a "security" for purposes of Section
351. If structured as a short term note in a Section 351 transction but still at
the proprietory risk of the enterprise, then presumably "security" treatment
rather than "equity" treatment would apply. See Lagerquist v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo 1987-185, 53 T.C.M. 530 (1987). (Short-term notes representing
another form of taxpayer's (largest minority shareholder) continuing interest
in new corporation constituted "securities"). However, this deep structure
policy has generally been articulated through an analysis of standards based
on "arm's length" effect dealings. Thus the question often becomes whether
an independent creditor would have made the loan, rather than more directly
focusing on the probabilities of repayment. However, where traditional
factors, particularly debt-equity ratio, are quite bad, courts often do look at
the type of assets transferred and more directly at probabilities of
repayment, indeed in a manner reminiscent of Otey. As discussed above,
however, the Section 707(a)(2) analysis proceeds to the payment subject to
entrepreneurial risk. The debt-equity analysis looks at the essential operating
assets factor as well as others to determine whether payment is at
proprietory risk. Where the "essential operating assets" approach is taken,
the same result should obtain under a Section 707(a)(2) analysis. However,
where the debt-equity ratio is less extreme, this approach is less apt to be
taken. In such circumstances reliance upon more objective factors such as
debt equity ratio and to a lesser extent subsequent payment history would
more likely cut towards debt treatment. Although perhaps in a partnershp
context equity treatment is more likely.
(B) Application of Corporate Debt-Equity Principles to S Corporations.
The legislative history to the "straight debt safe harbor" of Section
1361(c)(5) states that outside of the scope of the "straight debt safe harbor"
general principles are to apply. S. Rep. No. 640, supra. Apparently Congress
meant to refer to such general principles both where the instrument did not
fit the straight debt safe harbor and where the instrument did, but the
question was an issue other than small business corporation status under
Section 1361(b)(1)(D). Nevertheless, within the S corporation context
Congress did spell out certain operating rules. For purposes of pro rata
allocation of the S corporation's income and loss, purported debt is to be
treated as debt. Id. However, at least as to retirement of purported debt
issued by a C corporation that converted to S corporation status, if the
purported debt in fact constitutes equity under general principles, then upon
retirement Section 302(b) would be the applicable provision rather than the
normal rules as to retirement of debt. Nevertheless, Congress did not
examine the manner, if any, in which such general principles should be applied
differently in an S corporation.
The line of cases culminating in Portage Plastics Co. v. United States
486 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc), is instructive here. There the Ninth
Circuit concluded "that the traditional thin capitalization doctrine tests for
determining whether a purported loan should be treated as an equity
contribution in order to prevent improper tax avoidance in other contexts are
not suitable for determining whether purported loan constitutes a second
class of stock within the meaning of ... [the predecessor to Section
1361(b)(1)(B)]. 486 F.2d at 636-37. The more complete reasoning was that
the thin capitalization doctrine was directed towards preventing unintended
tax benefits.
In the normal corporate context, indebtedness instead of
equity may be used to avoid corporate level taxation on
earnings paid out as interest since interest payments are
deductible. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 163(a). It may be
utilized so that a corporate distribution appears as a non-
taxable or capital gain (if an excessive basis) repayment of
principal where it would otherwise constitute a non-
qualifying stock redemption giving rise to ordinary income.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, SS 301(c), 302(d), 1232 [now 1371].
Ostensible debt may be used so that in the event of
adversity an ordinary loss bad debt deduction under Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, S 166 is available. Debt may be used to hedge
against imposition of the accumulated earnings surtax. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954 S 53 1. Finally, a corporation may issue
short-term debt obligations instead of stock in exchange for
depreciable property in order to circumvent the non-
recognition provisions of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 351 and
thus acquire a stepped-up basis for the property. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, S 361. Portage Plastics Co. v. United States.
470 F.2d 308, 316, 317 (7th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion)
(author of dissenting opinion wrote en banc opinion reversing
Ninth Circuit panel). See 486 F.2d at 636.
The dissenting opinion, which later became the majority en banc approach,
pointed out that these traditional advantages of internal debt financing were
largely removed in the S corporation context due to its pass-thru character.
"Of the possible tax avoidance prospects which the thin capitalization
doctrine is designed to foreclose in the ordinary corporation, only the benefit
to be derived through the exchange of debt instruments for depreciable
property and the benefit to be gained through distribution of pre-election,
accumulated earnings and profits in the form of repayment of principal
remain as possibilities in a Subchapter S format." 470 F.2d at 318, and in
particular authorities cited at note 7.
In contrast, the purpose of the single class of stock requirement "was
none other than to avoid the administrative complexity in the allocation of
income which would result with more than one class of stock when preferred
dividends were paid in excess of current earnings from undistributed taxed
prior earnings. 486 F.2d at 637. This undoubtedly is the source of the
statement in the legislative history to the 1982 Subchapter S overhaul that
for purposes of allocation of income and loss purported debt is to be treated
as debt in order to avoid just such adnimistrative complexities. The Ninth
Circuit opinion lays out this problem in more detail at 486 F.2d 637. The en
banc opinion emphasized that preclusion of use of traditional debt equity
concepts for determination of whether purported notes violate the second
class of stock requirement "in no way forecloses use of the thin capitalization
doctrine test to recharacterize purported debt as equity where appropriate to
deny particular tax benefits wrongfully taken and those cases where tax
avoidance through the use of debt is still available in the Subehapter S
context and in those cases where it is peculiarly available within the confines
of Subchapter S. 486 F.2d at 637 n.3; 470 F.2d at 318 and n.9.
In the realm of possible tax avoidance, for example, debt
may be utilized for income splitting among a family group,
for avoiding the vulnerability of previously taxed but
undistributed income to forfeiture of its tax free withdrawal
status..., or for gaining additional net operating loss
deductions when the basis of stock has been exhausted by
previous loss deductions .... Portage Plastics Co. v. United
States, 470 F.2d at 318 n.9. Note that the additional basis
technique is probably superceded by the ability to offset
losses against debt under the current regime.
In short in precisely the areas in which subchapter S debt can still make a
difference: (a) bailing out pre-subehapter S accumulated earnings without
dipping into C E&P where AAA is exhausted and (b) post conversion to C
status bailout, that the Ninth Circuit warned traditional debt-equity
principles can be applied. Estate planning might not come under this
reasoning. Treatment as equity would not make a difference to the
shareholder objectives-preferred stock is the tool of choice anyway.
(C) Shareholder Guaranteed S Corporation Debt
The Eleventh Circuit in Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir.
1985), applied traditional debt-equity analysis to third party bank loans made
to an S corporation and guaranteed by the shareholder. Selfe not only looked
to traditional authorities such as Plantation Patterns, bufalso relied upon the
analogy of the Section 385 withdrawn regulations, even though they
specifically were inapplicable to S corporations (although this factor was not
especially noted by the court). The Eleventh Circuit remanded for a
determination of whether or not the bank primarily looked to the shareholder
for repayment and for the Court to apply the factors set out in a recent
Eleventh Circuit case (In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984)), which
applied a traditional nine factor debt-equity analysis, and Section 385 "to
determine if the taxpayer's guarantee amounted to either an equity
investment in or shareholder loan to ... [the corporation]. In short, we
remand for the district court to apply Plantation Patterns and determine if
the bank loan to ... [the corporation] was in reality a loan to the taxpayer
[shareholder]. 778 F.2d at 775. The Eleventh Circuit made no indication that
these traditional rules were to be applied in any special manner due to the S
corporation status.
Nevertheless, due to the approach of cases such as Portage Plastics in
applying the Section 1371 mandate to incorporate C rules, including therefore
Section 385, practitioners will be forced to examine more closely the
particular purpose for the loans and the particular purpose of corresponding S
corporation provisions. Thus the last chapter is yet to be written.
3. Conclusion
Both Subchapters K and S should contain a rationalized entrepreneur -
entity transactions provision encompassing rendition of services, loans, and
sales of property by the entrepreneur to the entity. The core features should
be as follows:
a. Where the transaction (rendition of service, advance of money, or
transfer of property) is made by the owner in a entrepreneur capacity (e,
essential services, capital or operating assets) and (b) the entity's payment for
it is subject to entrepreneurial risk as to fact or amount, the transaction and
payment should be treated on a passthrough basis (non-recognition carryover
basis contribution plus distributive or pro rata share of income-cum-
distribution).
b. Where the transaction is not made in an entrepreneur capacity and
payment is not subject to entrepreneurial risk, the contribution and payment
is taxed to owner as an outsider.
c. Where the transaction is not entrepreneurial but the payment is, the
payment portion should be treated as an entrepreneurial contribution of
money to the entity and a distribution upon payment.
d. Where the transaction is in an entrepreneurial capacity, but payment
is not, the existing Subchapter K pattern treats the payment as a non-partner
transaction. This is consistent with a deep structure corporate debt-equity
policy permeating the ill-fated Section 385 regulations: an owner can deal
with his/her entity as an outsider if arm's length standards are met, i.e., little
risk as to payment. Such a provision would be infinitely preferable to the
current law's inpenetrable, but quite prickly thicket. Moreover, statutory
pre-emption of the case law is desperately needed here. The case for debt-
equity Congress has almost recognized. Cf. S 385 (ultimately inapplicable by
regulation or statute to passthrough entities). And the treatment of services
and property transfers is fairly clear on the Subchapter K statutory (and
legislative history side) except as to debt-equity aspects and perhaps
compensatory profits interests, which the case law has unfortunately
confused with implicit, but unrecognized entity analysis.
E. Contributions
1. Introduction
The 1954 Code drafters of Subchapter K in describing the general rule
of non-recognition of gain or loss upon a contribution of property under
Section 72 1(a) merely stated that contributions to a partnership were to have
the same effect under the 1954 Code as under the prior Code, in effect,
permitting the tax-free transfer of property into (or under Section 731 out of)
a partnership. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, supra at 68-69. The drafters of the ALl
proposals forming the basis for Subchapter K similarly had adhered to the
1939 Code rule of non-recognition upon formation because they
felt that to tax the transaction would tend to discourage the
formation of partnerships and operate as a deterrent to new
business enterprises. Moreover, if gain on such a transaction
were to be taxed, there would then arise the question of
whether losses on similar transactions should be allowed.
Consequently, it was determined out the outset that no gain
or loss would be recognized on the formation of a
partnership. Jackson, Johnson, Surrey & Warren, supra 9
Tax L. Rev. at 120.
Analysis on this level alone could possibly be overridden by a deeper structure
analysis that the pooling of interest in a new entity constitutes such an
economic change that recognition is appropriate. Postlewaite, Dutton &
Magette, A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter
K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners 75 Geot. L. J. 423, 469-70 (1987);
Keyser, A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax: The Case of
Partnership Formation, 5 American J. of Tax Policy 269 (1986). However, an
aggregate deep structure analysis coupled with the mandatory post-1984
Section 704(c) special allocations as to built-in gain and built-in loss plus the
new Section 724 five-year outside-to-inside carryover character rule support,
even mandate, non-recognition under Section 721 since through them a
contributing partner in effect stands in virtually the same shoes as he/she
stood as an individual entrepreneur.
Subchapter S in this context incorporates Subchapter C under Section
137 1. Subehapter C in turn rests in the context of tax-free incorporation
solely on the purpose of facilitating business readjustments. See Bittker &
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Sharehol-d-ers, pp.3-3-3-
4 (4th ed. 1979). In the context of Subchapter S there is no parallel aggregate
approach ability since special allocations are not possible.
Unlike Section 351, Subehapter K's Section 721 does not require that the
contributors be in "control" of the partnership. But, like Section 351, it
applies to formation and subsequent contributions. Treas. Reg. S 1.72 1-1(a).
Conventional wisdom holds that "property" means the same for Sections
351 and 721. Stafford v. United States supra P.L.R. 8117210. But, in fact,
different deep structure policies apply due to Subchapter K's aggregate core
and Subchapter S and C's separate entity core as discussed above at p. __.
Both Subehapter K and the incorporated Subehapter C provide as a
concommitant to non-recognition under Sections 351 or 721 carryover basis as
to the transfer of property in the transferee entity's hands, I.R.C. S§ 368(b)
and 723 and as to the transferor owner, substituted basis in the received
equity interest, I.R.C. SS 358 and 722.
2. Tax-Free Contribution v. Sale.
a. Introduction
i. Conventional Wisdom Revisited: Recognition vs. Nonrecognition.
Conventional 1954 Code wisdom held that generally nonrecognition and
carryover-substituted basis was the preferred tax goal in transfers of
property to a controlled entity. Recognition and step-up in basis, on the
other hand, were thought generally desired only where the transferor (a) had
expiring deductions or credits (such as capital loss carryover or net operating
loss deduction), e.g., Ellis, Tax Problems on Sales to Controlled Corporations,
21 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 196, 224 (1968), or (b) wished to "lock in" the character
of the gain, e.g., Note, Capital Gains Treatment for Gain Realized in
Condominium Conversions, 47 Mo. L. Rev. 269, 275 (1982). If the elimination
of the capital gains income preference actually goes into effect in 1988, lock
in of character largely will become a historical footnote. The other
conventional reasons for recognition transactions or in the case of a
corporation issuance of securities, consisted of (c) tax-free withdrawal of
investment and (d) single tax on investment return through deductible
interest. Neither of these latter two goals makes much sense in an S
corporation or a partnership context. (An S to C conversion, now unlikely in
itself, may constitute an exception.)
ii.The Other End of the Telescope: Withdrawal of Contribution.
A major factor generating divergent development as to
sale/contribution to passthrough entities arises from the disparate treatment
at the end of the investment transaction, i.e., withdrawal or distribution of
the taxpayer's investment. For it is much easier to use the partnership
mechanism for a liquidating or non-liquidating distribution tax-free at both
the partnership level and the partner (level up to basis). Thus upon initial
formation of a partnership under pre-1984 rules a partner could contribute an
appreciated essential operating asset to the partnership tax-free under
Section 721 and the partnership then distribute cash from another partner or
from a (recourse) loan as to the assets tax-free under Section 731 to the
property-contributing partner. See Otey v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 312, 320-21
(1978), aff'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1980).
In contrast the Subchapter S withdrawal rules work simply only where
(a) no C E&P is present, and (b) cash is used. See I.R.C. S 1368(b). Moreover,
the basis limitation upon owner level tax-free withdrawals is much more
stringent in the S corporation context since inside borrowings do not increase
the shareholder's outside basis, unlike in the partnership context. Compare
I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1) with SS 752(a) and 722. If C E&P is present, usually from a
C to S conversion, then the accumulated adjustment account rules kick in to
complicate matters. I.R.C. S 1368(c); Coven, supra 42 Tax L. Rev. at 56-59.
In an S corporation context a contributing shareholder cannot avoid these
problems by borrowing on appreciated property and then contributing it to the
S corporation since post-acquisition liabilities are not included in basis. Lee
& Bader, Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions:
Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of Income 12 J. Corp. L. at
221-22 n.508 (1987). Hence such borrowing automatically would create
liabilities in excess of basis for purposes of Section 357(c). Thus, a borrowing
followed by contribution would trigger at least Section 357(c) and more likely
the tainted liability rule of Section 357(b). In-kind non-liquidating and
liquidating distributions by an S corporation trigger inside gain, I.R.C.
9 1363(d) and (e), (which is then allocated to all the partners according to
their "pro rata" share, I.R.C. S 1377(a)). Furthermore, if such an in-kind
distribution is cast as a redemption, the redeemed shareholder may find it
difficult to qualify for outside capital gain. Section 355 may not be used by
contributing shareholders as a means of exchanging tax-free properties which
contribute to a corporation and then spin off on a cost basis.
b. Subchapter K.
The 1954 House version of Subchapter K would have provided a parity of
treatment as to "contributed" property and "sold" property as to transfers by
a "controlling" (50%) partner. In order "to prevent the sale of property
between a partnership and a 'controlling' partner for the purpose of
recognizing losses or raising the basis of property", H.R. Rep. No. 1337, supra
at 67, the House bill provided that a sale between the partnership and the
controlling partner would not be recognized and carryover basis would be
mandatory. Id. at 67-68.
ABA witnesses at the Senate Finance Hearings on the 1954 Code
criticized this rule as "too rigid for practicality." Hearings on H.R. 8300 (the
1954 Code) Before the Senate Finance Committee, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Part
1) 466 (1954) ("1954 Code Hearings"). This rule coupled with the House rule
precluding special allocation of built-in gain or loss meant as a practical
matter that it would be impossible for partners to adjust the potential
inequities of contributing low-basis property to the partnership. Id. at 467.
The Senate Finance Bill looked to the perceived source of the problem-
prevention of tax avoidance through the realization of fictitious losses or
increasing the basis of property for purpose of depreciation-and instead
applied general rules parallel to Sections 267 and 1239 disallowing built-in
losses and recharacterizing gain where (higher level of ownership)
"controlling" partners sold property to the partnership. See S. Rep. No. 1620,
supra at 387.
The end result under the 1954 and hence 1986 Codes is that a sale of
appreciated (nondepreciable) property to a partnership is recognized or not
(and hence treated as a contribution plus distribution) essentially under case
law doctrine. Generally speaking a transaction cast as a sale is treated as a
contribution only where the partnership's purchase is through a note which
then may be considered equity as discussed above.
Perhaps more common, and certainly receiving more attention recently,
has the been the reverse transaction: a transfer cast as a contribution of
property followed by a distribution of property of money by the partnership to
the contributing partner. The issue here is whether the
contribution/distribution is recognized or is treated as in substance a sale by
the transferring partner to the partnership.
Prior to the 1984 enactment of Section 707(a)(2) the three major
methods for capitalizing a partnership with a transfer of property (generally
appreciated in the hands of the transferor "partner") for use in its business
were: (1) a sale by the transferor in a Section 707(a) (now Section 707(a)(1))
non-partner capacity; (2) a tax-free contribution under Section 721 and
capital account equalization by tax-free (to the extent not in excess of the
transferor partner's basis in his/her partnership interest) Section 731
distributions [Query , is Section 751(b) inapplicable to initial transfer?]; and
(3) a sale of an undivided interest in the property to the other partners
followed by a joint tax-free Section 721 contribution of the property to the
partnership. Barenholz v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 85 (1981). Economically all three
transfers are equivalent but radically different tax consequences attached.
Full recognition of gain (or loss in some cases) by the transferor partner
results from a Section 707(a)(1) non-partner capacity sale. Sale of an
undivided interest and joint tax-free conveyance possibly results in partial
recognition and partial contribution at the partner level as well as partial
carryover and partial cost basis at the partnership level. If the form of a
Section 721 contribution followed by a Section 731 distribution is respected,
no gain or loss is recognized upon either of these events, but through basis
reductions in the transferor partner's interest in his partnership under Section
733 the gain is deferred by him or her until the interest is sold or liquidated.
The Section 721 regulations have long provided that Section 721 does
not apply to a Section 707 transaction between a partnership and a partner
not acting in his capacity as a partner.
Rather than contributing property to a partnership, a
partner may sell property to the partnership or may retain
the ownership of property and allow the partnership to use
it. In all cases, the substance of the transaction will govern,
rather than its form. See It (c)(3) of S 1.73 1-1. Thus, if the
transfer of property by the partner to the partnership results
in the receipt by the partner of money or other
considerations, including a promissory obligation fixed in
amount and time for payment, the transaction will be
treated as a sale or exchange under section 707 rather than
as a contribution under section 72 1. Treas. Reg. S 1.72 1-
1(a).
The "substance over form" transaction described in the cross-referenced
Section 731 regulations appears on the surface identical to the Section 721
contribution/Section 731 distribution described above. For the regulation
states that if (a) there is a contribution of property to a partnership; (b)
"within a short period" before or after such contribution other property,
implicitly including money, is distributed to the contributing partner; and (c)
the contributed property is retained by the partnership, Section 731 does not
apply to the distribution, but instead the transaction is treated as an
exchange of property between the partner and the partnership. Treas. Reg.
S 1.73 l-l(c)(3) (this provision also characterizes contributions by two partners
followed by cross distributions as exchanges of property between the partners
outside the partnership). Many assumed from the above regulations that all
three methods of capitalization would at least in part be treated as sales.
However, the Tax Court in Otey v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 312 (1978), aff'd per
curiam, 634 F.2d 1046 (1980), applied a Section 707(a) analysis to determine if
in substance (a) the transfer of appreciated property by one partner to a
partnership for development, with the other partner providing services in
obtaining financing for the partnership through his good credit, followed by
(b) a distribution of the loan proceeds up to the fair market value of the
property to the first partner, constituted (i) a Section 721 contribution of the
property or (ii) a Section 707 outsider "sale" of the property to the
partnership. The Tax Court in Otey applied a six factor analysis, the most
important of which focused on (a) the relationship the transfer bore to the
partner's capacity as a partner, i.e., whether the transferred property
constitute an essential asset--"a part of the very raison d'etre of the
partnership."--,and (b) whether payment by the partnership was at the risk of
the economic fortunes of the partnership (apparently based on analogy to
Section 707(c), 70 T.C. at 318, 320-21). On a deeper structure level, the Tax
Court reasoned that "1[w] ere there no partnership at all, a taxpayer could
borrow funds on the security of the appreciated property and apply them to
his personal use for that triggering gain." 70 T.C. at 321; compare Lane,
supra 46 So. Cal. Rev. 239. The ' court overlooked, however, that in the
event of a default and full payment by the transferor partner, he/she might
under local law have a claim of subrogation for half of the amount paid under
such joit and several liability from the other partner. In the perhaps more
likely event the partnership proved successful and paid off the bank loan
through revenues, the contributing partner would in effect have shifted half
of the economic burden of the loan repayment to the other partner. Since
loan principal payments are not deductible, partnership taxable income (in
excess of other deductible expenses) must be used to make the principal
payment. The other partner will be taxed on such income used to make the
principal payment, but there will be no corresponding cash or distribution.
However, this will be the case for the contributing partner as well. Hence
there will be no capital account inbalance and no obligation of the
contributing partner to pay out the other partner's positive capital account
arising through partnership income used to pay nondeductible loan principal
payments. Thus, the other partner has borne half of the economic burden of
the loan.
The Tax Court in Otey appears to have relied more heavily on the
factor of whether the taxpayer got to keep the distribution, i.e., was at the
risk of the economic fortunes of the partnership (i.e., if the partnership failed
to pay the obligation, the contributing partner would be called upon to repay
it), than on the fact that the transferred property was the only contributed
capital and necessary to fulfillment of the purpose of forming the partnership
(i.e., development of the appreciated property for rental purposes).
A number of decisions considered the issue of Section 721 contribution
(plus Section 731 distribution) versus Section 707 sale within several years
after Otey. Some decisions also focused on whether the contribution/sale was
of an essential operating asset. Park Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 412
(1981). Where new partners contributed cash for admission to a partnership
accompanied by pro rata distributions of cash to the old partners, the Claims
Court in particular declined to find a Section 707 sale. See Communications
Satellite Corp. v. United States, 625 F.2d 997 (Ct. Cl. 1980. Indeed, the
Claims Court held in this context that such contribution/distribution of cash
did not constitute a sale of a portion of the old general partners' interest to
new (limited) partners because the outside rights and obligations of the new
partners varied from the outside rights and obligations of the old partners as
to preferential distributions, management functions and the general
difference between a general partnership and a limited partnership interest.
Jupiter Corp. v. United States. 2 Cl. Ct. 58 (Cl. Ct. 1983).
The Tax Court in Park Realty similarly placed emphasis on (inside) form
over substance where a partner contributed substantially improved property
to a partnership pursuant to a partnership agreement requiring payment to
the contributing partner of its "development" cost in the property which the
court found did not represent assets transferable and valuable independently
or apart from the unimproved real property. The partnership agreement
contemplated that the reimbursement of such cost would be paid to the
contributing partner upon sale by the partnership of key portions of the
conveyed property. The Tax Court in Park Realty faced with these facts (the
Government and taxpayer stipulated that the development cost did not
constitute assets transferable or valuable apart from the land or the
development) refused to accept the IRS's recharacterization of the
distribution for reimbursement of the development cost as constituting a sale
or exchange of the rights to these costs.
Surveying in 1984 several of the above cases, including Otey and Jupiter
Corp., the Senate Finance Committee concluded that "court decisions have
allowed tax-free treatment [Section 721 contribution followed by Section 731
distribution] in cases which are economically indistinguishable from sales of
property to a partnership or another partner. The committee believes that
these transactions should be treated for tax purposes in a manner consistent
with their underlying economic sustance." S. Rep. No. 169, supra.
Section 707(a)(2)'s legislative history dictating the direction of the
regulations indicates greater promise than the mere technical amendment
perceived by most commentators. The role of Section 707(a) has always been
to distinguish between parter and non-partner transactions. The drafters of
the 1954 Code believed that the former merit "aggregate" treatment, i.e.,
tax-free contribution and distribution up to basis; the latter, entity
treatment, i.e., sale/exchange treatment as with an outsider. See H.R. Rep.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 67, A226 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, supra at 386;
H.R. Rep. No. 2543, supra at 59. The case law adequately developed the
partner-capacity test as to the transfer of property/performance of
services: essentially, whether (a) such services constitute a part of the
activity the partnership is engaged in, Pratt 550 F.2d at 1026, or (b) the
property transferred is an essential asset, "part of the very raison d'etre of
the partnership," Otey v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. at 320. While the case law also
purported to focus on "whether payment by the partnership to the partner is
at the economic fortunes of the partnership," Otey, supra, here the legislative
history to Section 707(a)(2) appears destined to play the major role. For this
history elucidates that the fact and amount of payment for partnership
capacity transfers or rendition of services must be subject to entrepreneurial
risk. But if, in a partner-capacity transaction, the purported partner
performs services or transfers property and is paid an allocation-cum-
distribution in a partner-capacity manner, i.e., subject to entrepreneurial
risk, then legislative history to Section 707(a)(2) indicates that once a service
performer or property transferor is determined to be "actually a partner," S.
Rep. No. 169, supra at 227, presumably under the above case-law criteria,
then a second step entrepreneurial risk analysis must be applied to determine
whether the partner is receiving the putative allocation and distribution in his
capacity as a partner. Furthermore, Congress dictated that "regulations will
provide persons who [formally] become partners after performing services
for, or transferring property to, the partnership are to be treated as partners
[at the time of the provision of services or transfer of property." S. Rep. No.
169, supra at 232 (bracketed language added in 1986 Bluebook, supra 233).
Congress very subtly shifted the focus of these new Section 707(a)(2) to
the underlying economic substance. Thus, in the case of "proper
characterization" of payments for services or property under Section
707(a)(2)(A), the test is whether the allocations and distributions "which are
determined to be related" to the performance of services/transfer of property
and "which, when viewed together with distributions, have the substantive
economic effect of direct payments for such property or such services. . ." S.
Rep. No. 169, supra 226.
The test for whether a transfer of money other property by a partner to
a partnership when viewed in connection with a related direct or indirect
transfer of money or other property to that partner or another partner is
"properly characterized" as a "disguised sale" of property under Section
707(a)(2)(B) is whether "the transaction substantially resembles a sale or
exchange of all or a part of the property.. ." in the case of a partial sale and
partial contribution. Id. at 230-31.
For example, when a partner contributes appreciated
property to a partnership and receives a distribution of
money or property within a reasonable period before or after
such contribution, that is approximately equal in value to
the portion of the contributed property that is in effect
given up to the other partner(s) the transaction will be
subject to this provision [Section 707(a)(2)(B)].
This Committee Report authorizes regulations providing for a period, such as
three years, during which contributions by and distributions to the same or
another partner normally would be presumed related. Id. at 231. Compare
ALI, supra at 185 (24-month period).
You will recall that.Otey turned on a number of factors, the most
important of which, it is true, was the Tax Court's view that the risk of the
loan repayment remained with the transferor partner, but also the fact that
the contribution went to the essence of the partnership operations and was
the sole capital constituted a significant factor. The legislative history
subtly retains the Otey partnership capacity as to the character of the
transaction factor. For in the case of both characterization of payments for
services or property and disguised sales, the legislative history indicates that
the first determination is whether the service performer or property
transferor is actually a partner. S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 227, 230.
Presumably, the Otey analysis of whether the contribution or provision of
services went to the heart of the partnership would still be relevant on this
question. But, in the case of 707(a)(2)(A) the determinative question is
whether the partner is "receiving the putative allocation and distribution in
his capacity as a partner. Id. at 227 (emphasis supplied). Conversely, where a
partner receives an allocati-on (or an increased allocation) for an extended
period reflecting his contribution of property or services, Section 707(a)(2)(A)
does not apply if "the facts and circumstances indicate that the partner is
receiving the allocation in his capacity as a partner." Id. at 226.
The most important factor as to whether the allocation and distribution
is received in a partner capacity under Section 707(a)(1)(A) is
whether the payment is subject to an appreciable risk as to
amount. Partners extract the profits of the partnership with
reference to the business success of the venture while third
parties generally receive payments which are not subject to
this risk. An allocation and distribution provided for a
service partner under the partnership agreement which
subjects the partner to significant entrepreneurial risk as to
both the amount and the fact of payment generally should be
recognized as a distributive share and a partnership
distribution [under Section 7311, while an allocation and
distribution provided for a service partner under the
partnership agreement which involves limited risk as to
amount and payment should generally be treated as a fee
under sec. 707(a). For example, allocations that limit a
partner's risk may be either "capped" allocations of
partnership income (i.e., percentage or fixed dollar amount
allocations subject to an annual maximum amount when the
parties could reasonably expect the cap to apply in most
years) or allocations for a fixed number of years under which
the income that would go to the partner is reasonably
certain. Similarly, continuing arrangements in which
purported allocations and distributions (under a formula or
otherwise) are fixed in amount or reasonably determinable
under all the facts and circumstances and which arise in
connection with services also shield the purported partner
from entrepreneurial risk. S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 227;
Compare Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst on Fed. Tax. at 14-8,
14-9, 14-16-17, 14-32 (model for Section 707(a)(2)(A) and
Committee Report discussion).
The legislative history's analysis of partner capacity transfer coupled with
non-partner capacity payment is not as detailed in the context of a disguised
sale under Section 707(a)(2)(B) but the same analysis should apply. A transfer
of an essential operating asset would, indeed, constitute a partner capacity
transfer (under Otey) and hence is not subject to Section 707(a)(1). On the
other hand if the payment economically resembles a sale or exchange because
a distribution of money or property occurs within a reasonable period after
the contribution, then deemed Section 707(a)(1) treatment applies.
c. Subchapter S.
Recently the Senate Finance Committee Staff has proposed that
wherever a 20% or more shareholder transfers appreciated property to his/her
moderately "controlled" corporation, mandatory carryover basis and non-
recognition is to apply. However this is not yet the law. Therefore a "sale"
of property to an S corporation by a shareholder is recognized as a sale unless
under debt-equity analysis the S corporation pays with a note that is treated
as equity. This is discussed above.
Due to the different workings of Subchapters S and K, S shareholders
are less likely to cast a transaction as a tax-free contribution followed by a
tax-free distribution.
Section 351, including Section 35 1(b), applies to S corporations through
Section 1371. Under Section 35 1(b) recognition property or "boot", i.e., not
non-recognition property or stock or securities, is taxed notwithstanding
Section 351(a) to the shareholder to the extent of gain recognized on the
transaction. This in effect means that the transferring shareholder does not
get to use any basis until the boot exceeds the gain on the property
transferred. The 35 1(b) determinations are made property by property.
Under the temporary installment reporting regulations, a shareholder
installment sale for a boot note, does allow installment reporting at the
shareholder level, but the transferree corporation "properly" obtains basis
under Section 1362 only as the shareholder reports income under Section 453.
These patterns contrast strongly with the partnership patterns.
d. Conclusion
For both Subchapter K and Subchapter S the true issue is whether there
should be mandatory carryover for ease of administration or whether
essential operating assets plus risky payment analysis like Section 707 should
apply.
3. Boot: Part-Contribution/Part-Sale
a. Subchapter K
In 1984 Congress directed that regulations under Section 707(a)(2) treat
lappropriate transactions as a partial sale and partial contribution of property
to the partnership. This directive does not address allocation of basis.
Commentators differ as to the amount of basis that the transferor may
allocate to the "sale" portion of a partial sale and a partial contribution. See
Rubinstein, Transfers of Property to a Partnership: Contributions or Sales'
and Related Uncertainties, 34 Tax Law. 371 (1980).
b. Subchapter S
In contrast, Section 35 1(b) on its face allocates no portion of basis to
the boot or sale portion of the transaction. However, "boot" is limited to
total gain, hence the entire basis in appropriate circumstances is taken into
effect.
4. Liabilities in Excess of Basis
4
a. Subchapter K
General partnership rules governing transfers of encumbered property
to a partnership are contained in Treasury Regulations SS 1.722-1 and 1.752-
l(b)(2); see Treas. Reg. S 1.72 1-l(a)(last two sentences). These regulations
apply a mixed aggregate-entity approach: to the extent of the transferor
partner's Section 752 "share" of the transferred liabilities after the transfer
of the encumbered property to the partnership, his/her exchange of the
encumbered property for the partnership interest is treated as a "mere
change in form" producing non-recognition under Section 721 and no
"constructive cash distribution" under Section 752. However, to the extent
that the other partner['s] share after the exchange is reduced in the
"transferred" liability under Section 752, that portion of the exchange in
effect is treated under an entity approach. For that portion of the liability
now "shared" by the other partners is treated as a constructive cash
distribution. And under the general rules to the extent that such distribution
exceeds the transferor partner's basis, gain is recognized under Section 731.
In many, if not most cases, excess encumbered property transferred to a
partnership also has an excess of fair market value over basis, unless fair
market value has declined as fast as depreciation deductions or other
transactions reducing basis below the amount of the liabilities. To the extent
that the partner transfers the property with a built-in gain, the combination
of Sections 724 and 704(c) will ensure that such gain will be allocated to the
transferor and for five years after the transfer will retain the same character
as it would have had in his/her hands. Similarly, a sale of the transferor
partner's partnership interest within five years will trigger essentially the
same character/allocated gain under Section 751. Thus, the transferor
partner would under the general partnership rules would be taxed ultimately
on the Crane gain and hence a tax at transfer is inappropriate.
The above analysis ignores the potential partnership pay down of the
transferred liability. The partnership can however allocate, in a manner like
the principles of the non-recourse debt allocation of liability portions of the
Section 704(b) regulations, gross income to the transferor partner as soon as
possible whenever the tranferred debt principal amount is reduced--i.e., a
minimum gain charge back. Cf. Treas. Reg. S 1.704- If the partnership
agreement contained such a provision, then in effect the transferor partner
still in effect retains an interest as to the transferred property and debt.
Accordingly, the liability in excess of basis rule should not apply upon the
transfer to the partnership where such a charge back is provided.
As discussed below, Section 357(c) contains exceptions to the corporate
liability in excess of basis upon transfer rule for "trade accounts payable" and
similar obligations and provides for recognition as to "tainted" liabilities, i.e.,
transferred liabilities for which no business purpose for the transfer or
occurence of the liability is present. Section 752 and the current regulations
contain no comparable provisions. However, Congress, with a "thumb" on the
scales, has directed revisions of the Section 752 regulations to contain
comparable trade account payables exceptions. Furthermore, in the 1984
amendments to Section 707 to cover "disguised sales", i.e., Section
707(a)(2)(B), Congress described the disguised sale provision as also applying
to the extent that "the partner has received the loan related to the property
in anticipation of the transaction and responsibility for repayment of the loan
is transferred, directly or indirectly, to the partnership (or its assets) or the
other partners." This rule parallels Section 357(b) except that the latter
taints all liabilities, whereas the partnership rule does not.
Piecing together the way Congress intended the new Section 707(a)(2)(b)
rules to be promulgated in future regulations governing transfers of
encumbered property to a partnership is difficult due to the overly laconic
and unfortunately opaque at best and more likely contradictory statements in
the legislative history. First, the Senate Finance Committee Report stated
that Congress did "not intend to change the general rules governing the tax
treatment of the partners under Sections 721, 731, and 752 to the extent (1)
contributed property is encumbered by liabilities not incurred in anticipation
of the contribution or (2) contributions to a partnership which, because of
liabilities of the partnership incurred other than anticipation of the
contribution resulted in a deemed distribution under sec. 752(b)." S. Rep. No.
169, supra at 230. Essentially, the above cited rules work together to treat
the portion of a liability assumed or taken subject to by the partnership upon
a contribution of property by a partner which is "shared" by the other
partners under Section 1.752-1(e) of the regulations as a constructive cash
distribution. See Treas. Reg. SS 1.752-1(b)(2) and 1.752-1(c). Such a
constructive cash distribution is treated as if it were a real distribution of
money under Section 731 (and in some circumstances can trigger a Section
751(b) disproportionate distribution, but probably not upon an initial
contribution). See generally, Parker & Lee, Constructive Cash Distributions
In A Partnership: How and When They Occur, 41 J, Tax. 88 (1974). Under
these provisions the distributee partner can use his/her entire outside basis in
his/her partnership interest to offset the constructive cash distribution with
only the excess over such basis being treated as a constructive sale or
exchange.
The above cited discussion specifically excluded liabilities incurred in
anticipation of the contribution. The Committee Report treated an
anticipatory loan the same as a "distribution" of the proceeds of a loan taken
out by the partnership with respect to the contributed property and
distributed to the contributing partner. S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 231. As
discussed above, such distribution of loan proceeds is treated as a disguised
sale under Section 707(a)(2)(B) if the "responsibility for repayment of the loan
is tranferred, directly or indirectly, to the partnership (or its assets) or the
other partners." S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 231. The surface import of this
language is that transfer of responsibility for repayment or initial
responsibility for repayment lying in the partnership (or its assets) would
treat the entire amount of the loan proceeds as a disguised sale. However,
two factors militate against this. The formulation in the legislative history
of the "responsibility for repayment" is substantially similar to the ALl
Proposal, supra at 184 which the reporter stated would result in Otey "being
treated as a sale of a 50 percent interest in the real estate and a contribution
to the partnership of the joint owners of the real estate. Where the original
owner of the property remains solely liable for the debt, however, the sale
would be treated as occurring [sic?]." ALI, supra at 186. The cryptic
Conference Report reference that no disguised sale is to result to the extent
the contributing partner, in substance, retains liability for repayment of
borrowed amounts, i.e., to the extent the other partners have no direct or
indirect risk of loss as to such amounts, would indicate that to the extent that
the contributing partner shares the partnership liability the proceeds of which
were distributed, the distribution is treated as a Section 731 distribution and
not as a Section 707 sale. Therefore, at this point we have nonanticipatory
loans being treated as a constructive cash distribution to the extent the other
partners share in the transferred liability or liability to which the transferred
property is subject. Conversely, anticipatory transfers are treated to the
extent the other partners share in the liability as a "disguised sale" under the
Section 707(a)(2). In most cases the character of the amount realized would
be the same (although there are exceptions). The question of whether basis
must be allocated between the disguised sale portion and the contribution
portion is discussed below.
Unfortunately, however, the Committee Reports continue that "the
contribution of encumbered property to a partnership would not suggest a
disguised sale to the extent responsibility for the debt is not shifted, directly
or indirectly, to the partnership (or its assets) or to the non-contributing
partner." S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 23 1. The clear import of this language is
that to the extent that the encumbrance is so shifted, a disguised sale will
result. This conflicts with the first statement that the existing general rules
regarding contributions of encumbered property are continued to apply and
renders somewhat superflous the "anticipatory" loan rule discussed above.
Furthermore, treating a contributon of encumbered property as in part
a disguised sale to the extent of shifting of responsibility or debt repayment,
clearly leaves the implication that the remainder of the transfer will be
treated as a Section 721 contribution. Indeed in more than one place, and in
particular directly following the contribution of encumbered property
discussion, the legislative history "anticipates that the Treasury Regulations
will treat transactions to which the provision applies as a sale of property or
partnership interest among the partners or is a partial sale and partial
contribution of the property to the partnership, with attendant tax
consequences, depending upon the underlying economic substance of the
transction." S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 231.
The reference to a partial sale and partial contribution opens the door
for the issue of whether the contributing partner must make a proportionate
allocation of the basis of the tranferred assets between the sale portion and
the partial contribution portion. Prior to Section 707(a)(2) one commentator
had argued that a transfer to a partnership for an equity interest and a "true
sale" (rather than a constructive cash distribution from contributive property
with liabilities in excessive basis) should require a proportionate allocation of
the basis of the transfer property to the sale portion and to the contribution
portion. Rubinstein, Transfers of Property to a Partnership: Contributions or
Sales and Related Uncertainties, 34 Tax Law. 371, 390 (1980). The
commentator acknowledged that transfers of encumbered property were not
treated in this manner. Leading treatise writers in reliance upon the excess
liability contribution rules argue to the contrary that a true part sale part
contribution should be taxable only to the extent that the sale portion amount
realized exceeds the entire basis. McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, s at Supp.
114.0115]. It should be noted that the general Crane doctrine allows the
transferor of property to offset against the Crane phantom gain the entire
basis. Surely the drafters of the legislative history could have made it a little
more clear. McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, supra at Supp. S4-6.
Conceivably the Section 707(a)(2) regulations could distinguish between
(a) a contribution of encumbered property and (b) a partial sale (with non-
liability "discharge" boot) and a partial contribution. No sound policy reason
suggests itself at first blush. Presumably the reference to partial sale and
partial contribution was made specifically to bring up this issue.
Furthermore, McKee's argument, based upon 731(a) as permitting offsetting
the entire basis in the transferred property against the "sale" portion, falls
down when the distribution, even a constructive cash distribution from
liability "decrease", is treated as a sale. Therefore we may expect a required
allocation of basis between the sale and contribution portion, thereby
increasing the gain on the sale or boot portion and leaving some basis in the
contribution, along with a carryover basis inside. Furthermore significant
inside basis adjustments could result according to whether distribution or
partial sale partial contribution reasoning applies. The constructive cash
distribution Section 731 approach gives rise to an inside basis adjustment only
if the transferee is taxed on a cash distribution in excess of basis and a
Section 754 election is in effect so that Section 743 applies. Furthermore,
this inside "increase" generally must be allocated under Section 755 solely to
capital assets and Section 1231 assets. In contrast, in a partial sale, the
partnership would have a cost basis in the deemed purchased portion of the
property transferred and such cost would be allocated to the particular assets
deemed purchased rather than according to the type of gain recognized by the
contributing-selling partner.
b. Subchapter S.
The S corporation rules themselves contain no special provisions as to
transfers of property, including encumbered property, to an S corporation.
Rather Section 1371 must be looked to, which incorporates general C
corporation rules to the extent not inconsistent with Subchapter S. Section
357(a) provides that liabilities with respect to property "transferred" recourse
or non-recourse to a corporation in a Section 351 transaction generally are
not treated for recognition purposes as boot. (For basis purposes, they are
treated under Section 358(d) as "boot" or cash, thereby reducing the
shareholder's basis in the stock received for the transferred property.)
Section 357(b) carves out a seemingly a significant exception where any
liability transferred is "tainted", i.e., no business purpose for the transfer or
the occurrence of the particular, tainted liability, in which case all
transferred liabilities are recognized. Where Section 357(b) does not apply,
but liabilities exceed basis, Section 357(c) treats such excess as gain arising
from a sale or exchange of the transferred property. Section 357(c)(3) carves
an exception for trade accounts payable and similar liabilities which are not
counted in the formula of liabilities over basis.
The net effect of these rules under conventional wisdom is that the
entire amount of the transferred liability in excess of basis (where no
exceptions apply) is taxed to the transferor shareholder. However, just as in
a partnership, the Crane gain but for this rule would be ultimately recognized
by the S corporation ifi sold the property. A portion of this gain would pass
through to the transferor shareholder. Therefore, again on a policy basis
there is no need to tax the transferor shareholder as to the "retained" portion
of the built-in gain/loss. Thus the S rules on a policy basis should parallel the
classic understanding of the partnership liability rules (prior to the Sections
724, 707(c) changes). One could argue that the full recognition of the entire
amount of the excess liability provided by Section 357(c) is to the extent of
the transferor shareholder's "pro rata" interest in the S corporation stock
inconsistent. Thus, one could argue that only the portion of the liability
corresponding to the other shareholders' interest in the S corporation should
be triggered under Section 357(c). Later allocation of the "inside" gain to the
transferor alone would be hard, however.
In conclusion, under conventional doctrine the S corporation rules
produce a greater gain than the partnership rules. Even under the above
policy-based proposals the partnership rules would yield less gain than the S
corporation rules.
Here too the focus historically has been on form rather than on
probability of the transferor shareholder being called upon to repay the loan.
An exception is the Jackson case in the Ninth Circuit which looked to this
factor. However, Jackson is contrary to the overall approach to the Crane
doctrine here which does not particularly look at probabilities, but looks
either at "reversed assumptions" or at true debt analysis, neither of which
take into account particularly probabilities of repayment. Here again, a
substantial difference exists between partnerships and S corporations, which
probably should not.
Both the Subchapter K and the Subchapter C rules applicable to S
corporations under Section 137 1 rules seek to incorporate the Crane
doctrine. At the time of the enactment of the 1954 Code Crane was thought
to hold that upon transfer of encumbered property, at least by sale, the
taxpayer's "amount realized" (for purposes of Section 1001) included liabilities
to which the property was subject (regardless of whether the purchaser
assumed such liability). Thus, liabilities in excess of the seller's basis produce
gain, at least up to the fair market value of the encumbered property under
the then prevalent view of the meaning of the famous footnote 37 in the
Crane decision, recently overruled by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Tufts as to the fair market value ceiling.
The Subchapter S and the Subchapter C corporation rules produce
disparate results upon an otherwise tax-free contribution of excess liability
property to the entity. Section 357(c) applies an entity approach so that the
entire amount of the liability in excess of the transferor shareholder's basis
generally constitutes gain regardless of the fair market value of the
property. On the other hand the existing Subchapter K regulations employ a
mixed aggregate-entity approach. The partnership rules thereby produce a
lesser amount of recognized gain upon a contribution under Section 721 of
encumbered property than a contribution under Sections 351 and 357(c)
because under the partnership approach only the portion of a liability is
"allocated" to the other partners gives rise to a constructive cash distribution
where the excess of such lesser distribution constituting the recognized
gain. The impact here too of Section 707(a)(2) is yet to be plumbed.
F. Distributions
1. Subchapter K
Essentially an "aggregate approach" applies to a liquidating partnership
distribution in kind. Section 736 should not apply on the theory that an in-
kind distribution does not constitute a "payment." No gain is recognized by
either the partnership under Section 73 1(b) or the partner under Section
731(a), unless in the latter case cash exceeds his/her basis in his/her
partnership interest or the "disproportionate distribution" rules of Section
751(b) described below apply. Losses are recognized by a partner (excess of
his/her outside basis over the sum of money and his/her basis in distributed
inventory and receivables) in a liquidating distribution where only money and
receivables are distributed. In that case there is no carry-over basis property
to "carry" the accrued loss. The character of receivables carries over from
the partnership to the partner under the aggregate-like mandate of Section
735. This provision, however, is not as detailed as the later analogue for
transmission-in of character upon a contribution of property (Section 724).
The partner does not, however, use in liquidating distributions the
partnership's inside basis for the distributed property as in non-liquidating
distributions in kind. Rather, the partner applies his/her outside basis in
his/her liquidating partnership interest (less cash distributed in the same
transaction) under Section 732(b). Liabilities under this aggregate approach
pose no problems. True, the partner holding the liquidating partnership
interest may incur a substantial "constructive cash distribution" due to
his/her ceasing to share in partnership liabilities. However, this constructive
cash distribution is deemed matched simultaneously by an equal constructive
cash contribution by the liquidated partner to the liquidating partnership due
to his/her receiving the distribution in kind subject to the accompanying
liabilities.- Again a disproportionate distribution is subject to Section 751(b).
Liquidation of a partner's interest or liquidation of the partnership generally
will trigger the "revaluation" capital account rules of Treasury Regulation
S 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f).
Note that if a partner has an obligation to restore a deficit in his/her
capital account (necessary for a Section 704(b) allocation creating a deficit to
stand up unless special rules apply), withdrawal from the partnership without
paying the deficit may generate "cancellation of indebtedness" income (if the
allocation creating the deficit stands?).
a. Distributions Subject to Return
The Senate Finance Committee Report describing Section 707(a)(2)(B)
states that it applies where, "taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, the transaction substantially resembles a sale or exchange of
all or part of the property. . . For'example, when a partner contributes
appreciated property to a partnership and' receives the distribution of money
of property within a reasonable period before or after such contribution, that
is approximately equal in value to the portion of the contributed property
that is effect given up to the other partner(s) the transaction will be subject
to this provision." S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 230-3 1. "Entrepreneurial risk"
applies in a Section 707(a)(2)(B) context where the distributee partner may be
required to return the distribution. The Committee Report discusses two
situations in which this could occur: (1) a recourse loan obligation to the
extent that responsibility for repayment of the loan rests with the other
partners or their share of the partnership income and, (2) a distribution that
creates a deficit capital account which must be restored. S. Rep. No. 169,
supra at 23 1.
i. Distribution of Loan Proceeds
The Tax Court in Otey purported to apply an "entrepreneurial risk"
approach to loan proceeds distributions: "Where the payment by the
partnership to the partner is at the risk of the partnership's economic
fortunes of the partnership." 70 T.C. 320. The court found that Otey was at
the risk of the economic fortunes because if the partnership cash flow was
not sufficient, under his joint and several liability he could be liable for the
full loan if the partnership defaulted. Id. at 320-21. But the court overlooked
the consequences of the loan being repaid with partnership cash flow. The
share of the other partner of the cash flow would'be reduced to the extent
the principal payments were made. Therefore, the ALl Proposals would
reverse Otey to the extent that the-responsibility for repayment of the loan
was wholly or partially transferred to the partnership or the other partners.
Thus, the transaction in Otey would have been treated as a sale of a 50%
interest in real estate to the other partner and a contribution to the
partnership of the joint owners of the real estate. Id. at 186. Apparently
where the original owner remains solely liable for fh-e debt, no sale would be
treated as occurring. Id.
The Senate-Finance Committee Report took the same approach.
The disguised sale provisions also will apply to the extent (1)
the transferor partner receives the proceeds of a loan
related to the property to the exten)t rpsponsibility for the
repayment of the loan rests, directly or indirectly, with the
partnership (or Its assets) pr the other partners, or (2) the
partner has received the loan related to the property in
anticipation of the transgction and responsibility for
repayment of the loan is transferred, directly or indirectly,
to the partnership (or Its assets) or the other partners, S.
Rep. No. 169, sugm at 231.
The Conference Report followed the Senate Finance Committee provision
here. However, it noted that
(w] hen 4 partner of a partnership contributes property to the
partnership and that property is borrowed against, pledged
as collateral for a loan, or otherwise refinanced, and the
proceeds of the loan are distributed to the contributing
partner there will be no disguised sale under the provision to
the extent the contributing partner, In substance, retains
liability for repayment of borroWed amounts (i.e., to the
extent the other partners have no direct or Indirect risk 9f
loss with respect to such amounts) sirce, in effect, the
partner has simply borrowed through the partnership.
However, to the extent the other partners directly or
indirectly bear the risk of loss with the respect to the
borrowed amoults, this may constitute a payment to the
contributiong partner. H. Rep, No. 861, supra at 862.
It is unclear whether the conference report requires that the focus solely
beyiond whether the other partners have any direct or indirect risk of loss, or
wihether the factor of responsibility fpr repayment resting with the
partnership or its assets sheuld be considered as well. For example, if thepartnership loan were nonrqpor re, then the other partners (and the
contributing partners as well as a matter of fact) would not bear the risk of
loss other than indirectly as the partnership loses assets that the partners
would otherwise be entitled to upon liquidation.
Apparently, a partner could contribute encumbered property without
triggering Section 7Q7(a)(2)(B) by retaining total liability for the loan
repayment. This calls to mind the Stonecrest doctrine under which wrap
around mortgages originated. Here,'P6*eveV, no payments would be made by
the partnershp to the contributing partner, rather he/se would simply remain
liable for the total loan an make the required payments to the creditor.
It also should be possible for the contributing partner to be fully
responsible f9r the loan repayment where the loan is taken out by the
partnership after the contribution and proceeds distributed to him. This canbe achieved by providing a "special allocation" analogous to a "minimum gain
charge back" under the nonrecourse liability portion of the Section 704(b)
regulations. Cf. Treas. Reg. S 1,704-1(b)(4)(Iv)(e). In other words as principal
payments are made on the loan, the distributee partner will be allocated,
before any other allocation is made under Section 704(b), items of income and
gain for that tax year (and if necessary subsequent tax years) in an amount
equal to such principal payment. Thus, the distributee partner will be taxed
with partnership income equal to the prior distribution benefit. Of course
this approach, just as the Section 704(b) regulations, ignores time value of
money considerations. In light of consideration given by Congress to this
factor in a similar context, as discussed below, a minimum gain charge back
approach probably would not be successful if principal payments were not
required to be made until a such a distant point in the future that the present
value of the obligation to make such payments were small. Compare S. Rep.
No. 169, supra at 231.
ii.Preferential Distributions Creating Capital Account Deficit
The Tax Court in Otey recognized as a usual and customary partnership
capitalization arrangement preferential distributions to a partner who put up
a greater share of capital than her/his share of partnership profits in order to
equalize the capital accounts of the partners. Otey v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. at
321. The Committee Report echoes this sentiment in stating that Congress
did "not intend to prohibit a partner from receiving a partnership interest in
return for contributing property which entitles him to priorities or
preferences as to distributions, but is not in substance a disguised sale." S.
Rep. No. 169, supra at 23 1. Unfortunately, the legislative history provides no
guidance as to when such preferential distributions do and do not constitute a
disguised sale.
The Committee Report does, however, address distributions that create
deficit capital accounts. Such distributions frequently arise, for example,
where a partner who has received a profits interest for services also receives
a cash flow distribution. Such distribution may well not be currently taxable
to the distributee partner to the extent that it and any tax losses have not
exceeded the service partner's outside basis including his "share" of the
partnership's inside liabilities. Leder, whose commentary and observations
clearly form the secondary literature-substrata for the legislative history
accompanying Section 707(a)(2)(A), addressed distributions creating a deficit
balance in the partner's capital account through cash flow distributions.
Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. at 14-5. Leder reasoned that if the
distributee partner were required to restore the deficit in his capital account,
as he/she would be if the capital account maintenance rules of Treas. Reg.
S 1.704-1(b) are followed, the cash flow distribution should be treated as cash
distributions under Section 731 (taxable only to the extent in excess of the
partner's outside basis) and not as payments under Section 707(a). Leder,
su!r at 14-5. The Committee Report generally agreed that Section
S(2)(B) should not adversely affect distributions that create deficit
capital accounts maintained in a manner consistent with Treasury Regulations
S 1.704-1(b) "for which the distributee is liable, regardless of the timing of
the distribution, unless such deficit capital account is improperly understated
or not expected to be made up until such a distant point in the future that its
present value is small." S. Rep. No. 169, supra at 231. This approach makes
imminent sense and has been suggested by commentators in other areas in
which capital account analysis is relevent save the basic provision itself. See
Marich & McKee, supra. 41 Tax L. Rev. at 638-39 n.34.
Cash flow distributions to a service partner who receives a constant
percentage of cash flow, income, and losses, often produces in the early years
of a real estate tax shelter, particularly if not highly leveraged, a distributive
share of tax losses and a cash flow distribution. If this distribution is
respected as a distributive share, it will be tax free to the distributee up to
his/her basis and treated as a sale or exchange to the extent in excess
thereof. I.R.C. SS 731(a) and 741. Under the format of the legislative
history, so long as the point at which such deficit must be restored is not too
far distant, the distribution will be respected. At some point then, the
partner will restore the deficit, thereby increasing her/his basis and reducing
capital gain on the ultimate liquidation or sale of his/her interest.
Alternatively, through taxable income in excess of cash flow, the service
partner's deficit would be restored. Viewed in this manner, the distortion of
income does not arise from a character change, but there is the timing abuse
that Section 707(a)(2)(B) is essentially directed at. Perhaps the appropriate
remedy here would be to charge the distributee partner interest at the
applicable federal rate on the "deferred tax" on the distribution along the
lines of new Section 453C(4)(B).
Leder pointed out that partnership drafting techniques could produce
"payments" not too dissimilar substantively to Pratt which generally prior to
Section 707(a)(2) were respected as Section 704allocations-cum-Section 731
distributions rather than Section 707 payments.
For example, general partners may receive a priority
distribution as to cash flow based on a rental formula, with
the distribution being fully chargeable to capital account.
Depreciation deductions are often then specially allocated
on a basis which is weighted heavily to capital (normally
limited) partners. Remaining partnership income (i.e.,
without deduction for depreciation) is allocated first to
cover cash distributions. Thus the capital account charged
to the general partners would be offset with virtual
certainty than income allocation each year. Should the
allocation of income and distribution provisions be
telescoped as a "payment"? Leder, supra 41 N.Y.U. Inst. on
Fed. Tax. at 14-12.
The legislative history of Section 707(a)(2)(B) addresses this question by
pointing out that if the deficit creating distribution is coupled with an
allocation of income or gain, the distribution/allocation arrangement may be
subject to Section 707(a)(2)(A), although Section 707(a)(2)(B) will not apply. S.
Rep. No. 169, supra at 23 1. In short, the thrust of Section 707(a)(2)(B) as to
"entrepreneurial risk" is a large part whether the partner will be ultimately
liable to repay the distribution. If not, then generally Section 707(a)(2)(B)
deemed outsider transaction treatment applies.
Interestingly, the ALL Proposals would tax cash flow distributions to a
service partner with a profits interest only if the distribution was within
three years after the receipt of the interest, and several factors were met,
primarily focusing on a partnership in which capital was material income
producing factor and the service partner had not contributed capital to the
partnership or assumed liability for indebtedness in proportion to his/her
interest and the partnership was not principally a service partnership. See
ALl, supra at 160.
The ALl Proposals also considered distributions that were required to be
ultimately repaid to the partnership, but repayment was deferred for some
time. The reporter suggested that an interest free loan should be treated as a
distribution under Section 731 (and perhaps then as a disguised sale under
Section 707 but this is not clear). ALI, supra at 178-79. [Query: Do the time
value of money rules apply in this context?]
b. Section 751(b): Disproportionate Distributions
The above rules alone would permit a partnership to distribute tax-free
property with a particular built-in character, e.g., ordinary or capital gain, to
a particular partner who could best utilize income of such character. To
preclude such asset selectivity, the 1954 Code introduced exceedingly
complex provisions in Section 75 1(b) which reconstruct a "disproportionate
distribution" of "ordinary income", i.e., Section 75 1(c) or 751(d) property or
"capital gains property" into a "constructive pro-rata distribution" of
whichever property the partner didn't receive his/her "share", i.e., Section
741 property, followed by a "constructive sale", producing the end positions of
the partner and of the partnership after the actual disproportionate
distribution, which can result in both recognizing a gain or a loss. This area is
further complicated by the fact that Section 752(b) treats a decrease in the
partnership liabilities as a "constructive cash" distribution which often will be
disproportionate if the partnership has certain types of assets, unless
precautionary special allocations are in place, e.g., a "revaluation" of assets
followed by Section 704(c)-like allocations or "segregation" of debt by
"minimum gain charge backs."
The apparent reality is that Section 75 1(b) is largely ignored, at least
where triggered by profit shifts. Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 61
(Rabinovitz); ALl, supra 51 at n.5. "ilhe complexity S 75 1(b) introduces into
Subchapter K appears to overshadow its benefits." Id. at 52. Therefore, the
ALl Proposals recommended its repeal. Id. at 53. The old (ALI-1954) tax-
neutral reallocation among partners argument is saluted. Id. at 55. The
reality is that if Section 751(b) were eliminated and capital gains-ordinary
rate differentials persisted after 1987, something would have to be done
about flip-flop bottom line allocations. Probably mandatory revaluations and
Section 704(c)-like allocations would suffice. But what about time value of
money considerations?
2. Subchapter S
a. Introduction.
The S Corporation rules essentially take an entity approach as to
nonliquidating distributions. Thus there is no inside adjustment to reflect
outside basis adjustments as there is in the partnership arena.
b. Non-liquidating Distributions.
Under Section 1363(d) a non-liquidating distribution of appreciated
property triggers recognition inside the S Corporation. This gain then is
shared on a "pro rata" basis by all of the S Corporation shareholders. I.R.C.
5 1377(a). At least as to ordinary income asset distributions, recognition is
thought by some preferable to an analogue of Section 75 l(b). See Hearings on
H.R. 6055 (Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982) before the Subcommittee on
Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways & Means Comm., 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 215 (1982) (Statement of Martin Ginsburg) ("S Revision Hearings"); Staff
S Recommendations 17. The S Corporation shareholder receiving the
property distribution in turn obtains a fair market value under the general
corporate distribution rules in the property and is taxed only to the extent
that the distribution exceeds his/her basis in his/her stock with the excess
being treated as constructive sale or exchange. If, however, C E&P is present
then the "AAA" tier rules kick into play. The potentialities for tax planning
available here that are not available in partnership are obvious. A fair
market value basis can be obtained at a tax cost of the other shareholders.
c. Liquidating Distribution in Kind
i. 1954 Code
Inside the S Corporation prior to the advent of the 1986 Code a
liquidating distribution did not trigger the sale-exchange rule of Section
1363(d) as to appreciated property by virtue of Section 1366(e)(1). However,
Sections 336 or 337, as the case might be, would apply under the
incorporation by Section 137 l(a)(1) of the not otherwise "inconsistent" general
C Corporation rules. Therefore, the "recapture income" discussed in C to K
conversions above would apply to the extent such items override Sections 336
or 337.
At the outside shareholder level, the "distribution rules" of Section 1368
did not apply since they were limited to Section 301(c), i.e., dividend-like
disfrITitions. Therefore again under Section 137 1(a) the regular liquidation
rules discussed above apply. If a Section 331 complete outside recognition-
liquidation, albeit at capital gains approach, were taken, the distributed
property would obtain a fair market value under Section 334(b). However,
prior to the 1986 Code, Section 333 offered a practical alternative where
there was no C E&P. S Revision Hearings, supra at 72 (David Glickman,
Deputy Ass't Sec'ty). Because under Section 333, properly and timely elected,
no gain was recognized to the shareholder except for capital gains equal to
the cash and liquid assets received where there is no earnings and profits.
(Earnings and profits were treated as a dividend.) At the same time the
shareholder applied his/her outside basis, plus liabilities taken subject to or
assumed, to the property received in the liquidation rather than fair market
value. Thus under this approach a partnership-like liquidation consequence
essentially could be achieved. This avenue was to disappear with the 1986
Code.
ii.1986 Code
Under pre-1986 Section 1362(e) the non-liquidating distribution deemed
sale rule did not apply so that old Section 336 did, Section 336 and 1363(e)
permitted an outside basis increase with no inside toll charge other than
"recapture," sometimes masking ordinary income. H.R. Rep. No. 426, supra
at 279. Whether Section 341 caught this was problematical.
The House bill would have "retroactively" terminated the S election if a
former C liquidated before the close of the second taxable year following the
conversion year. Id. at 287. The Conference instead supplied new Section
1374's 10-year taifff. With no explanation in the legislative history, the 1986
Code revised the complete liquidation exception to Section 1363(d), by
limiting the exception to "reorgs" under Sections 354, 355 or 356, I.R.C.
S 1363(e) which contain their own inside recognition rules in "boot"
distributions.
3. Conclusion
Ginsberg views the absence of an analogue in the S corporation tax rules
of Sections 754 (governing inside basis adjustments) and 75 1(b) (the
consequence of the tax-free carryover basis rules applicable to distributions,
Sections 731 and 732) as an improvement. Ginsburg, Subchapter S and
Accumulated E&P: A Different View. 17 Tax Notes 571 (Nov. 22, 1982).
Treasury similarly views the optional basis adjustments as creating
"administrative complexity." Passthrough Entity, su at 15. It is true that
the Section 743 and in particular the Section 751(b), but not to be overlooked
the Section 704(b), regulations all do give complexity a new meaning. Thus,
the aggregate approach to purchases, distributions and allocations allows the
partners flexibility. But such flexibility generated tax-shelter abuse, i.e.,
uneconomic allocations of preferences, etc. This in turn gave birth to
complex, preventative Code and regulation provisions, e.g., Sections 706(d)(2),
723, and 75 1(b) and Section 704(b) regulations and Section 707(a)(2) and 752
regulations to come. In an ideal world a nonliquidating distribution to an
active participant S corporation shareholder, where there is no C E&P, should
be tax free with a carryover basis. Instead an outside step up at the toll
charge of an inside tax passed through proportionately to all the S corporation
shareholders is provided by Section 1363(d). Unfortunately the partnership
rules counterbalance that tax-free distribution flexibility with the Section
75 1(b) complexities and others to come. A similar S Corporation rule would
entail the same. The inability for S Corporation to adjust its inside basis to
reflect outside shifts interest is also unfortunate. Here too in the ideal S
corporation world inside adjustments should follow outside adjustments just as
Section 743 does if Section 754 is elected, or if "revaluations" and Section
704(c)-like allocations are made.
G. Purchase/Sale of a Partnership/S Corporation Interest
1. Subchapter K
a. Partial Entity/Aggregate
The 1954 House version of Subchapter K treated the sale of a
partnership interest partially under the entity approach as a sale of a capital
asset (Section 741) and partially under the aggregate approach as a sale of a
proportionate interest in the underlying partnership "unrealized receivables"
and "fees" (Section 751), regarding "the income rights as severable from the
partnership interest and as subject to the same consequences which would be
accorded an individual entrepreneur." H.R. Rep. 1337, supra at 71. The
Senate adopted this partial entity sale of interest, partial aggregate sale of
pro rata portion ordinary income assets approach, expanding the category to
include "substantially appreciated inventory." S. Rep. No. 1622, supra at 99.
i. Sections 75 l(a) and (b)
Section 751 is aimed at two different problems: (1) use of the entity
approach adopted in Section 741 applicable to the sale of an interest in the
partnership to achieve outside partner-level capital gains when under an
"aggregate approach" ordinary income would result in whole or in part were
there an entity-level sale of the selling partner's proportionate share of
partnership assets with Sections 702(b) and 704 pass through of income and
character; and (2) use of the aggregate rules providing for tax-free in-kind
liquidating and nonliquidating distributions with a substituted or carryover
basis through disproportionate distributions and retentions of capital gains
and ordinary income property. In the partnership context the goal is not
avoidance of an entity-level tax, but rather true transmutabon of character.
The aggregate approach of Section 75 I(a) to partnership Section 75 1(c)
ordinary income assets effectively closes this loophole, albeit at the cost of
substantial complexity.
Section 751(b) in practical effect applies an entity approach to
"disproportionate distributions" of ordinary Income and non-ordinary income
property. As discussed above the distribution is recharacterized as
disproportionate distribution followed by deemed sales between the
partnership and the distributee partner to achieve the actual final result.
ii. Opional Inside Blasis Adjustment
Both the House and Senate bill provided as does current Section 743(a)
that generally the transfer of an interest portion of a sale or disposition does
not affect the "inside" basis of the partnership's assets. S. Rep. No. 1622
jspra at 96. Both bills provided, however, (as does current Section 743(b)) for
an optional inside basis adjustment to reflect the increase or decrease in the
acquiring partner's hand in the basis of the partnership Intrest transferred.
The House assumed that such (in revocable) election would only be made if
the basis increase were substantial so as to outweigh the "bookkeeping
expense and inconvenience." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, §M ra at 70.
The House bill, following Its entity-simplicity bias, allocated the
Section 743 basis increase/decrease pro rata according to distributive share
to all partners. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, gupra at 70. The Senate, following the
objections of the ABA, 1954 CodenHea !0$8 W at 474, allocated the
Section 743 inside basis adjustment entirely to th transferee partner
"because it is more accurate than the House bill In reflecting the increase (or
decrease) in basis to the partner to whom It is attributable." S. Rep. No.
1622, 2pra at 97.
Here Subchapter K follows as an initial matter an entity approach. The
new partner has a cost basis under Section 1012 and Section 742 plus her/his
share of the constructive cash contribution under the Section 752 regulation
regime. If no Section 754 election is made and partnership property is
distributed to him/her within two years after her/his acquisition of the
partnership interest, the distributed property will be treated under Section
732(d) as having an inside basis in the partner's hands equal to the cost it
would have had had there been a Section 754 election In effect. This Is to
ensure that the distributing partner is able in effect to apply her/his
hypothetical inside cost basis under Section 732(d) to the distilbuted
property. This is the partnership analogue to pre-1982 Section 334(b)(2).
If a Section 754 election is in effect, the partnership rust adjust its
inside basis, but only as to the transferee partner, In its assets (allocated
under Section 755) up by the amount of any excess of the transferee partner's
basis in his/her partnership interest over his/her share of the adjusted inside
basis of the partnership property (or decrease its inside basis by the excess of
his/her share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property over his lower
outside basis in his interest in the partnership) under Section 743(b).
Otherwise, the partnership makes no adjustment to its inside basis due to the
transfer of an interest in the partnership under the general rule of Section
743(a). Of course, the Section 732(d) two-year rule and Section 743(b)
adjustments constitute an aggregate approach, whereas the general rule of
Section 743(a) constitutes an entity approach.
The absence of a Section 754 partnership election may now be of
"academic" in most cases. The last sentence of Treas. Reg. S 1.704-
l(bO(2)(iv)(f) implies, properly in my view, that upon admission of a new
partner or other interest shift, failure to "revaluate" partnership capital and
implement Section 704(c)-type allocations of built-in gain or loss may violate,
for example, the assignment of income doctrine. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(iii).
2. Subchapter S
Here Subchapter S most clearly adopts an entity approach. A sale of a
S corporation interest is treated as sale of an interest, generally capital
unless the collapsible corporation provisions apply. And no inside basis
adjustment is made.
a. Collapsible Corporation
Section 341 serves as a surrogate penalty principally designed to
suppress at the shareholder level (and on occasion the corporate level in the
case of a 1954 Code Section 337 transaction) liquidating distributions of
contingent items to be collected by the shareholder after complete
liquidation of the corporation. Under longstanding flawed, traditional
doctrine before and after the 1954 Code a liquidating corporation avoided
taxation at the corporate level upon distribution of a contingent claim and
upon subsequent collection as well by the distributee shareholders if the
liquidating corporation were not in existence at the time of collection, due to
erroneous limitations of the assignment of income/clear reflection of income
doctrine in its case law and statutory codifications to traditional tax accrual
of income concepts. See Lee & Bader, supra 12 J. of Corp. L. at 187-206. At
the same at the shareholder level such liquidating distribution of contingent
claims without ascertainable fair market value could be treated as an open
transaction with year one character treatment obtaining in year two (subject
more recently to the time value of money principles after the 1984
revisions). Id. at 171-186. Rather than addressing the underlying inside
corporate le-vel escape, Congress chose instead the surrogate of converting
the outside shareholder-level long-term capital gain into "ordinary income".
Why such a conversion was thought to equate the escaped inside tax is
unclear. Perhaps Congress felt it was simply ignoring the "collapsed"
corporation through application of Section 34 1.
A nonliquidating distribution by an S corporation even if contingent
income does not oppose the abuse potential that a liquidating distribution
would since the S corporation under traditional doctrine will be taxed upon
tcollection of the contingent item. Nevertheless, such a distribution usually
would trigger the collapsible corporation provisions. At the same time a
liquidating distribution by an S corporation under the 1954 Code did pose
collapsible and potential transmutation of income problems to the extent that
the collapsible corporation provisions can be avoided which is often a case
through several escape hatches.
3. Conclusion
The surface simplicity of the entity approach as to outside character is
outweighed by the collapsible provisions, but as to sales and other
transactions, other than non-pro rata distributions under Section 751(b),
Sections 75 1(a) is probably less complicated than Section 341. Where owners
materially participate inside basis adjustments should apply with mandatory
revaluations, etc.
H. Business Combinations and Divisions
1. Subchapter K
Section 708 provides the basic rules for "continuation" and
"termination" for tax purposes of a partnership. Section 708(b)(1)(B)
mandates "termination" if within a 12-month period there is a sale or
exchange of 50% or more of the total interest in partnership capital and
profits. In the case of a merger or consolidation of two or more partnerships,
the resulting partnership is the "continuation" of any merging or consolidating
partnership whose members own a more than 50% interest in the capital and
profits of the resulting partnership. Similarly, in the case of a division of a
partnership into two or more partnerships, the resulting partnerships in which
the members had an interest of 50% or more in the capital and profits of the
prior partnership are considered a continuation of the prior partnership.
Where the prior partnership terminates, the partnership year closes on the
date of the tainted sale or exchange.
The terminating partnership is deemed to distribute its properties to the
purchaser and the other remaining partners in proportion to their respective
interest in the assets under Treas. Reg. S 1.708(b)(1)(iv). Following this
constructive distribution, the buyer and the other remaining partners are
deemed to have constructively contributed the "distributed" properties to a
new partnership in a transaction governed by Section 72 1, etc. In such a
constructive liquidation and recontribution transaction, a revaluation of
partnership properties and a restatement of partnership capital accounts to
reflect such fair market value is permitted, probably even required if an
"aggregate" concept is applied (at some point, if enough of your partners
change, you no longer are the same aggregate of partners), under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f). In such a revaluation adjustments consistent with
Section 704(c) principles are necessary. See, id., 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g). If, as
likely as to be the case, the "terminated" partnership contains property other
than money, then in this deemed distribution the property and capital
accounts must be restated by virtue of Treasury Regulations § 1.704-
l(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). Thus, the essential difference between continuation or
termination appears to be whether revaluation is mandatory or optional and in
the case of termination the reconstituted partnership presumably treated as a
new entity with new elections relating the accounting methods, depreciation
and other matters. However, such elections have been increasingly ever more
circumscribed by statutory reform and apparently were the chief reasons for
the "termination" rule. See Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 62
(Rabinovitz); ALl, supra at 101 n.l. It is probable that suspended Section
704(e) losses terminate upon a termination of the partnership. For Section
704(d) provides that a suspended loss is allowed "as a deduction at the end of
the partnership year in which such excess is repaid to the partnership."
(Emphasis added.)
2. Subchapter S.
Here too is an area in which the general corporate rules apply. Thus, an
S Corporation may be merged with another S Corporation or with a C
Corporation so long as the corporate reorganization rules are met. A
technical problem that may arise is that generally stock ownership in an S
Corporation is limited to an individual or certain qualified trust under Section
1361(b)(1). Furthermore, an S Corporation cannot be a member of an
affiliated group, which precludes ownership by it of 80% or more of a
subsidiary. Certain reorganizations require that a target corporation stock be
owned perhaps momentarily by another corporation. Furthermore, certain
acquisitive reorganizations require that the organizing corporation control a
subsidiary for at least a transitory moment. Fortunately the Service has
ruled that mere transitory ownership of S Corporation stock by another
corporation or of a controlled subsidiary by an S Corporation will be ignored
so long as the S Corporation as part of the transaction in the final step meets
the stock ownership and ineligible corporation definition requirements of
Section 136 1.
As to corporate divisions there are both technical and frequently
practical problems. The technical problem is that a corporate division often
requires the old corporation to establish a subsidiary at least momentarily.
Fortunately a momentarily established subsidiary or other alternatives can be
devised for meeting Section 355 without jeopardizing S Corporation status.
The practical problems are that Section 355 requires in part that a divided
corporation be conducting a five year or older active business that was not
acquired by the dividing corporation in a cost basis acquisition. For new
service corporations this may be an insurmountable problem. See Lee, How
to Salvage Tax Benefits When a Professional Corporation Dispanels, 45 J.
Tax. 14 (1976). Again, under pre-1986 rules, an S Corporation without C E&P
could obviate this problem in part by a Section 333 liquidation provided that
the other shareholders were willing to shift out of corporate status. With the
repeal of General Utilities this avenue is closed.
Unlike the Section 708 rule, shifts in S corporation stock ownership do
not terminate the entity. Although a 50%+ shift can set the stage for a
reconsidertion of the S election. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(l(B).
The partnership approach as to both combinations and divisions is to
categorize transactions on the basis of whether (a) the resulting partnership
constitutes a "continuation" without termination of the partnership in
question or (b) the entire transaction constitutes a constructive liquidation in
kind of the old partnership followed by a contribution in kind by the
continuing partners to the new partnership. I.R.C. § 708(b)(2) Continuation
or termination turns on whether there is more than a 50% change in capital
and profit/losses of the old partnership within a 12-month window ending on
the transaction in question under the Section 708 standards. I.R.C.
S 708(b)(2).
A Subchapter S corporation is subject to the general corporate rules
regarding reorganizations, both acquisitive and divisive, although more than
"transitory" existence as a member of an "affiliated group" can cause "status"
problems. Prior to 1986, however, an S Corporation without C E&P had
available the partnership-like avenue of a Section 333 liquidation so long as
the shareholders of the liquidated corporation did not reincorporate all or
part of the assets into a new corporation as a part of a step transaction. The
acquisitive reorganization rules are probably posed less problems so long as
the transaction was kept simple. On the Section 355 divisive reorganization
side, however, the "active business" test and "device" tests often pose
qualification problems particularly as to new service corporations. See Lee,
supra, 45 J. Tax. 14.
3. Conclusion.
Clearly the partnership is the easier vehicle for mergers with other
partnerships and divisions. The S Corporation rules are both too complicated
and too simple: (a) They are too complicated due to the general corporate
rules and (b) they are too simple in that they would allow tax free shifting
from conduit S Corporations status to separate C Corporation status in a
merger of an S Corporation with a C Corporation with the latter surviving.
For the reasons discussed in S to C conversions this rule is too simple.
I. Estate Planning
1. Introduction
Historically the closely-held C corporation has been the prime
candidate for estate planning, particularly in the context of an "estate
freeze". An estate freeze seeks to transfer future appreciation to other
taxpayers, generally the younger generation. In the closely-held C
corporation context the principal means of estate freezes has been through
(I) the Section 351 formation of a holding company with preferred stock
(which holds all of the stock of the operating company), (2) a recapitalization
changing common stock into preferred stock or (3) a preferred stock
dividend. Generally all three methods result in the preferred stock coming
under Section 306. At the opposite extreme lies an S corporation. Since it
can have no second class of stock, the ability to effect an estate freeze is
quite circumscribed. The principal method would be through creative use of
debt instruments. However, if the debt instrument is not issued in an initial
incorporation, the issuance of the debt most likely will constitute a dividend
to the recipient. In between these two extremes lies a partnership capital
freeze.
A partnership capital freeze is implemented by forming a
new partnership or by restructuring an existing partnership
to provide for at least two classes of partnership interests:
(1) a 'frozen' or 'preferred' partnership interest with a fixed
liquidation preference and preferred rights to income and
distributions; and (2) a 'regular' or 'common' partnership
interest with a residual claim to the partnership's assets,
earnings and distributions. The resulting multiple class
partnership may be either a general or limited partnership.
The older generation family member receives the 'preferred'
partnership interest and members of the younger generation
receive the 'common' partnership interests. Control and
management responsibilities may be allocated to either the
'preferred' or 'common' partnership interests or to a separate
class of partnership interests created solely to control and
manage the partnership. Elias, The Partnership Capital
Freeze: A Path Through the Maze, 40 Tax Law. 45 (1986).
2. Subchapter K Estate Freeze
The primary purpose of a partnership capital freeze is to reduce estate
and gift taxes for the older generation, but additional consequences may
include cash flow to the older generation; possible income tax savings through
income shifting (discussed in subparagraph i below); and flexibility in
allocating management responsibility, risk-taking, and control of the business
Elias, supra 40 Tax Law. at 45.
A partnership capital freeze entails not only consideration of whether
the freeze does in fact accomplish the estate tax objectives, but also the
basic question of whether the mechanics themselves are respected. The
latter issue involves consideration of both the "family partnership" provisions
of Section 704(e) and the allocation provisions of Section 704(b).
Capital must be an material income producing factor. See Elias, supra.
40 Tax Law. at 47; for other Section 704(e) problems see id. at 48-49.
Conversion or recapitalization of partnership does not in itself give rise
to taxation. Id. at 50. But constructive cash distributions from a change in
profit-loss ratio in such a conversion can give rise to problems. Article
suggests use of guarantee. Elias, supra 40 Tax Law. at 57.
Estate freeze allocations have substantial economic effect. Id. at 54;
for other estate tax and gift tax issues, see id. at 6 1-7 1.
3. Subchapter S Estate Freeze
The core problem here is the S corporation prohibition of multiple
classes of stock. The narrow exceptions for non-voting common stock, etc.,
are not helpful in effectuating an estate freeze. An estate freeze in an S
corporation context usually must turn on creative use of debt. Fortunately as
long as a straight debt instrument is used no second class of stock issue is
posed.
Issuance of a debt instrument by an existing corporation other than an
exchange for property gives rise to dividend potentiality at the shareholder
level. After the 1982 changes to Section 304 use of a holding company does
not avoid this problem. Only initial issuance of debt under current rules
(likely to be changed) gives rise to no dividend consequences. Even so use of
debt instruments appears awkward.
Other suggested means of achieving life-time estate freeze effects in
an S corporation's setting include (1) a private annuity, (2) an installment sale,
and (3) a combination of an S corporation and a partnership. A private
annuity can be a somewhat leaky tax shelter. If the seller of the stock dies
early, he/she will have received few payments and the annuity is not
includable in his/her estate. On the other hand, if the seller of the stock
survives beyond his/her life expectancy, while the annuity is still excluded,
more payments will have been received by the decedent, which in turn would
have to be disposed of to reduce the estate. Also, the private annuity
approach results in giving up all voting control in most circumstances. An
alternative approach to the annuity transaction is for the shareholder to
contribute the S stock to a grant or trust reserving an annuity from the
property for a specified period. The trust income would be taxed of the
grantor and the value of the corpus is includable in the estate if the grantor
does not out live his/her annuity interest.
The installment sale of stock has an effect similar to that of a private
annuity by converting the value of the S stock into a debt obligation with a
fixed value. However, the installment sale approach yields more certainty
because fixed payments generally are to be made rather than an annuity
turning on the number of years the seller lives. A variant of a self-cancelling
installment note has been suggested here with the potentiality (probably
weak) that the cancellation of the note as the seller's death will not
constitute a disposition of the installment obligation triggering recognition to
the estate. The above list focuses on life time estate freezing alternatives.
Disposition at death can also be structured into a "freeze" under a binding by-
sale agreement which fixes the estate tax value of the decedent's S
corporation stock.
Beyond the second class of stock rule, a number of other S corporation
prerequisites pose potential traps, or at least warnings, in S corporation
estate planning. Thus, the permitted ownership requirements (number of
shareholders, categories of shareholders, etc.) must be carefully attended to
prior to death. Estate planning, by buy-sell agreements or by terms of the
wills of S corporation shareholders should be coordinated with the numerical
and categories of permitted shareholders restrictions. Sound tax planning
also calls for contractual penalties to be imposed upon violators by will or
sale.
P.L.R. 8711020 recognizes an S corporation as partner where it sells
half of its going business to a unrelated company who then becomes a joint
venturer with the S corporation in operating the old business. See Freeman,
Some Early Strategies, etc., 64 Taxes 962 (1986), on roll-outs and roll-ups for
estate freeze effects.
J. Family Income Shifting
1. Subchapter K
Congress in enacting in 1951 the predecessor to Section 704(e) restated
the assignment of income principles as follows:
Two principles governing attribution of income have long
been accepted as basic: (1) income from property is
attributable to the owner of the property; (2) income from
personal services is attributable to the person rendering the
services... [The amendment] makes it clear that however
the owner of a partnership interest may have acquired such
interest, the income is taxable to the owner, if he is the real
owner. If the ownership is real, it does not matter what
motivated the transfer to him, or whether the business
benefited from the entrance of the new partner. S. Rep. No.
781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 38 (1951).
The Supreme Court in Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), also
looked at services and capital, but its analysis was not whether the services
or capital contributed were of sufficient importance to meet some objective
standard, supposedly established by the Court in Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S.
280, 290 (1946), which articulated the issue in the family partnership context
as "whether the partners really and truly intended to join together for the
purpose of carry on business and sharing in the profits or losses or both."
Culbertson reasoned that the question instead was
whether, considering all the facts--the agreement, the
conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their
statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the
ownership of parties, their respective abilities and capital
contributions, the actual control of income and purposes for
which it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their
true intent--the parties in good faith and acting with a
business purpose intended to join together in the present
conduct of the enterprise.
Section 704(e)(1) provides that a person will be recognized as a partner for
purposes of the partnership tax provisions "if he owns a capital interest in a
partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor .... " The
regulations, however, accompanying this provision incorporate to a large
degree the case law focus in requiring the gift or other transfer of capital to
meet certain basic tests for the donee or purchaser to be treated as the "real
owner" of the capital interest. The regulations turn on retained direct and
indirect controls, which would preclude the vesting of dominion and control of
the partnership interest in the transferee. Participation in management,
income distributions, and conduct of partnership business, or lack thereof,
also constitute relevant factors. Generally a minor is not recognized as a
partner unless control of the partnership interest is a exercised by another
person as a fiduciary under judicial supervision acting solely for the minor's
benefit.
Once the basic test of "real ownership" is satisfied, the issue narrows to
whether capital is a "material income-producing" factor in the particular
partnership. The regulations draw the bright line of (a) capital not being a
material income-producing factor where the business income consists
principally of compensatory income from services on the one hand, and (b)
capital ordinarily constituting a material income producing factor, on the
other, if the business requires substantial inventories, or a substantial
investment in plant and machinery or other equipment. See summation of
case law at 37 Tax Law. 275.
If the taxpayer fails either the true ownership or capital as a material
income producing factor test, then the statutory presumption of partnership
status does not apply. But in that case the common law test fashioned by the
Supreme Court in the family partnership cases including Tower and
Culbertson generally governs. If the purported partner performs services for
the partnership, then the regulations to be promulgated under the 1984
amendments to Section 707 are to provide for partnership status.
Once partnership status is attained by virtue of a capital interest, case
law factors, or Section 707(a)(2) analysis by performing services for, or
transferring property to, the partnership, the second leg of the statutory
codification of the assignment of income doctrine in Section 704(e)(2) comes
into play provided that if the partnership interest was created by a gift or
purchased by one family member from another. Section 704(e)(2) recognizes
the distributive share of the donee-purchaser from family member partner
under the partnership agreement except to the extent that such a distributive
share is determined without allowance of reasonable compensation for
services rendered to the partnership by the donor or to the extent that the
portion of such distributive share attributable to capital is proportionally
greater than the share of the donor-family member seller attributable to
his/her capital. The "reasonable allowance" for services rendered by partners
is determined essentially under the Section 162 reasonable compensation
standards. Query, what happens in a loss situation?
2. Subchapter S
The S corporation provisions contain no statutory analogue to Section
704(e)(1), i.e., recognition of the taxpayer as a partner if capital is an
income-producing factor. But the S corporation case law springs from the
same assignment of income well from which Congress drew Section
704(e)(1). Thus the Tax Court in Duarte v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 193 (1965),
treated transfers of S corporation stock to minor children as not being bona
fide or economically real despite the appointment of a custodian for the
children where (a) neither the children nor the custodian exercised any
influence in the operation of the corporation, and (b) the children did not
receive any of the income which the S corporation reported as having been
distributed to them. The Tax Court similarly found a transfer of S
corporation stock to children to be not bona fide where there were no
purported distributions of S corporation earnings, but the father of the
children and principal employee of the corporation obtained the use of the
undistributed taxed S corporation income through large, unsecured advances
which were not repaid. See generally, Heller, Shifting Family Income
Through Subchapter S Corporations: Problems and Planning, 5 J. Corp'n Tax.
157 (1978). See Beirne v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 268 (1973). Furthermore, the pre-
1982 S corporation regulations provide to similar effect:
A donee or purchaser of stock in the corporation is not
considered a shareholder unless such stock is acquired in a
bona fide transaction and the donee or purchaser is the real
owner of such stock. The circumstances, not only as of the
time of the purported transfer but also during the periods
preceding and following it, will be taken into consideration
in determining the bona fides of the transfer. Transactions
between members of a family will be closely scrutinized.
Treas. Reg. S 1.1373-1(a)(2).
In essence, while through a somewhat different route, the same result that
should obtain as to recognition of an S corporation shareholder as to
recognition of a partner in the family partnership context.
Once the S corporation shareholder is treated as the true owner, Section
1366(e) applies a somewhat more limited "deflection of income" provision
modeled on Section 704(e)(2). The S corporation rules provide that the
Service may make "adjustments in the items taken into account by (a) an
individual, related to one or more shareholders in the S corporation, who
renders services, or furnishes capital, to the S corporation without reasonable
compensation and (b) such related shareholder(s) in order to reflect the value
of such services or capital. The Senate Finance Committee Report explains
that
[items taken into account by members of the family
(whether or not themselves partners) wherever it is
necessary to reflect reasonable compensation to the
shareholder for services rendered or capital furnished to the
corporation may be properly adjusted. Both the amount of
compensation and the timing of compensation can be so
adjusted. S. Rep. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982).
The above legislative history, consistent with the fact that Section 1366(e)
can apply to a nonshareholder, implies that the Service has the power under
this provision to allocate, presumably much like Section 482, compensation
income (for services or capital, i.e., interest) to the under compensated
individual and at the same time to create or allocate to the S corporation a
corresponding deduction. In contrast, the partnership provisions appear
merely to readjust the partner's distributive shares of income. Of course
there an individual providing services, transferring property or investing
"material" capital would be a partner under either Sections 704(e) or
707(a)(2)(A). On the other hand, some commentators believe that instead
Section 1366(e) contemplates a reallocation of specific items of corporate
income and perhaps expense among the family members as their "pro rata
share". If this approach were followed, conflicts with the rule that pro rata
share is based upon stock ownership would arise, requiring perhaps imputed
stock ownership.
The pre-1982 Subchapter S rules followed neither of the above
patterns. Rather if a shareholder-employee received either excessive or
inadequate compensation (the prior provision being limited to services
rendered to the corporation by family member shareholders), the amount
reallocated was treated as a Subchapter S corporation dividend and not as
compensation for services. This approach appears closer to a passthrough
model than to a reallocation of income or loss items. On the other hand the
1982 legislative history refers to the timing of compensation, and allocations
impacting on timing are more consistent with Section 482 allocations than
distributive share reallocations.
3. Conclusion
Income shifting in Subchapters K and S contexts faces common-law
assignment of income and partial legislative codifications of that doctrine.
The partnership provision (Section 704(e)) is more detailed than the
corresponding S corporation provision (Section 1366(e)).
Section 704(e)(1) recognizes a person as a partner if he owns a capital
interest in a partnership in which capital is a "material income-producing
factor." Once a partner is recognized, then the distributive share of a donee
(or a purchase by a member of the seller's family) is recognized only after an
allowance for reasonable compensation for services rendered to the
partnership by the donor and if the portion of such share attributable to
donated capital is proportionately the same as the share of the donor
attributable to the donor's capital.
Parallel S corporation rules are limited to reallocations for reasonable
compensation or return on capital. However, under the case law and other
authorities the Service closely scrutinizes transfers between family members
to determine if the donee (or purchaser) is the "real owner" of the stock.
Treas. Reg. S 1.1373.1(a)(2).
J. Death of Owner
1. Subchapter K
At a partner's death, his/her interest in the partnership can be (1)
continued by his/her successor In interest; (2) sold (pursuant to a buy-sell
agreement in place at date of death) to the other partners; or (3) liquidated
by the partnership, generally with continuing Section 736 payments. In all
three cases the value of the partnership interest, including the distributive
share of income or loss at the date of death is includable in the decedent's
gross estate.
The partnership year generally does not close as to a partner who dies
prior to the end of the partnership taxable year. But if the decedent partner's
estate or other successor sells or exchanges later in the tax year the
decedent's entire interest in the partnership, the partnership taxable year as
to the estate or other successor closes on the date of such subsequent sale or
exchange. Similarly if the entire partnership interest is liquidated later in
the tax year, the partnership year closes on the date of the completion of the
liquidation as to the estate or other succession. However, such liquidation
may coincide with the end of the partnership tax year. Moreover, if
continuing Section 736(a) payments are involved, the liquidation is not
completed until the payments are completed.
The final return of a decedent partner includes only his/her share of
partnership taxable income for any partnership taxable year ending within or
with the last taxable year of the decedent partner (the year ending on the
date of his/her death). If the partner's estate or other successor in interest
continues to share the profits or losses of the partnership, the partnership
taxable income for the entire partnership taxable year ending after the
decedent's last taxable year is included in the return of the estate or of the
successor. (Thus, if the partnership is generating net losses for the entire
year and the decedent partner had substantial income in his/her final year,
the decedent's surviving spouse, if any, should be the successor in interest, so
that the losses and income could be netted on a final joint return. Such
successor in interest must be designated in accordance with the terms of the
partnership agreement.)
Conversely, a sale or exchange of the decedent partner's interest
pursuant to a buy-sell agreement existing at the date of the death of a
partner, results in a close of the taxable year of the partnership as to such
decedent partner at the date of death which is also the date of the sale or
exchange.
The distributive share of partnership income as of the date of death of
the decedent partner constitutes Income in Respect of a Decedent ("IRD").
Hence, the successor in interest takes a carryover basis in IRD items,
generally zero in the case of a cash method decedent's receivables. And the
recipient successor characterizes the IRD items under Section 691(a)(3) in the
same manner as if they had been received by the decedent. These provisions
are more-or-less meshed with Section 751 through the case law.
With advance planning, the partners can arrange for the decedent
partner's year to end with the date of his/her death through a buy-sell
agreement. Furthermore, if the partners decide to transfer the decedent's
interest through a sale or exchange to the remaining partner(s), such form is
respected rather than treating the transaction as a liquidation of the
partnership. Consequently, the sale or exchange of the interest to the other
partner(s) results in a capital gain under Section 74 1, except to the extent
that Section 75 1(a) applies. As discussed in more detail above, under Section
75 1(a) a sale of the partnership interest under an aggregate approach will
nevertheless trigger a deemed sale as to the selling partner of his/her pro
rata share of partnership Sections 75 1(c) and 75 l(d) assets. Since in this
deemed sale the selling partner is deemed to have received a distribution of
the Sections 75 1(c) and (d) assets with an inside basis flow through
immediately prior to the sale, the estate's basis in the partnership interest
and in the Sections 75 1(c) and (d) is critical. As discussed above, to the
extent that the items constitute IRD, no step up occurs. Thus true "accounts
receivable" constitute IRD with no inside step up. The interesting, and as yet
not finally resolved question is whether potential recapture, a constructive
Section 75 1(c) asset is stepped up (as would be the case if the decedent held
the depreciable depletable asset directly--death purges the recapture taint)
or constitutes IRD.
If the sale approach is chosen, and no Section 754 election is in effect,
then the purchaser obtains no inside basis adjustments (except for Section
732(d)). If however such an election is in effect, the purchaser obtains an
inside basis adjustment under an aggregate approach as if he/she had
purchased his/her proportionate share of partnership assets for their fair
market value at the time of acquisition of the partnership interest.
The partners also may choose for the partnership to liquidate the
decedent partner's interest. Upon completion of the liquidation of the
decedent partner's interest, the partnership year closes as to such partner.
Thus, the partners can control the closing of the year. Moreover by
agreement under Section 736(b) the partners may allocate the tax burdens as
they choose, with a minimum of uncertainty and difficulty, at least as to
stated and unstated good will.
The intended purpose of this provision was to permit the
participants themselves to determine whether the retiring
partner or the remaining partners would bear the tax
burdens for payments in liquidation of a retiring partner's
interest. Thus, under the general approach of subsection
[7361(a), the tax burden is borne by the retiring partner-he
recognizes the payments as taxable income, and the
remaining partners are allowed a commensurate deduction
from partnership income. [Literally in the case of a
"guaranteed payment", figuratively in the case of a
distributive share.] Under subsection [736(b), the general
rule concedes an approach of nonrecognition of ordinary
income to the retiring partner, but places the tax burden on
the partnershp by denying a deduction from income for the
payments. This latter provision, however, adopts a special
rule-[subsection 736](b)(2)(B)-in an express effort to assist
the participants to decide inter sese upon the allocation of
the tax burden .... Under this rule, payments for the good
will of the partnership are deductible by the partnership (and
hence recognizable as ordinary income to the retiring
partner) "except to the extent that the partnership
agreement provides for a payment with respect to good
will." If the partnership agreements provides for a payment
with respect to good will, the tax burden is allocated to the
partnership-no deduction is allowed and the retiring partner
need not recognize the payments as ordinary income.
Commissioner v. Jackson Investment Co., 346 F.2d 187.
Thus, the parties have the ability to state or not state good will and
thereby effect Section 736(a) or Section 736(b) treatment as desired.
Moreover, to some degree turning on the partnership agreement the parties
have an ability to allocate premium between unrealized receivables and
stated good will under the Fixel decision.
If a partnership election is in effect under Section 754, then the
partnership will increase the inside adjusted basis of partnership property by
gain recognized to the distributee partner in exchange for his partnership
interest under Section 736(b), 731(a)(1), and Section 741. Otherwise no inside
basis adjustment will be made by the partnership due to the liquidation, nor
will it recognize income on the liquidation, even as to distributions of
property and kind.
2. Subchapter S
In the S corporation context there are also three possibilities: (1) the
estate or the decedent shareholder's successor in interest continues as the S
corporation shareholder; (2) the estate or other successor in interest sells the
S corporation stock whether or not pursuant to a buy-sell; or (3) the estate or
other successor's stock interest is redeemed by the S corporation. In all three
scenarios, the decedent shareholder's final return includes his/her pro rata
share of S corporation income and loss for its tax year in which the decedent
dies. In and all three cases the accrued income is includable in the estate.
Thus there is less flexibility, but also less traps for the unwary, in the
Subchapter S regime.
As to sale or liquidation of the decedent's stock interest, essentially the
same results obtain so long as family or other attribution is not involved. Due
to the S corporation stock ownership restrictions, usually family attribution
would be the only attribution involved. Except in exceeding limited
circumstances, an estate cannot the waive the attribution; therefore, stock
owned by family members most likely will have to be taken into account in
the case of a redemption by the S corporation. If a redemption does not
quality as a sale or exchange due to attribution, then it is treated as a Section
301 distribution and for S corporation purposes as a distribution under Section
1368.
Regardless of whether continuation, sale, or redemption is chosen, no
inside basis adjustment is made by the S corporation as to the transferee or
remaining shareholders.
As to continuation by the decedent's successor and interest, the
ownership restrictions of Section 136 1(b) and (c) must be kept in mind.
Particularly the prohibition of all save quite limited trusts as permitted S
corporation shareholders poses traps for the unwary here.
3. Conclusion
Again the partnership vehicle offers the maximum flexibility,
particularly as to the deceased partner's distributive share of partnership
income for the partnership year in which the partner dies. Who is taxed on
that distributive share of income turns on which of three scenarios are chosen
as to the decedent's interest in the partnership. (I) The interest in the
partnership can be continued and acquired by the deceased partner's
successor-in-interest; (2) the decedent's interest can be sold, for example
pursuant to a buy-sell agreement, to the remaining partners and an agreed
upon valuation; or (3) the partnership interest can be liquidated by the
partnership under Section 736 pursuant to a preexisting agreement as well. If
the partnership year ends at the deceased partner's death, which is the case
only if alternative two of a sale is chosen, the deceased partner's share of
partnership income or loss up to the date of his/her death is included in the
deceased partner's final income tax return covering the period from beginning
of the calendar year as a usual matter through the date of his/her death.
Otherwise, in the case of continuation by a successor in interest or Section
736 liquidation, the partnership's year is not closed as to the deceased partner
and his/her entire partnership Section 702 distributive share of partnership
income or loss passes through to his/her successor in interest. In all three
cases the value of the accrued partnership income at date of death is
includable in the decedent's estate. In the case of a continuation or Section
736 liquidation, such accrued income constitutes income in respect of a
decedent ("IRD") and is not stepped up or down at death. Other tax
consequences of the continuation, sale or liquidation methods also vary.
Indeed the entire area offers great flexibility, but equally great traps for the
unwary.
As to S corporations, the picture is much simpler and less flexible.
Regardless of whether (I) the estate or other successor in interest to the
deceased S corporation shareholder remains a stockholder in the S
corporation; (2) the stock interest is sold to other shareholders, (a) pursuant
to buy-sell arrangement or (b) not; or (3) the S corporation stock interest of
the deceased shareholder is redeemed by the S corporation, the decedent is
taxed on his/her pro rata share of the S corporation's items of income or loss
under Section 1366(a)(1). This provision specifically refers to the final
taxable year of a shareholder who died before the end of the corporation's
taxable year. Of course, the pro rata share only reflects the stock ownership
by the decedent during the tax year, and the successor or other transferee
takes into account his/her pro rata share for the balance of the S
corporation's tax year. Additionally assuming no family attribution, the
results at the decedent shareholder's estate level are the same regardless of
whether the stock is sold to others or is redeemed.
K. Owner Buy-Outs
1. Subchapter K
One of the few partners' choice provisions left substantially unchanged
in the recent wave of anti-abuse partnership amendments is Section 736
governing payments to retired partners. Even here, the legislative history to
the 1984 amendments to Section 707 calls for conforming amendments to the
Section 736 regulations.
a. Section 736 Retirement/Liquidation Payments
Section 736 divides payments to a retiring partner (or successor to a
deceased partner) into two broad categories: (1) payments for the partner's
interest in partnership property, and (2) all other payments. Broadly, amounts
paid for the partner's interest in partnership property are treated as a
constructive sale or exchange yielding capital gains income. Other payments
are treated as attributable to a continuing share of partnership income, i.e., a
Section 704(a) or (b) "distributive share" or a Section 707(c) "guaranteed
payment," as the case may be. "Unrealized receivables" and "inventory
items", the heart of the collapsible partnership provisions (Section 751), are
treated specially under an intricate interweaving of provisions.
i. In-Kind Distributions
Pro rata in-kind distributions of unrealized receivables and inventory
items, being specifically excluded from sale or exchange treatment under
Section 736(b), at first blush fall into Section 736(a), which provides for
distributive share (Section 704(a) or (b)) or guaranteed payment (Section
707(c)) treatment, according to whether dependent upon partnership profit or
not. Arguably an in-kind distribution rather than cash payment is tax-free
with a substituted tainted character. I.R.C. S 731, 732 and 735. Non-pro rata
distributions of property other than than unrealized receivables, while
superficially under Section 736(b), are really subject to Section 75 l(b), which
restructures the disproportionate distribution as a "constructive" pro rata
distribution of non-Section 75 1(c) property and Section 75 l(c) property i.e.,
unrealized receivables and inventory. This restructured constructive pro rata
distribution is followed by "deemed," i.e., constructive, sales and exchanges
between the partner and the partnership to achieve the final actual
disproportionate result. Thus, the distributee partner will most likely be
deemed to have sold his/her deemed proportionate share of unrealized
receivables and inventory items back to the partnership resulting in
immediate ordinary income and recognition due to the interplay of Sections
751(b) and 735 (which carries over the inventory taint for five years in the
distributee partner's hands).
ii. Payments for Interest: Constructive Sale or Exchange
Payments for a partner's interest in partnership assets other than
"unstated" good will and unrealized receivables are in effect treated under
Section 736(b) as a constructive sale or exchange of the partner's interest in
the partnership. For such payments are treated as a constructive cash
distribution, which results in recognized income to the distributee partner
only to the extent in excess of his/her basis in his/her partnership interest.
Of course, such basis must be allocated between Section 736(b) partnership
property and unrealized receivables and other Section 75 l(c) property.
iii. Payment for "Profit Share"
Other payments, i.e., payments for pro rata interest in unrealized
receivables and inventory and unstated good will, fall into Section 736(a).
Section 736(a) is intended to treat such payments in effect as a continuation
of the partner's profit share, i.e., to the extent payable only out of
partnership profits treated as a distributive share under Section 704(a) or (b)
and to the extent payable without regard to partnership profits, treated as a
guaranteed payment under Section 707(c). Such treatment of unrealized
receivables and inventory follows from their "ordinary" nature. The
treatment of unstated goodwill is due rather to a concession to the policy of
flexibility between partners: they can choose whether (a) to "state" goodwill,
in which case it will be a Section 736(b) constructive sale or exchange item,
or (b) not to state goodwill, in which case the distributee partner would
recognize ordinary income (or other flow through character of partnership
income), thereby reducing the other partner's shares of income (or giving
them a deduction in the case of a guaranteed payment).
The Internal Revenue Service apparently prefers an approach that
determines each partner's share of Sections 75 l(c) or 75 l(d) property on the
basis of his/her interest in the partnership. The Tax Court, however, has
looked to the partnership agreement to determine whether a retiring partner
has any interest in unrealized receivables. If he/she does not, and the
agreement indicates that payment is for "stated good will", then a partner
may be able to obtain entirely sale or exchange treatment upon the
liquidation of his/her interest in the partnership even where the partnership
contains substantial unrealized receivables. These rules apply even in a two-
person partnership in which one partner retires. As long as Section 736(a)
payments are due the retired partner, the partnership is deemed to continue
under the regulations.
Some pre-1984 commentators believed that Section 736(a) payments,
particularly the "guaranteed payments", were deductible under a technical
reading of the statute without regard to the general capitalization or other
rules normally applicable to "ordinary" payments. This reading was supported
by the legislative history accompanying the 1976 amendments to Section
707(c), codifying Cagle. S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 94 n.7 (1976).
However, the legislative history to the 1984 changes to Section 707(a)(2)
mandates incorporation of the principles of those ainendments in the Section
736 regulations. S. Print No. 169, supra at 228. Hence, where payments to a
retiring partner are attributable to services performed by him/her and the
payment is deemed under Section 736(a) to be a guaranteed or non-partner
payment, the general capitalization (and non-amortization for syndication
costs) rules should apply as to such guaranteed payments. The question of
employee status remains to be resolved.
b. Partner Cross-Purchase
Instead of the partnership liquidating the retiring partner's interest, the
remaining partners can instead purchase the interest. Different tax
consequences result and the choice is that of the partners. As to the selling
partner, the sale of a partnership interest is treated as the sale or exchange
of the interest under Section 741, an entity approach. However, to the extent
of the selling partner's interest in unrealized receivables, Section 751(a) a
modified aggregate-fragmentation of assets approach applies. Under it the
selling partner is deemed to have had a in kind distribution of his/her share of
partnership Section 751(c) assets immediately prior to the sale. As to such
deemed distribution, the selling partner takes over the partnership's inside
basis, generally zero in the case of unrealized receivables (Sections 732(d) or
734(b) would apply to such hypothetical distribution). The selling partner is
then deemed to have sold the deemed distributed Section 751(c) assets to the
purchaser and to have sold the rest of his/her partnership interest for a
capital gain or loss, against which he/she offset the rest of his/her remaining
basis, to the purchasing partner for the remaining purchase price. The old
result of ordinary gain and corresponding capital loss becomes untenable on a
policy basis if the capital gains preference does not return.
The purchasing partner in contrast is treated under an entity approach
as having purchased the partnership interest in which he/she has a cost basis
under Sections 742 and 1012 (plus share of liabilities under Section 752(a)).
No inside basis adjustment is made to the partnerships assets for the benefit
of the purchasing partner (except the two-year Section 732(d) rule as to
distributions within the two years following the purchase), unless a Section
754 election is in effect. In essence, through a sale a selling partner can
convert unstated good will into capital gain, which would not be possible in a
liquidation.
c. In-Kind Liquidation
A third, and probably less frequently chosen, alternative is an in kind
liquidating distribution to the retiring partner. While the law is somewhat
unclear here, as discussed above, such liquidation should be a nonrecognition
event with substituted basis and carryover taint for five years. Unstated
goodwill "distributed" should not be recognized either. A distribution of
Section 751(c) or (d) property should not be treated as a liquidating payment
for such interest. Rather they should be treated as Section 735 5-year
tainted distributions.
2. Subchapter S
a. Outside Retiring Shareholder Treatment
The starting point is that the S corporation provisions contain no
parallel to Section 736. Rather the S corporation provisions are silent as to
the outside retiring shareholder's treatment in a redemption or, for that
matter, partial liquidation or complete liquidation. Therefore, for the
redemption or partial liquidation transactions, by virtue of Section 1371 we
must look to Section 302.
If Section 302(b) applies, under Section 302(a) constructive sale or
exchange treatment results of the shareholder level unless Section 341,
applicable to collapsible corporations, is triggered. In broadest outline,
Section 302(b) requires for shareholder-level constructive sale or exchange
treatment that the shareholder surrendering stock to the S corporation in a
redemption either (a) to surrender all or a substantial portion of his/her stock
(and the other shareholders are unrelated or the complete termination of
interest waiver under Section 302(c) of Section 318 family attribution rules
apply) or (b), coupled with a redemption, to sell a substantial portion of
his/her remaining stock to other shareholders (and attribution not be a
meaningful factor). As a practical matter, therefore, capital gains treatment
normally requires retirement or a bootstrap-acquisition "meaningful" shift of
interest. Or under Sections 302(b)(4) and 302(e) (old Section 346) the
transaction must qualify as a partial liquidation, a contraction of the S
corporation's business at the corporate level. Such a transaction usually is
practical only in services corporations (which historically have not been
structured in the S mold).
If redemption status is obtained, then the entire amount paid for the
stock (absent time value of money considerations) is treated as received in a
sale or exchange even if economically attributable to inside accounts
receivable. Thus, the S corporation entity approach redemption rules parallel
the partnership entity approach sale or exchange to other shareholders or
liquidation with unstated good will as to the selling owner. Indeed, more
ordinary income is likely to be recognized under the collapsible partnership
rules than will be recognized in the redemption of S corporation stock.
If the S corporation is carrying on a continuing business, and
particularly if it has in the past been distributing rather than retaining
profits, redemption of a substantial stock interest usually will require a
"credit redemption". S corporation notes given in redemption of the retiring
shareholder's stock should not pose a disqualifying "second class of stock"
problem, so long as the minimal "straight debt safe harbor" requirements of
Section 136 l(c)(5) are met. For other purposes, however, such debt can still
constitute disguised equity. At the present time the only applicable
"standards" are to be found in the common-law morass. It appears, however,
that treatment of redemption notes as debt is judged more lightly than the
traditional debt equity criteria might suggest.
Much more difficult in the S corporation context is obtaining parallel
treatment to unstated good will and Section 75 1(c) assets, principally
unrealized receivables, than in the parallel partnership context. Most
commentators suggest that the most likely avenue of success is the
"severance pay" technique. Under this approach a retiring S corporation
shareholder, particularly in a services corporation, is awarded severance pay
upon retirement or other termination of interest, generally equal to his/her
"pro rata share" of accounts receivable. While outside such severance pay is
indeed likely to result in ordinary income to the retiring shareholder, the
inside "reasonable compensation" deduction is more questionable. Under
traditional corporate rules, such severance pay would be deductible only to
the extent that it, plus prior compensation, did not exceed "unreasonable
compensation". Depending on how the retiring S corporation shareholder was
treated as to in-place accounts receivable upon his/her entry into the S
corporation, the prior compensation from the S corporation is likely to have
been reasonable (particularly if shares of profit in the S corporation are taken
into account). If this be the case, then additional severance pay is not
deductible by the S corporation, i.e., it is passed through to the remaining S
corporation shareholders.
b. Inside S Corporation Level Treatment
The inside S corporation treatment of a redemption poses no income tax
problems to the S corporation so long as an in kind distribution is not
involved. If, however, a redemption involves an in kind distribution, then,
under the Section 1371 "incorporated" general corporate rules, the distributee
shareholder presumably obtains an outside fair market value basis. The
corporate rules are silent as to basis of property acquired in a redemption;
therefore, under conventional wisdom Section 1012 applies to provide fair
market value. However, this rule is not a subchapter C rule. So it may be
doubtful whether Section 1371 incorporates it. However, so long as Section
1363(d) mandates inside recognition of distribution of appreciated property in
redemptions and partial liquidations (and under the 1986 Code complete
liquidations as well), then equity demands an outside fair market value basis
step up. As discussed above, the better S corporation "flow through"-
aggregate approach would have been a substituted basis, carryover taint and
nonrecognition.
3. Conclusion
Maximum flexibility would grant owners the choice whether to treat
continuing payments to a retired partner or S corporation shareholder on an
"aggregate" or an "entity" approach. If an aggregate approach were chosen,
then continuing payments would be treated as a distributive profit share or a
guaranteed payment, turning on whether tied into the entity's profits or risk
of payment. If an entity approach were chosen, then sale or exchange
treatment and installment reporting of the owner's interest in the entity
would be available.
In the partnership context, essentially just such choices are available.
But in the S corporation context, the entity approach prevails. In order to
receive the S corporation equivalent of a continuing profit share, an S
corporation shareholder must retain a stock interest generating such "pro
rata" share. Moreover, the other active S corporation shareholder's services
must be adequately compensated in a family group. (The corresponding
partnership provisions apply to all partnerships.) A risky, rough equivalent to
a "guaranteed payment" in an S corporation context is perhaps obtainable
through "severance pay". However, if prior compensation plus the severance
pay exceeds reasonable compensation, then no deduction is allowable to the S
corporation--a likely event if all the S corporation income has been passed
thru to its shareholders.
L. Qualified Retirement Plans and Fringe Benefits
1. Subchapter K
a. Qualified Retirement Plans
Until 1982 substantial disparity existed between (1) corporate
retirement plans and (2) retirement plans of partnerships or sole proprietors,
principally as to substantially lower contribution and benefit ceilings in the
case of the latter, but a host of other restrictions applied only to partnerships
or sole proprietors as to vesting, coverage, distributions, self-dealing, etc.
The qualified retirement plan of an S corporation was treated essentially as a
corporate plan with partnership-like restrictions as to deductible
contributions and self-dealing. In 1982 Congress separated the deduction
rules and the abuse rules. True parity was achieved as to the level of tax
incentives by raising H.R. 10 ceilings substantially while lowering corporate
ceilings to the new H.R. 10 level under the rationale "that the level of tax
incentives made available to encourage an employer to provide retirement
benefits to employees should generally not depend on whether the employer is
an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise." At the same time Congress
believed that the anti-abuse rules "should generally apply without regard to
whether the employer maintaining the plan is incorporated or
unincorporated." Thus, Congress imposed special restrictions (1) limiting the
amount of a participant's compensation that can be taken into account in
determining benefits, (2) requiring more rapid vesting, (3) providing minimum
non-integrated contributions or benefits for non-key employee-participants,
(4) reducing the Section 415 aggregate limitation on contributions and
benefits for certain key employees, and (5) placing additional restrictions on
distributions to key employees on "top-heavy plans" (i.e., plans which
primarily benefit an employer's key employees), regardless of whether the
plan is a corporate or partnership (sole proprietor) plan. These top-heavy
rules are reminiscent of H.R. 10 restrictions, but not as rigorous. To a large
degree, at least as to vesting, here too the 1986 Code with its more rigorous
vesting requirements (5-year cliff or 3-7 year graded (20% a year)) for all
plans, revised Section 41 l(a)(2), when effective in plan years beginning after
1988, Pub. L. 99-514, Title XI, S 1113(e)(1), largely, but not completely,
catches up with Section 416(b)'s 3-year cliff or 6 years graded vesting.
There remained a small gap between corporate and
partnership/subchapter S qualified retirement plans as to loans to
participants. The tax amendments permitted such loans, but the labor
provisions of ERISA were not amended. Thus, a distribution to a partner or
shareholder-employee including a plan loan constituted a violation of Title I
of ERISA. The 1986 Code made changes to the treatment of loans to
participants, but while noting the ERISA conflict did nothing to resolve it.
Furthermore, the new vesting and participation rules applicable to all plans,
partnership or corporate, lessen the gap between top-heavy plans and non-
top-heavy plans.
b. Fringe Benefits
Perusal of the major non-qualified retirement plan fringe benefit
provisions in the Code reveals three major patterns: (1) explicit exclusion by
cross reference to Section 40 l(c) of "self-employed individuals", including
partners, from eligible employees, Sections 101(b), 105(g), 127; (2) equally
prevalent, application of one of various statutory anti-discrimination
standards to preclude discriminatory benefits in favor of highly compensated
employees, Sections 79, 125, and 132(h), surely more responsive to the
underlying policies, if any; and (3) most rarely, simply silence. I.R.C. S 119.
Section 40 1(c) treats partners and other self-employed individuals as
employees, by its own terms, only for purposes of Section 401, i.e., the basic
qualification provision setting definitional requirements for a "qualified
retirement plan." Therefore, exclusion in the other fringe benefits of self-
employed individuals "described" in Section 40 l(c)(1) implies that a partner
can achieve employee status other than through Section 40 1(c), thereby
enhancing the precedential value of Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1968). At the same time, the first category of fringe benefit provisions
clearly bars availability of the particular fringe benefit to a partner even if
he/she does attain employee status under Armstrong v. Phinney or any other
rationale. But the other silent or anti-discrimination oriented fringe benefit
provisions still may be available to a partner who also merits employee
status.
Armstrong v. Phinney read the 1954-1984 predecessor to Section
707(a)(i) as adopting the "entity" approach where a partner not acting in his
capacity as a partner sells to, purchases from, or renders services to, the
partnership. In such cirsumstances, a partner can stand in any number of
relationships with a partnership, including employee-employer for purposes in
the case at bar in Armstrong v. Phinney, of Section 119 (which excludes from
an employee's income "meals and lodging" furnished for the convenience for
his/her employer). Consistent with Armstrong v. Phinney the Tax Court in
Pratt established the converse rule. Partnership payments to a partner for
performing services (a) within the normal scope of his duties as a general
partner and (b) pursuant to the partnership agreement, cannot constitute
Section 707(a)(1) payments because they fail the test of being paid for "not
acting in capacity as partners". Thus, the touchstone for employee status for
a partner is rendition of services other than within the normal scope of a
general partner's duties and perhaps such services cannot be regular or
continuous, unless customarily rendered by the partner to others for
compensation (under a possible gloss added by Rev. Rul. 81-30 1).
A "guaranteed payment" under Section 707(c) constitutes a payment
fixed without regard for partnership profits paid to a partner for services
performed his/her capacity as a partner or for use of his/her capital--both
such services and such use of capital without payment are the more usual
form of partnership structure. Thus, the essence of Section 707(c) is that the
partner is a non-partner only as to risk of payment. The activities or the use
of capital constitute normal partner activities or investment. Consequently,
not surprisingly the Section 707 regulations properly state that a guaranteed
payment is a non-partner transaction only for purposes of Sections 61 and 162
(or Section 263). On the one hand the payment is not treated as a
profit/share for purposes of the "varying interest" rule of Section 706(d)(3);
the related party sale-loss disallowance rule of Section 707(b), which
disallows recognition of a built-in loss upon a sale between a partnership and
a partner who owns more than 50% of the profits interest (or capital
interest); and the termination rule of Section 708(b) turning on a sale or
exchange of 50% or more of the total interest in partnership profits (and
capital) during a 12-month period. On the other hand, a guaranteed payment
is treated as a "distributive share" for other purposes, including most
significantly timing, i.e., a guaranteed payment is included just as a
distributive share is in the partner's tax year coinciding with the partnership
tax year or in which the partnership tax year ends. In summary, a guaranteed
payment does not, and should not, give rise to employee status, because the
rendition of services-allowance of use of capital are partner-capacity
transactions.
On its surface new Section 707(a)(2)(A) would appear to support and
Armstrong v. Phinney non-partner capacity-employee status argument as to
a partner receiving "disguised" payments (allocation-cum -distribution) for
services. The 1984 amendment treats as a Section 707(a)(1) non-partner
capacity transaction the (1) performance of services and transfer of property,
viewed together with (2) an allocation and distribution if they are "properly
characterized as a transaction occurring between the partnership and a
partner acting other than in his capacity as a member of the partnership.
." The legislative history articulates the test as whether the
services/property transfers plus allocation and distribution constitute the
"substantively economic effect of direct payments" for such
services/property. Congress clearly was directing new Section 707(a)(2)(A) at
devices (one time or continuing) designed to avoid the capitalization (Section
263) or even the nonamortization requirements (Section 709) applicable to
direct payments. S. Print No. 169, supra at 226; Tax Shelter Hearings, supra
at 9-10, 22 (Ass't Sec'ty Chapoton). The Senate Finance Committee
"mandated" a six factor--facts and circumstances--test aimed primarily at
lack of "entreprenurial risk" as to amount and fact of payment, evidenced by
factors such as certainty of payment, transitory nature of allocation, size of
proported allocation in relationship to continuing interest in profits/losses.
Id. at 227. If such payments, for example, a gross income allocation, are
attributable to year-by-year continuing partnership capacity services, the
deemed-non-partner capacity payments may in fact be much more like
Section 707(c) guaranteed payments to a partner. Such payments, even
though recharacterized as a non-partner capacity payment, perhaps should
not give rise to employee status on a policy standpoint. However, the statute
forces the payments into the non-partner capacity posture under Section
707(a)(1). The apparent rationale is "that to be considered partners for tax
purposes, persons must, among other things, pool their assets and labor for
the joint production of profit. To the extent that a partner's profit from a
transaction is assured without regard to the success or failure of the joint
undertaking, there is not the requisite joint profit motive, and the partner is
acting as a third party." Joint Committee Staff, General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
226 (1984). This test appears derived from the Court's test in Tower-
Culbertson. Significantly, this is an "aggregate" definition. See Anderson &
Coffee, Proposed Revision of Partner and Partnership Taxation: Analysis of
the Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter K (First Installment) 15 Tax
L. Rev. 285, 286-87 (1960).
The House provision in 1984 for disguised payments to partners for
property or services would simply have treated the transaction as "a sale of
property" to the partnership. The House anticipated that regulations would
coordinate the new provision with existing rules regarding payments to
partners in their non-partner capacity and guaranteed payments to partners,
as well as other provisions. The Senate Bill, without explanation, adopted the
deemed non-partner capacity approach followed in the final legislation.
While possibly Congress may have chosen the 707(a)(1) constructive
transaction rather than the Section 707(c) guaranteed payment approach due
to the timing differences, more likely following the logic that a partner must
not only contribute services or investment but also share in the risk as to
payment Congress considered such a service provider as not constituting a
partner unless from other aspects of the partnership. Indeed the legislative
history provides that the future regulations will determine whether such a
service provider is a partner. S. Print No. 169, supra at 227.
2. Subchapter S
a. Qualified Retirement Plan
From 1969 to 1982 qualified retirement plans maintained by S
corporations were treated as corporate retirement plans but subject only to a
few H.R. 10 like restrictions, principally as to deductible contributions for
shareholder-employees, allocations of forfeitures to such employees from
other such participants' accounts, and self dealing, but not to the balance of
the H.R. 10 restrictions on owner employees. This hybrid treatment ended
with TEFRA in 1982 and parity has been obtained, at least between qualified
retirement plans of partnerships and S corporations.
b. Fringe Benefit Rule
The standard exclusion, if any, from statutory fringe benefit provisions
for "self-employed individuals" under Section 40 1(c) does not encompass
shareholder-employees of S corporations. Thus, until 1982 standard corporate
fringe benefits were available for shareholder-employees just as for other
employees. However, TEFRA also added Section 1372, which provides that
for purposes of "employee fringe benefits," an S corporation is treated as a
partnership and a two percent or more S corporation shareholder is treated as
a partner. The legislative history is silent as to the S corporation treatment
of a shareholder-employee who receives a salary from the S corporation.
The issue is whether receipt by an S corporation shareholder of a
"salary" is more like a "guaranteed payment" to a partner acting in his
capacity as such or is more like a direct payment to a non-partner for non-
partner capacity services, in which latter case alone could employee status
for fringe benefit purposes apply. A fundamental problem is that an S
corporation is an entity and under general corporate law a shareholder has no
duty to provide capital or services or be at risk as to return. Therefore,
seemingly if the shareholder provides services for compensation to the S
corporation it is in a non-shareholder capacity so that an employee status
could attach. Instead, the regulation should take a functional approach to
achieve the same result as a partnership, especially under the "emerging"
partnership approach where there is no risk, partner status does not attach.
In any event, regulations under Section 1372 should address the Section
707(a)(1), and in particular deemed payments for services in non-partner
capacity, and Section 707(c) guaranteed payment aspects of payments to
shareholders for services.
3. Conclusion
Conventional wisdom believed that after 1982 there was no longer any
substantial difference between the tax treatment of partnerships and of S
corporations as to qualified retirement plans and other statutory and
nonstatutory fringe benefits. True, some obscure differences remain between
the qualified retirement plans of a C corporation, including a closely held C
corporation, and the qualified retirement plans of a partnership or an S
corporation, particularly as to loans by qualified retirement plan trust to
employees. This poses a "hidden" transactional cost to C to S conversions.
But in this context partners and shareholder-employees of S corporations
were treated the same in any event such loans to partners or shareholder-
employees are now precluded by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The picture is less clear as to fringe benefits for partner-employees and
subchapter S shareholder-employees. On the partnership side uncertainty
centered on the Section 707 amendments to non-partner capacity transactions
and the continued vitality of Armstrong v. Phinney as well as its meaning.
The S corporation difficulties arise from implementation of the Section 1372
mandate to treat an S corporation as a partnership and any two percent
shareholder as a partner for purposes of employee fringe benefits of the
Code. In particular, how does the teaching of Armstrong v. Phinney translate
into an S corporation context, where the shareholder-employee receives a
substantial salary for services?
III. NONTAX DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PASS-THRU ENTITIES.
A. Certainty of Legal Environment
1. Interpretive Materials.
The general environment governing rights of stockholders, management,
and corporations vis-a-vis each other it is much better established in statute,
commentary, and precedents than the comparable partnership questions.
Thus, the advisor can easier predict the consequences of the (S) corporate
form than of the partnership form. Moreover, for good or for bad, corporate
practice is developed to the extent that by-laws and articles of incorporation
are extremely standard, with relatively small usually insignificant changes for
each corporation. The buy-sell agreement should reflect more flexibility
between the parties, but hereto often the approach is too cut and dried.
In contrast, drafting a good partnership agreement requires so many
more questions of governance, distributions, treatment upon liquidation, etc.
to be addressed, particularly where the partners have flexibility, that the
drafting itself is more time consuming and expensive. The consulting time
also is generally greater, and the consequences of planning are less certain.
The corporate advantage here may be slightly offset by the factor that
most local jurisdictions have not addressed whether there should be different
treatment under local law vis-a-vis shareholder rights for example in S
corporations than are regular corporations. For example, frequently in
closely held C corporations the majority can freeze out a minority, for
example a widow, by not paying any dividends. In a tax arena in which
earnings are currently taxed to the shareholders, a failure to distribute
previously taxed earnings may pose different fiduciary and equitable rules if
judges are properly apprised of the differences.
2. Certainty of Status.
If a general partnership is chosen as the tax entity, certainty is easiest
obtained. The garden variety partnership organized under the Uniform
Partnership Act easily constitutes a partnership under the association
regulations. True, use of a limited partnership always poses status
problems. But, the usual small business operating under subchapter K is
usually conducted in the general partnership form. This is because while a
limited partnership provides limitation against liabilities for a limited
partner, such shield is lost if the limited partner takes an active role in the
business. Banoff, Tax Distinctions Between Limited and General Partners:
An Operational Approach, 35 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1979). Usually in the small
business all the investor-entrepreneurs do take an active role. As a practical
matter, therefore, limited partnership is not a feasible alternative.
Status of C corporation is relatively easy to obtain and the formalities
are easy to meet. As long as a formally organized C corporation is formed
for, or serves, a business purpose it is treated as a corporation. Pass-Through
Entities Hearings supra at 28. But election of Subchapter S status properly is
quite a different story. Eustice & Kuntz, supra at 2-10. The litigation record
would show that more mistakes are made in S elections than in status and
other areas. Hence, certainty of status is least likely to be obtained in the
Subchapter S arena. This compounded by the fact that the Service only
notifies the taxpayer that the S election has been received, not that S status
has been obtained.
Commentators often view the issue of the tax status of an entity, i.e.,
whether it constitutes a conduit or a separate tax entity, as posing a greater
problem in the partnership context than in the S Corporation context due to
the "association taxable as a corporation" risk as to a partnership but not as
to an S Corporation. In reality, the "association" issue has been largely
limited to limited partnerships in the tax shelter context. As the PAL
becomes fully applicable this issue should be of far less importance in that
context. However, the potential trend towards Master Limited Partnerships
(MLP) and disincorporation may change this. But a moderately profitable
business faces neither the shelter nor the MLP problems. To such enterprises
the greater problem would appear to be the stock ownership and other
eligibility requirements of an S Corporation, as well as the election process
itself.
B. Limitation of Liability.
1. Introduction.
The conventional wisdom is that an S corporation provides a corporate
"shield" to protect the shareholder from liabilities of the corporation. In
contrast, general partners have joint and several liability, except where
excalpation clauses are obtained. While a limited partner may achieve
limited liability except for unpaid capital contributions, a limited partnership
is usually an inappropriate vehicle'for conducting any small business in which
all of the principles wish to take a part. Consequently, the shareholder's
limited liability is often the only substantial non-tax reason for choosing the
corporate form for conducting a small business. See, e.g., Comment,
Incorporated Lawyers--The Veil Rises and Falls, 55 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 785
(1987).
2. Exceptions to Limitation of Liability.
The corporate veil, however, has a number of tears in it. First, under
the professional corporation laws of most jurisdictions the professional
relationship is explicitly maintained together with unlimited personal liability
for the professonal rendering services. See, id. at 786. But, the states very
widely as to how far the liability of an incorporated professional extends
beyond his/her own acts.
Beyond the special professional corporation rules, the corporate veil can
"pierced" for a variety of reasons, probably impossible to reconcile. More
objectively, unpaid stock subscriptions trigger liability to that extent.
Furthermore, a shareholder who also is a chief employee may be responsible
for his/her own torts in the scope of his/her employment and possibly in
supervising others. See Kessler & Yorio, supra 1 Corp. L. Rev. 291, 302-04.
Significant creditors, particularly third party lenders, usually require a
guarantee by the shareholder and his/her spouse. Pass-Through Entities
Hearings, supra at 19 (Mentz); Kessler & Richmond, supra, 7 Corp. L. Rev. at
294. For subchapter S tax reasons is highly inadvisable in the first place.
Hence, borrowings in most S corporations will be at the shareholder level.
Finally, corporate assets are always subject to the liabilities of the
corporation and particularly in the case of professional corporations unpaid
accounts receivable may constitute a substantial asset equal at least to
several month's earnings and in some businesses even a year's earnings. In
summation, Treasury acknowledges that a close C "may more closely
resemble a sole proprietorship than a corporation." Pass-Through Entities
Hearings, supra at 28.
Turning to partnerships, joint and several liability exist as a matter of
state law as to general partners. The only protection here is insurance and
the right to contibution once a partner is required to pay more than his loss
percentage of the obligation against the other general partners. If the
partnership is unable to make the payments, the likelihood is that the other
general partners are unable as well.
Limited partnership status does provide a shield except for unpaid
capital contributions. However, the limited partners as a practical matter
must give up control and participation in the business. See 1986 Bluebook
supra at 214. Furthermore, if corporate general partners are involved, Rev.
Proc. 72-13 and similar requirements must be met, raising again the
uncertainty level.
C. Liquidity of Investment
Here the concept is whether the owner can withdraw his/her investment, or
better "tax cost" or basis, from the pass-thru entity tax free. As discussed above
such withdrawal is a standard feature of the pass-thru regime. Thus in a
partnership it is simple, provided that no disproportionate distribution
consequences attach, as is likely to be the case unless proper precautions are
taken, for the partner to withdraw his/her tax cost tax free under Section 73 1,
particularly if cash distributions are involved. The same pattern prevails in the S
corporation context only if there is no C E&P present. If there is, then the
complicated AAA concept kicks in. See Coven, *upra, 42 Tax L. Rev. at 394-
401. The reality then is except as to S's that are converted C's, the
partner's/shareholder's investment is equally liquid.
The real difference is between a C corporation and a pass-thru entity. The
inability to withdraw C earnings without triggering an outside, generally ordinary
income, tax to the shareholders can be both a blessing and curse. This is because
either for business expansion reasons or for typically patriarchal family reasons,
the corporation or the shareholders may not wish for minority shareholders to
have the ability to freely withdraw the entity's earnings. In a pass-thru regime,
the temptation to withdraw the earnings by minority partners or shareholders is
well nigh irresistable. Thus, where the corporation, its management, or majority
shareholders desire to lock in earnings and plow them back into expansion, then a
C corporation is the preferred even if the corporate rates may approach or exceed
the outside individual rates. See Passthrough Entities Hearings supra at 26, 75
and 109 (Mentz, McKee, and Pennell). Indeed, this attitude by corporate managers
in particular scuttled Treasury's 1977 partnership-like full integration proposal.
D. Rewarding Key Employees
Conventional wisdom is that a corporation (C or S) constitutes a better
vehicle for rewarding key employees, through stock options. Without capital
gains, qualified stock options lose their meager luster remaining. Non-qualified
stock options are more likely to be the mechanism of reward. The bargain
element will be ordinary income, but also create a deduction to the employer.
The flexibility, however, of profit shares, in my eyes renders the partnership
in fact a better vehicle for compensation than a corporation. Moreover as
discussed above a partnership can be used to give an interest for future services
without immediate income taxation under the better view, whereas a corporation
including a S corporation cannot be so used due to the entity approach embodied in
Section 35 1(d).
E. Available Sources of Financing.
In theory the C corporation is most flexible as to the form of equity
participation, permitting various classes of stock, voting and nonvoting, preferred,
and various types of debt instruments, including securities or short term boot.
The S corporation is considerably less flexible in theory due to the restrictions on
number of owners, the restriction against non-individual owners, and the second
class of stock requirement. These ownership restrictions (other than the
shareholder cap to avoid "disincorporation" revenue drain) have been uniformly
and ably criticized. See 2.g., Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 44, 60, 64-
65 (Kuller, Rabinovitz); Coven & Hess, spra at 575-92; Eustice, supra at 356-57,
397-400. In reality, however, most smaI Tcorporations cannot raise equity money
beyond the credit of a handful of the principals. Kessler & Yorio, supra at 299.
Therefore the S corporation restrictions on classes of shareholder and stock have
little impact. True, as the venture becomes much larger, it may seek to call upon
equity capital that would not be available in an S corporation, e.g., a tax exempt
corporation or a tax exempt trust (for example, a qualified retirement plan trust)
may be a ready source of capital in certain venture markets. This would
unavailable to an S corporation.
Partnerships permit maximum flexibility as to type of investment, but the
exposure in other than limited partnerships to liabilities renders them unattractive
as investment vehicles for active businesses. Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra
at 43 (McKee).
F. Continuity of Life
With this factor, we begin a series of pseudo-factors, i.e., factors that in
conventional wisdom make a difference but in practicality operate functionally
much the same in both pass-thru entities. Ironically they are factors that are used
to distinguish corporations from partnerships under the association regs. See
Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 26; Pass-Through Entities Hearing
Pamphlet, supra at 4-7, 14. Indeed, industry witnesses at the Pass-Through Entity
Hearings argued that these factors failed to distinguish between close C
corporations and small partnerships. Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 51
(McKee).
As to continuity of life, in theory a corporation has indefinite life under
most state corporate charter statutes. But as a practical matter when the
principal dies the business dies too unless successors have already been arranged.
Thus, what is important to the investor is less continuity and more the factor of
transferability. See Kessler & Yorio, supra at 298.
In the S corporation context the additional wrinkle is added in that
shareholders holding more than one-half of the shares of stock of an S corporation
may terminate the S corporation by consent to revocation of the election. I.R.C.
S 1362(d)(1)(B). Thus, more important than the corporate charter, is a restriction
on revocation by the majority and upon transfer of a majority shares to someone
who would revoke.
Noncontinuity in a partnership context arises from two sources. First, most
of the Uniform Partnership Act requires a statement of how long the venture is to
last and typically a 20 or 30 year term is selected. Furthermore, under the
Uniform Partnership Act trigger events as to a general partner result in
"disillusion" under state law, .g., death, insanity, etc. of a general partner.
However, by agreement the remaining partners may substitute a new general
partner and continue the partnership. This could cause "status" problems. Pass-
Through Entities Hearing Pahmplet, supra at 16.
For tax purposes a partnership "terminates" if no part of its business,
financial operation, or venture continues to be carried on by any of its partners in
a partnership or within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50% or
more of the total interest in (a) partnership capital and (b) profits. I.R.C.
S 708(b). Thus, a more than 50% shift in ownership (through purchase, but not
through capital contribution) in both profits and capital will terminate the
partnership for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. 9 1.708-l(b)(l)(iv) provides essentially
that the old partners and the new partners are deemed to have received a
distribution from the old partnership, followed by a recontribution to the
continuing partnership. The net effect of this is to provide a stepped up inside
basis as to the new partner's interest even if no Section 754 election is in effect.
Such constructive distribution and recontribution trigger under the capital account
rules generally a revaluation and capital account restatement. Treas. Reg.
S 1.704-2(b)(2)(iv). By and large, however, the net effect absent disproportionate
distributions, etc., as to the old partners of the entire transaction is zero. Private
rulings apparently go the next step and treat the termination recontribution as an
"entity" continuation contrary to the underlying aggregate policy. The entire rule
has been criticized, Passthrough Entities Hearings supra at 62-63 (Rabinovitz),
but under an aggregate approach some percentage line drawing is necessary.
G. Transferability of Interest
In theory corporate shares under the Model Business Code are freely
assignable. The reality, however, is that in most close corporations transfer is
restricted by private contract, i.e., a buy-sell. See Kessler & Yorio, supra at 298-
99. The other shareholders and the corporation are protected against unwanted
newcomers by a right of first refusal and occasionally a call at a stated value or
fair market value. At the same time, the shareholder or more precisely his/her
estate or surviving spouse are protected by having a put to the corporation or the
other shareholders under the buy-sell as well. This provides a market and prevents
squeeze outs of estate and other heirs. Cf. Passthrough Entities Hearings? supra
at 8 1. Such buy-sell is often funded by ie insurance which leads to a necessity
for careful planning as to the valuation formula. The ownership of shares in
professional corporations is often restricted to licensed professionals under the
state statute. Furthermore, ownership restrictions in a buy-sell are important in
an S corporation context to preclude transfers to non-permitted shareholders or
that would exceed the permitted number of shareholders. Such restrictions would
not create a second class of stock in most circumstances.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act a partnership interest cannot be
transferred without the consent of all the partners. This merely provides a legal
requirement for what is a practical requirement in most close corporation buy-sell
agreements. Moreover, such restriction on transferability does not preclude a
transfer to a new partner. A partner can assign without the consent of other
partners his/her right to profits (and losses) and partnership distributions, which is
effective to make the assignee a successor partner for tax purposes, albeit not for
state law purposes, even if the other partners are not aware of the transfer. See
Evans v. Comm'r, supra. A limited partnership interest is freely assignable under
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, but rarely is there a market for such
interest. Moreover, the partnership agreement can restrict such assignability and
frequently does at least in the form of a right or first refusal.
Limited partners frequently give the general partner a blank check power-
of-attorney consenting to substitution and admission of new limited partners.
However, rarely a put or call is provided as to partnership interest and indeed
there is probably even a narrower market for a partnership interest than for close
corporate stock.
In essence there is little difference as to the practicalities of transferability
of S corporation stock and a partnership interest for tax purposes, although the
market is narrower for the latter than the former.
H. Centralized Management: Governance
The corporate entity offers centralized management because "the business
and affairs of the corporation are managed by the board of directors." Section 35
M.B.C.A. Such directors unless otherwise provided are elected by a majority of
the shareholders and the board in turn appoints the officers of the corporation who
manage the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. In widely held public
corporations, the board of directors generally appoints professional management
to operate the corporation resulting in a separation of management and control
from ownership. This rarely the case in the close corporation where the
shareholders, the board of directors, and the corporate officers are generally one
and the same. At the same time when one of the original principals dies different
problems arise, generally a squeeze out of the nonactive shareholder while the
others draw out the earnings through compensation. Here, a buy-sell agreement is
a must. True, there is more development here of the corporate rules regarding
fiduciary obligations of the majority to the minority, but all and all this has
amounted to little.
In a general partnership centralization is nonexistent, unless by agreement
the partnership appoints an executive committee or a managing partner, as is
likely to be the case in a large professional partnership. Section 18 (U.P.A.).
Moreover, such vesting of management authority in one or more general partners
does not relieve the other partners from personal liability arising from claims
against the partnership. A limited partnership does offer centralized management
since all management authority must rest under the agreement and in actuality
with the general partner. If a limited partner chooses to become involved with
the management affairs of the partnership, he/she may become personally liable
to third parties for partnership liabilities. U.L.P.A. § 303(a). See generally,
Banoff, supra.
IV. THE WINDS OF CHANGE: RECLASSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION.
A. Introduction
The two major pass-through entities, partnerships and S corporations, have
left one small business era with the close of the 1954 Code -- close C corporations
as inside tax shelters, S corporations for initial losses, and partnerships for tax
shelters -- for a new era under the 1986 Code. Under the 1986 Code as it now
stands, or will perhaps stand after transition rules, it should be clear that a pass-
through regime, particularly of income, will be the ideal for all larger, close
business and should be for smaller close C corporations as well. But pass-through
probably will not be chosen in all cases where warranted.
Save for the non-tax advantage of limited liability, such as it is, in an S
corporation, Subchapter K appears the more flexible regime. And this actual
limitation-of-liability potential of an S corporation is often more than
counterbalanced by the denial of basis for inside S corporation debt (save for the
shareholder's own loan to it). Yet common advice has been to reach for the S
corporation as the ideal.
In fact, the current state of both Subchapters K and S is sad. The current
Subchapter S rules are deficient, operationally or conceptually as to (1) entity-
level debt and outside basis, (2) shareholder eligibility limitations (except perhaps
as a backdoor block against homemade integration), (3) capital structure
limitation (single class of stock), (4) some aspects of special allocations, (5) inside
entity level adjustments to assets on transfers of unit of ownership, and (6)
conversion rules. See generally, Eustice, s 39 Tax L. Rev. at 355; Coven &
Hess, supra 59 Tenn. L. Rev. at 576-77, 590, 649-50, 666-70, 674, 694-99; Coven,
supra. 74 Calif. L. Rev. at 59-62; Coven, supra 42 Tax L. Rev. 381, at 383. Coven
generally calls for more of a conduit approach, more closely paralleling the
Subchapter K regime. Eustice appears to vary more, provision by provision,
generally favoring a conduit or pass-through approach. Industry witnesses at the
Pass-Through Hearings often followed Eustice's paradigm. See Passthrough
Entities Hearings, supra at 43, 63-64.
Conversely, Postelwaite, Dutton & Magette, s 75 Geo. L.J. 423, adopt
an entity approach as to (1) all formation or "organizational" issues, Id. at 437; (2)
determination of amount and character of income at entity level, with income and
loss "passing-through," Id. at 438-39, but bottom-line netted in an entity approach,
Id. at 440-41; (3) all disposition and liquidation payments on complete aggregate
approach, Id. at 442; and (4) transfers by sale or death result in inside aggregate
basis adjustments; Id. at 445.
The original Subchapter K rules with the initial goal of letting partners
allocate their tax burden among themselves, with Treasury a mere stakeholder led
sooner (S 75 1(b)) or later (SS 707(a)(2), 704(c) and Reg. S 1.704-1(b)) to increasingly
complex, mechanized rules, "vastly more difficult to apply, increasing
administrative burdens on taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service. . .
Passthrough Entities Hearings. supra at 13, 32 (Mentz); accord, Id. at 55-56 (Joel
Rabinovitz).
The Treasury proposed approach to Subchapters K and S is essentially an
entity approach, with limited conduit pass-through of income and losses on a strict
per unit of ownership basis (with some flexibility for service partners). And the
basis for this approach is end abuse under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)'s capital
account analysis. At the same time, Treasury proposed to tax master limited
partnerships on the basis of the relationship (i.e., passive investors) of the limited
partners to the entity.
B. Entity Classification Standards.
1. Aggregate Concept and "Material Participation".
The aggregate core of the 1954 Code, Holiday Village Shopping Center
v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. at 570, has been seemingly muted as Subchapter K
twisted and turned from the ALl proposal of aggregate/pass-through with
optional entity features for simplicity, to the louse's version of an entity
approach for simplicity with limited elective aggregate features, to the final
Senate and Conference hybrid of (a) aggregate as to allocations,
contributions, distributions, liabilities, basis adjustments and retirement
payments, (b) entity as to accounting, reporting and now audit with entity and
optional (mandatory or elective) aggregate treatment as to sales and
transfers of an interest in the entity and where the partner deals as an
outsider with a partnership, and (c) aggregate wherever else it would be
appropriate. Se, Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R.
83,000, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 459 (1954)
(Section of Taxation, ABA); H.R. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 59.
Nevertheless, the undercurrent is that the aggregate/pass-through approach
of the 1939 Code was continued, with entity reporting. Moreover, reading the
entire legislative history, it is clear the Congress felt that the aggregate
approach was (1) more equitable (albeit more complex) with more accurate
tax results, and (2) functionally equivalent to dealing with oneself, so that the
goal under the aggregate approach is to subject the partner "to the same tax
consequences which would be accorded an individual entrepreneur," if there
were no partnership. S. Rep. No. 92, 99, and Conf. Rep. 58; 1984 Bluebook
238, see Holiday Village Shopping Center, 773 F.2d 282. Thus, the aggregate
approach treats a partnership as a collection of individuals jointly owning the
partnership property rather than as an entity in which the partners only own
shares in the enterprise. Holiday Village Shopping Center, 5 Cl. Ct. 57 1.
In short, under the functional approach, the partnership is treated
merely as a convenient income-reporting vehicle and not as a means of
effecting major changes in the tax consequences to the individuals involved.
Lane, 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 259-60. This approach of testing an allocation by
functional equivalency to direct taxation of an entrepreneur finds support in
the recent cases as well. The Tax Court in Otey justified its § 721 and 731
tax-free (contribution-distribution) treatment of contributed property
followed by distribution of loan proceeds to the contributing partner in order
to equalize capital investments in part on an analysis of treatment of the
partner's borrowing as if there had been no partnership at all. 70 T.C. at
321. However, the use of the partnership form to result in greater tax
benefits than would be available in the case of direct ownership implicitly
violates the aggregate approach. See 773 F.2d at 282 citing 1984 Bluebook at
238.
Most commentators and quite recently the Treasury as well
traditionally formulate the issue as pass-through entity versus separate (i.e.,
separately taxable entity). However, under a deep structure analysis, the
only university valid functional distinction is between an aggregate approach
and a separate entity approach (not necessarily as a separate taxpayer). In
other words, the basic issue as to which the classification regulations and
authorities have been stabbing for many years really is whether the taxpayer
is entitled to an aggregate approach or a separate entity approach. Under the
aggregate approach the owner is treated as nearly as possible like an
individual entrepreneur apart from the partnership, ideally in virtually all
aspects except audit, reporting, and perhaps characterization of income. In
contrast, under the entity approach the taxpayer is not treated as having any
inside interest in the entity's assets. A pass-through in such an entity is
limited to pro rata share of income and loss and withdrawal of investment and
no more. This essentially is the current Subchapter S approach and the
preferred approach of Treasury as to Subchapter K as well. These traditional
classification criteria do not speak in any way to whether the entity should be
taxed separately or should pass through its income/loss and permit withdrawal
of investment. Whether an entity (as contrasted to an aggregate) should be
able to pass through income and loss poses different policy questions
discussed below.
The Morrissey multi-factor resemblance approach remains with us down
to this day in the current (1960) Kintner regulations, which, however, as has
been extensively discussed elsewhere, deliberately place several thumbs on
the scales intending to classify most partnerships as such, limited or general,
not as an association taxable as a corporation. This was done to preclude
professional associations from attaining corporate status and, hence,
corporate retirement benefits -- a campaign lost on several other fronts. A
major different in emphasis between Morrissey and the Kintner regulations
was that the former's resemblance test was supplanted by a preponderance
test under which the association must have three out of four corporate
characteristics in order to be classified as a corporation. Moreover, the
characteristics tests themselves deliberately took a mechanical formal
approach over a substance approach. But even these were not the most
serious flaws in thelti-factor approach.
First, as several commentators and witnesses at various hearings have
hinted or directly argued, most, if not all, of the traditional corporate
advantages, and hence, characteristics are functionally, in fact usually, not
available to a close corporation and its owners which constitute
approximately 90 percent of all corporations. Conversely, by skilled drafting
most of the corporate advantages can be obtained by entities that
traditionally have been viewed as partnerships. Thirdly, until the ill-fated
preponderance test was provided, certainty as to classification was virtually
impossible. Most suggestions for a multi-factor approach still pose the same
problem, unless the thumb on the scales is simply reversed to apply a
preponderance test as to partnership status. But the most serious defect is
that the resemblance-characteristics multi-factor approach has never been
clearly directed at any underlying identifiable policy.
On the eve of the 1954 Code, most small businesses were conducted in
partnerships or sole proprietorships, not in corporations. But due to various
factors, particularly (a) the inside corporate minimum bracket being
substantially lower than the maximum outside bracket, and (b) the availability
of corporate retirement benefits prior to full parity of corporate and non-
corporate retirement plans in 1982, small businesses and in particular
professionals came to prefer a separate corporate entity, not for traditional
corporate advantages, but instead solely for the tax advantages of the
retirement plans or the inside shelter. Indeed, under the 1954 Code when
individual rates were still truly progressive (at least in appearance), owners of
closely held corporations (usually subject only to the minimum corporate
rates) were on the average higher income taxpayers than owners of publicly-
held corporations.
Commentators have advocated myriad changes to the multi-factor
approach, generally settling on one factor as determinative, either limited
liability or whether the owner's interests are publicly traded. For reasons
discussed below, none of these proposals go to the heart of the distinction
between an aggregate and an entity approach. The Joint Committee Staff
has stated that the issue of whether an entity should be treated as a separate
(taxable) entity should turn in large part on the relationship between the
entity and its owners: "In particular, to the extent that an entity is viewed as
acting separately from its owners, rather than merely as their agent or alter
ego, an argument can be made that it should be treated as a separate taxable
unit." Passthrough Entities Hearing Pamphlet, supra at 13.
I agree that the relationship of the owner to the entity is a basis for
determining whether the entity is to be treated as a separate entity (whether
separately taxable or as an entity-conduit with pass-through of the entity's
income or loss and generally tax-free withdrawal of investment including
accumulated earnings, but all other features essentially following an entity
approach). The Joint Committee Staff bottomed its "relationship to the
entity" analysis on the rationale that if the entity acts separately it, not the
owners, actually earns the entity's "income in a realistic and substantial
economic sense. To the extent of such separate action, owners may not have
full control either over the process of earning the income, or over the use and
disposition of amounts earned that the entity retains." The Joint Committee
Staff did a fair job of tying the traditional factors into this analysis, but in
fact only "centralization of management," as reinterpreted by the Staff really
goes to the heart of the issue.
"The existence of centralization of management suggests
that owners of an entity may not, at least by reason of their
ownership interests, guide the activities of the entity on a
regular and continuous basis. The presence of centralized
management suggests at least some separation between the
activities of the entity and those of the owners, even though
the management may be viewed, in some respects, as the
agent of the owners. In particular, it can be argued that an
owner not involved in managing the entity is not properly
viewed, in a realistic and substantial economic sense, as the
party responsible for earning the income of the entity.
Passthrough Entities Hearing Pamphlet, supra at 14-15.
Assistant Secretary Mentz' written statement at the 1986 Pass-Through
Entity Hearings points the way to a proper deep structure analysis: "The tax
and non-tax factors that make the limited partnerships an unwieldy vehicle
for a publicly traded business enterprise all derived from the fact the
partnership rules are, on the whole, designed to treat the partnership as an
aggregation of its individual partners." Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra
at 30.
Treasury too attempted to tie into this aggregate partners analysis its
wish list for classification factors, requiring:
"corporate classification in the case of an entity that, one,
has a large number of owners, substantially all of whom are
not involved in the management or operation of the entity;
two, has ownership interest that changed hands frequently;
three, has access to capital markets in a manner comparable
to large corporate entities; and, four, is carrying on
significant business activity and dividing the gains
therefrom."
Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 11.
Only the first factor corresponds exactly with the underlying policy. If
substantially all of the owners are not involved in the management or
operation of the entity, there is no functional basis for an aggregate
approach. An entity approach is called for. It is conceivable, albeit unlikely,
that an entity with a large number of owners and publicly traded ownership
interests may have a large number of owners who are involved in the
management or operation of the entity. Treasury surely added the frequently
change of ownership and access to capital markets factors in order to narrow
effectively the targeted group to master limited partnerships.
In fact, the functional aggregate analysis could readily use the new
"material participation" standards as a starting point in determining whether
the entity should be treated as an aggregate of its owners. The "material
participation" standard also looks at the relationship of the owner to the
activity of the entity. "The relationship to an activity of an investor who
does not materially participate may be little different from the relationship
of a shareholder to a corporation." S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at
717. The actual approach probably should not track the detailed rule after
detailed rule applied to passive activity losses. For example, the automatic
rule excluding real estate from material participation except in narrow
circumstances probably is inapplicable in this context. Conversely, limited
partnership status, whether or not the interest is publicly traded, would
functionally appear to be an interest that does not materially participate and
hence would be limited to an entity approach. Moreover, following through
logically, closely held C corporations that functionally would be aggregates
should not be entitled to deferred taxation to the owner until distribution of
profits. Treasury would avoid this little problem (encompassing probably 90
percent of all corporations) by granting automatic status to a general
partnership and a formally organized corporation, in effect only applying the
relationship to the entity analysis to limited partners, indeed, publicly traded
limited partnerships or master limited partnerships. Is this really any
different than the Kintner regulations -- result-oriented mechanical tests not
responsive to the underlying policy?
Material participation for this purpose should not be limited to
performance of services by the partner. In a small enough operation, for
example, the classic moneyman and service partner, a general partner
moneyman should be deemed to materially participate if he is a general
partner.
Public trading of the ownership interest in the entity probably means as
a practical matter that the majority of the owners of the entity do not
materially participate and hence should be limited to an entity relationship.
The same cannot be said about the other single classification factor currently
advocated, namely limited liability. It is possible for an entity in which
substantially all of the owners materially participate in the business to have
nonrecourse financing, or more likely to not have any substantial debt, if a
service organization, and to have insurance against all substantial risks
(although that too becomes less likely under current insurance practices).
Indeed Congress itself in PAL provisions recognized that liability and
material participation were not synonymous. "The distinction that the
Committee believes should be drawn between activities on the basis of
material participation bears no relationship to the question of whether, and to
what extent, the taxpayer is at risk with respect to the activities." S. Rep.
No. 313, supra at 717. Moreover, the absence or presence of liability does not
address the underlying aggregate issues. Compare Id. at 717 n.6.
2. Material Participation and Close C Corporation.
The above discussion posits that the only policy grounds for
distinguishing "aggregate" treatment from "separate entity" treatment is
"material participation" or investment by a general partner-moneyman in a
small partnership. Industry witnesses at the Pass-Through Hearings argued
that such a standard (or not publicly traded) actually would mean that most
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close C corporations should not be treated as separate (tax) entity, but as a
conduit. Passthrough Entities Hearings, supra at 43, 51, 81 (McKee;
Barksdale Hortenstine). I agree -- close C corporations in which most of the
owners materially participate should be required to report on a pass-through
basis -- either (a) a modified Subchapter K model ("aggregate") or (b) a
modified entity or Subchapter S model with flow through of income/loss, with
no inside basis adjustments or special allocations, much like Treasury's
preferred entity-conduit. As I have pointed out earlier, no policy basis exists
for the graduated close C rates, as Treasury and the Staff know, see Lee,
Capital Gains Exception to the House's General Utilities Repeal: -Tirther
Indigestions From Overly Processed Corn Products, 30 Tax Notes 1375, 1384
n.39 (1986). Therefore, repeal of the graduate rate or a mandatory pass-
through for close C corporations where most of the owners materially
participate is dictated by tax policy. And Treasury's argument that
"certainty" is best served by respecting close C corporations formed under
state law appears a Kintner-like cop-out. But Congress has been told many
times about use of a close C as an inside tax shelter. Se e.g., Hearings on
President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals Before House Ways &
Means Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 6) 3517-19 (1978) (Dennis Gaffney);
Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 903-04 (1959) (Janin); Compendium, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. at 1686 (Janin); Hearings on General Revenue Revision
Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (Part 2) 1368
(1954) (Colloquy Chairman and F.N. Barnes, a rancher). And where the owner
controls the income as in close C's, the conduit principle should apply. 1978
Hearings, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.; Panel Discussions, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. at
905, 912; Tax Revision, Compendium supra at 1688, 1695 (Janin).
Ideally, a close C would have three options: (I) liquidation and
reformation as "aggregate," (2) remaining a corporation but being taxed under
the "aggregate" provisions, the original 1954 idea of S, or (3) conduit pass-
through under an entity-conduit or S-like model.
3. MLPs, publicly traded C's and integration.
a. Introduction: Treasury view.
For Treasury, master limited partnerships were to be taxed as separate
entities because of the passive investment relationship of such limited
partners/owners to the business. Taxation as a separate entity was
automatic, because "integration" was not possible "as it involves competing
considerations of economic theory, administrative practicality, fiscal
responsibility, and public perceptions of fairness." Passthrough Entities
Hearings, sura at 17, 25-26 (Mentz). Treasury's heart "obviously lay with
classic integration" (or more likely dividends paid deduction, which I suspect
actually magnifies the deferral).
As discussed above, the first question that must be
addressed in considering the proper taxation of business
enterprises is under what circumstances should an enterprise
be treated as a taxable entity separate from its owners.
Most economists agree that income from business activities
carried on through separate legal entities should not be
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taxed more onerously than income from activities not
conducted in entity form. This view is grounded in the
proposition that a market economy operates most efficiently
if all business activities are subject to the same rate of tax.
Under current law, significant differences in effective tax
rates result from subjecting certain business activities to an
extra level of tax. With minimum corporate and individual
income tax rates of 46 and 50 percent, respectively, the
current maximum effective tax rate on corporate earnings
distributed to shareholders is, as noted above, 73 percent,
nearly 1-1/2 times the maximum effective tax rate on
income taxed only to individuals.
When you have this different kind of treatment, significant
inefficiencies will result. That raises the question, is there
a possibility of integrating the corporate shareholder system
of taxation?
As a matter of ideal tax policy, income from different
business activities should be taxed at equivalent rates,
irrespective of the corporate and individual income tax
systems will perpetuate differences in effective tax rates.
Such differences will exist not only among different entities
engaging in the same activity, but among different sectors
of the economy, with the production of those goods and
services that are more readily produced by corporations
discouraged relative to the production of other goods and
services.
A wholesaler that is doing business in corporate form
generally bears a higher burden of tax than a similarly
situated wholesaler operating through a limited partnership.
Realistically, it does not appear that a significant level of
integration will be achieved in the foreseeable future.
Passthrough Entities Hearings
, supra at 10 (Mentz).
Ass't Sec'ty Mentz continued that because MLPs functionally resembled
publicly traded C corporations they too should be subject to § 11 C corporation
tax, even though "horizontal equity" is violated. Id. at 11-11. As discussed blow, I
believe horizontal equity together with vertical equity in fact believe horizontal
equity together with vertical equity in fact require a similar burden of taxation on
income earned by a large C and similarly by a separate entity with passive
investors. However, entity-conduit treatment may still be available.
b. First, a little policy theory.
When Congress first imposed a separate corporate income tax in 1909 it
provided no principled analysis as to the tax policy for imposing such a tax.
Clark, Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform 87 Yale L.J. 90, 97 (1977). The cause may have been that this
income tax was initially de minimis. Id.
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Historically, no doubt, the first rather nominal corporate
income taxes were motivated by a combination of the desire to
raise revenue and the realistic perception of corporations as
legal entities which, independent of their shareholders, bought
and sold, generated large amounts of revenue and income, and
reported the results. It is no accident that corporate taxes
began to appear just as industrial corporations first began to
occupy major independent roles in the economy. The legalistic
theory of a privilege or franchise tax would not justify the
present 48 percent tax, which is out of proportion to the benefit
conferred. On the other than, the demand for tax revenues has
continued to increase through wars and growth in the size of
government, and today corporations are larger, account for a
substantial portion of the national income, and in many cases
are so wisely held that few shareholders have more than a
minute percentage of ownership.
1978 Hearings, supra at 3419 (Ernest Christian).
The recent reality has been, however, that 90 percent of the C
corporations in existence do not operate independently of their shareholders
and they, not the corporation, really earn the income, case law
notwithstanding (which reflects probably proper deference to the legislature),
and then should be taxed directly on the income whether or not it is
distributed. See 1978 Hearings, sup at 3419. However, the 10 percent of
the corporatli-n's which are publicly traded generate 90 percent of the taxable
income reported and indeed three percent of these corporations report over
60 percent of the total income. 33 Tax Notes 292.
In addition to raising revenue, the other conceptual basis often offered
for the corporate tax is to preserve the integrity of taxing individuals at
progressive rates of tax. 1978 Hearings supra at 3421; 5 Va. Tax Rev. 577,
583. Obviously this was not the original intent of Congress since there was no
individual income tax when the corporate income tax was first imposed.
Clark, 87 Yale L.J. at 97. Furthermore, a far more efficient means of
backstopping the individual rates would have been a mandatory pass-through
of the entity's income whether or not distributed. Moreover, as long as the
maximum individual rate was considerably higher than the maximum
corporate rate, many high bracket taxpayers used publicly traded C
corporations (as well as closely held C corporations) as an inside tax shelter.
While commentators have pointed out that as to a lower bracket individual
taxpayer, the burden of double taxation is far greater and the C does not
serve as an inside tax shelter, 1978 Hearings, supra at 3422, 6079, the reality
is that low bracket taxpayers don't own corporate stock, 1978 Hearings, supra
at 3504, 3507, 6 104-05 (Sheldon Cohen).
Separate taxation of a separate entity fares no better under classic tax
policy analysis. One of the "commonly accepted canons of taxation" is tax
entity which rests on "ability-to-pay, horizontal and vertical equity, and the
benefit principal." McCure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate
Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals 88
Harv. L. Rev. 532, 535 (1975). Ability-to-pay and vertical equity speak to the
relative tax burdens imposed on taxpayers at various points in income
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distribution. Conceptually, therefore, the flat corporate tax is perceived as
taxing the corporate source income of shareholders at a flat rate regardless
of their marginal rates. Horizontal equity is defined as equal treatment of
taxpayers with equal income, which arguably is violated since corporate
source income when double taxation applies is higher than any other source
income, as Mentz appears to believe. Passthrough Entities Hearings, sura at
10, 24-25.
The historical reality has been that as to publicly traded C corporations,
the net inside and outside tax, until recent years, has been less than if the
shareholder operated the enterprise directly, due to corporate retention of
earnings taxed at lower than individual rates coupled with shareholder
realization through capital gains rates or after date of death step up with no
outside tax. Thus, integration should have been applied to large C
corporations as well as under the 1954 Code to end inside shelter. See
Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, The Proper Way to Eliminate the
Corporate Tax, 27 Notes 37, 638-39 (1985). The further reality is that due to
ever increasing 1976-86 tax shelters, capital gains preference and other
preferences, the effective rate was actually not progressive, but regressive
vis-a-vis the mythical middle income taxpayer. Thus, while the brackets may
have stayed constant, s.ee Cohen, Reflections on the U.S. Progressive Income
Tax: Its Past and Present, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1317, 1331 (1976), the actual
effective rate has dropped at the top. Haskell, 35 Tax Notes 301. Therefore,
vertical equity was, and is, violated by the current individual income classes
taken alone as to vertical distributional balance. But the incidence of
corporate tax is believed to fall on shareholders in the short run and hence
adds some progressivity to an otherwise regressive system.
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